Jacobus Arminius · 12 of 81

SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS · Part 2

Preterition or reprobation is not without justice, but it is not of justice, as its cause: damnation is with justice and of justice. Election and reprobation or preterition are the work of free will according to the wisdom of God; but damnation is the work of necessary will according to the justice of God; for God "cannot deny Himself" (2 Tim. ii. 13.) As a just judge, it is necessary that He should punish unrighteousness, and execute judgment. This, I say, is the work of the manifold wisdom of God, which in those creatures, in whom he has implanted the principle of their own ways, namely, a free will, He might exhibit its two-fold use, good and bad, and the consequent result of its use in both directions. Hence he has, in His own wisdom, ordained, both in angels and in men, the way of both modes of its use, without any fault or sin on His own part. But it is a work of justice to damn the unrighteous. Therefore also it is said truly that the passed by are damned by the Deity, but because they were to be damned, not because they were passed by or reprobated.

Now I come to your argumentation, in which you affirm that, "according to that theory, God is, by necessary consequence, made the author of the fall of Adam, and of sin &c." I do not, indeed, perceive the argument from which this conclusion is necessarily deduced, if you correctly understand that theory. Though I do not doubt that you had reference to your own words, used in stating the first theory, "that he ordained also that man should fall and become depraved, that he might thus prepare the way for the fulfillment of his own eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save some, &c." This, then, if I am not mistaken, is your reasoning. He, who has ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is the author of the fall and of sin; God ordained that man should fall and become depraved; therefore, God is the author of sin. But the Major of this syllogism is denied, because it is ambiguous; for the word ordain is commonly, though in a catachrestical sense, used to mean simply and absolutely to decree, the will determining and approving an act; which catachresis is very frequent in forensic use. But to us, who are bound to observe religiously, in this argument, the propriety of terms, to ordain is nothing else than to arrange the order in acts, and in each thing according to its mode. It is one thing to decree acts absolutely, and another to decree the order of acts, in each thing, according to its mode. The former is immediate, the latter, from the beginning to the end, regards the means, which in all things, pertain to the order of events. In the former signification, the Minor is denied; for it is entirely at variance with the truth, since God is never the author of evil (that is, of evil involving guilt). In the latter signification the Major is denied, for it is not according to the truth, nor is it necessary in any respect that the same person who disposes the order of actions and, in each thing, according to its mode: should be the author of those actions. The actor is one thing, the action is another,-and the arranger of the action is yet another. He who performs an evil deed is the author of evil. He, who disposes the order in the doer and in the evil deed, is not the author of evil, but the disposer of an evil act to a good end. But that this may be understood, let us use the fourth fundamental principle, which we have previously stated, according to this, we shall circumscribe this whole case within this limit; every fault must always be ascribed to the proximate, not to the remote or to the highest cause. In a chain, the link, which breaks, is in fault; in a machine, the wheel, which deviates from its proper course, is in fault, not any superior or inferior one. But as all causes are either principles, or from principles, (in this case, however, principles are like wheels, by which the causes, originating from the principles, are moved), God is the universal principle of all good, nature is the principle of natural things, and the rational will, turning freely to good or evil, is the principle of moral actions. These three principles, in their own appropriate movement, perform their own actions, and produce mediate causes, act in their own relations, and dispose them; God in a divine mode, nature in a natural mode, and the will in an elective mode. God, in a divine mode, originates nature; nature, in its own mode, produces man; the will, in its own appropriate mode, produces its own moral and voluntary actions. If, now, the will produces a moral action, whether good or evil, it produces it, of its own energy, and this cannot be attributed to nature itself as a cause, though nature may implant the will in man, since the will, (though from nature) is the peculiar and special principle of moral actions, instituted by the Deity in nature. But if the blame of this cannot be attributed to nature as a cause, by what right, I pray, can it be attributed to God, who, by the mode and medium of nature, has placed the will in man? I answer then, with Augustine, in his book against articles falsely imputed to him, artic. 10.

