Jacobus Arminius · 67 of 81

EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE · Part 7

But from your last argument, you deduce nothing against those, who make sin a requisite condition in the object of Predestination; for they acknowledge that "it is of the mere will of God that this one is elected, and that one rejected." The passage also which you cite from the author of the book "De vocatione gentium," also places sin as a condition, prerequisite to Predestination. For he is not "delivered" who has not been, first, made miserable and the captive of sin.

The second act of reprobation, you make to be "ordination to punishment," which you distinguish into "absolute and relative." There might be also a place for the same distinction, in the contrary act of election. For absolute election is a reception into favour; relative election is that, by which one person, and not another, is received into favour. You do rightly in making the will of God the cause of absolute ordination, yet not to the exclusion of sin. For it is very true that, in the Deity, there is the same cause of willing and doing that which He has decreed. Sin also has the same relation to ordination as to damnation. It has the relation of meritorious cause to damnation, hence it has also the relation of meritorious cause to, ordination. There is likewise no probable relation, to which a contrary can not be conceived. Therefore, it can not be absolutely denied that "sin is the cause of the decree of damnation." For though it may not be the immediate, proximate or principal cause, yet it is the meritorious cause, without which God can not justly ordain any one to punishment. But I should desire the proof that "sin does not precede, in the relation of order, in the divine prescience, that former act" of preterition and rejection. There is, indeed, in my judgment, no passage of Scripture, which contains that idea; I wish that one may be adduced. "Relative ordination is that by which this person, and not that, is ordained to punishment, and on the same condition." God has indeed the power of punishing and of remitting sin, according to His will, nor is He responsible to any one, unless so far as He has bound Himself by His own promises. In this, also, "the liberty of the divine goodness is exhibited," but not in this only. For the same thing is declared in creation itself, and in the dispensation of natural blessings, in this, that He determined that one part of Nothing should be heaven, another the earth, a third the air, &c. Indeed He has in creation demonstrated "the same liberty in the bestowment of supernatural blessings." For He has honoured some of His creatures with supernatural gifts, as angels and men, and others, indeed all others, He has made without supernatural gifts. He has likewise demonstrated the same freedom, not only in the creation, but in the government and care of His rational creatures, since He has made a communication of supernatural felicity, according to the fixed law and pleasure of His own will. From which angels and men could understand that God was free to communicate it to them according to His own will. This is declared by the arbitrary prescription of its condition. I make this remark that no one may think, that the act, which we now discuss, was the first act by which God evinced the freedom of His will.

Your words—"and indeed if God should destroy and damn all those who are rejected by Him, yet He would not be unjust," I can not approve, and you will not, if you compare your previous statements with them. For you said that ordination to punishment is subsequent to sin in the order of nature, and, here, you do not place sin between rejection, which is the first act of reprobation, and damnation, which is the second; while damnation does not follow rejection immediately, but it follows sin. Those words; so to speak, also contain a manifest falsity. First, because "the judge of all the earth can not do right, if He should slay the righteous with the wicked" (Gen. xviii. 25); and sin is the single and only meritorious cause of damnation. "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book" (Exod. xxxii. 33). "The soul that sinneth it shall die" (Ezek. xviii. 4). Secondly, because that rejection is the cause into which sin can be resolved, and, therefore, the cause of sin, by the mode of removal, or non-bestowment of that aid, without which sin can not be avoided. No small error is committed here, in the fact that, when you do not suppose sin to be previous to rejection and divine preterition, you yet make ordination to punishment subsequent to rejection, without any explanation of the coherence of both those acts. If you attempt this, you will fall into no less a fault; for you will make God, on account of that rejection, the author of sin, as can be shown by irrefutable arguments. The illustrations, which you propose, are not adapted to your design, and fail through want of analogy. For it is one thing to kill a beast, by which deed it ceases to exist and is not rendered miserable, or to exclude from your house one whom you do not please to admit, and a very different thing to condemn a man to eternal punishment, which is far more severe than to annihilate the same person. "The cause of this relative reprobation is the mere will of God without any consideration of sin," namely, that which may have any effect in making a distinction between different persons, but not in giving the power to ordain certain persons to punishment, which power indeed exists in God as Lord and Judge, but can not really be exercised except towards a sinner who deserves punishment from the equity of divine justice. That which you quote from Augustine and Gregory agrees with this distinction. For both make sin the meritorious cause of reprobation, and consider sin and sinners as altogether prerequisite to predestination; but attribute the act of separation to the mere will of God.

In this "second act of reprobation," you make two "steps, just rejection, and, damnation on account of sin." It is apparent, from this, that you distinguish between that rejection which you made the first step of reprobation, and this latter rejection. Yet you do not state the distinction between those two rejections, which, however, ought to have been done, to avoid confusion. Yet it may be right to conjecture, since you make the former prior to sin, that you would make the latter consequent upon sin, and existing on account of the desert of sin. You make the divine rejection two-fold, but do not explain whether you mean, here, the latter, which you consider the first step in the second act of reprobation, or divine rejection in general. It is not the former, in my judgment, for that, as it pertains to the second act of reprobation, is on account of sin; and this is considered by you to be prior to sin. Perhaps it is the same with the rejection, which is the first act of reprobation. If so, you can not in the passages now referred to, escape the charge of confused discussion.

Let us see how you explain that two-fold rejection. You say that the former is "the denial of aid, confirmation, and assisting grace, by which the first is rendered efficacious for the resistance of temptations, and for perseverance in goodness," and you style it "rejection of trial or test" and affirm that it occurs in the case of those "who have not yet forsaken God," illustrating it from the example of the first man, Adam. But I inquire of you, whether you consider that aid, confirmation, and assisting grace so necessary for perseverance in goodness, that, without it, a man could not resist temptation? If you reply affirmatively, consider how you can excuse, from the responsibility of sin, the Deity, who has denied to man, apart from any fault in him, the gifts and aids necessary to perseverance in goodness. If negatively, then indeed, tell me by what right you call this a rejection by God. Can he be said to be rejected by God, who is adorned and endued with grace, rendering him acceptable, provided with all gifts and aids necessary to perseverance in goodness, and even fortified by the help of the Holy Spirit to resist temptation? If you speak in accordance with Scriptural usage you can not call it rejection. You will say that it is not called, in an absolute sense, rejection, but in a certain respect, -- that is, so far that God affords to him, on whom He has bestowed all those things—not efficacious aid, not actual confirmation in goodness, not that assisting grace, without which the former graces are inefficacious. This is apparent, you say, from the event, since, if he had obtained also those helps, he would have been steadfast in goodness, he would not have fallen. This you express in quoting from Augustine: -- "God rejected man, not as to ability, but as to will." If he had possessed the latter, he would have maintained his integrity.

Here we enter on a discussion of the utmost difficulty, and scarcely explicable, at least by myself, as yet but a tyro, and not sufficiently acquainted with those heights of Sacred Theology. Yet I will venture to present some thoughts, trusting to the grace of Him, who gives wisdom to babes, and sight to the blind. You will assist me in part, that, by our mutual conference, the light may shine with greater brightness. For I have undertaken to write not against you, but to you, for the sake both of learning and of teaching.

I see here two things which will need explanation from me.

First, in reference to sufficient and efficacious grace. Secondly, in reference to the administration and dispensation of both, and the causes of that dispensation.