"The predestination of God neither excited, nor persuaded, nor impelled, the fall of those who fell, or the iniquity of the wicked, or the evil passions of sinners, but it clearly predestinated His own judgment, by which He should recompense each one according to his deeds, whether good or bad, which judgment would not be inflicted, if men should sin by the will of God." He proceeds to the same purpose in art. 11, remarking, "If it should be charged against the devil, that he was the author of certain sins, and the inciter to them, I think he would be able to exonerate himself from that odium in some way, and that he would convict the perpetrators of such sins from their own will, since, although he might have been delighted in the madness of those sinners, yet he could prove that he did not force them to crime. With what folly, what madness, then, is that referred to the counsel of God, which cannot at all be ascribed to the devil, since he, in the sins of wicked men, aids by enticements, but is not to be considered the director of their wills. Therefore God predestinated none of these things that they should take place, nor did He prepare that soul, which was about to live basely and in sin, that it should live in such a manner; but He was not ignorant that such would be its character, and He foreknew that He should judge justly concerning a soul of such character."

But if this could be imputed neither to nature, nor to the devil, how much less to God, the most holy and wise Creator? God, (as St. Augustine says again, book 6) "does not predestinate all which he foreknows. For He only foreknows evil. He does not predestinate it, but He both foreknows and predestinates good." But it is a good, derived from God, that, in His own ordination, He disposes the order in things good and evil; if not, the providence of God would be, for the most part, indifferent (may that be far from our thoughts). God does not will evil, but He wills, and preserves a certain order even in evil. Evil comes from the will of man; from God is the general and special arrangement of His own providence, disposing and most wisely keeping in order even those things which are, in the highest degree, evil.

Here a two-fold question will perhaps be urged upon me:

first, how can these be said, in reference to the will, to be its own motions, when we acknowledge that the will itself, that is, the fountain of voluntary motions, is from nature, and nature is from God? Secondly, why did God place in human beings this will, constituted in the image of liberty? I will reply to both in a few words. To the first; the will is certainly from nature, and nature is from God, but the will is not, on that account, the less to be called the principle of those motions, than nature is called the principle of natural motions. Each is the principle of its own action, though both are from the supreme principle, God. It is one thing to describe the essence of a thing, another to refer to its source. What is essential to nature and the will? That the former should be the principle of natural motions, the latter, of spontaneous motions. What is their source? God is the only and universal source of all things. Nor is it absurd that a principle should be derived from another principle: for although a principle, which originates in another, should not be called a principle in the relation of origin or source, yet, in the relation of the act it does not on that account, cease to be an essential principle. God is, per se, a principle. Nature and our wills are principles derived from a principle. Yet each of them has its own appropriate motions. Nor is there any reason, indeed, why any should think that these are philosophical niceties: they are natural distinctions, and that, which is of nature, is from God. But if we are unwilling to hear nature, let us listen to the truth of God, to Christ speaking of the devil (John viii. 44), "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar and the father of it." Here he is called "the father of a lie," and is said "to speak of his own."

According to Christ’s words, then, we have the origin and the act of sin in the devil. For the act has a resemblance to himself, for he speaks of his own. What, I pray, can be more conclusive than these words? Hence Augustine, in the answer already quoted, very properly deduces this conclusion. "As God did not, in the angels who fell, induce that will, which they did not continue in the truth; so he did not produce in men that inclination by which they imitate the devil. For he speaketh a lie of his own; and he will not be free from that charge, unless the truth shall free him." He indeed gave free will, namely, that essential power to Adam: but its motion is, in reference to Adam, his own, and, in reference to all of us, our own. In what sense is it our own, when it is given to us by God? Whatever is bestowed on us by God, is either by the law of common right, or of personal and private property. He gave the will to angels and men by the law of personal possession. It is therefore, one’s own and its motion belong to the individual. "This," says Augustine, (lib. de Genes. ad litt. in perf. cap. 5,) "He both makes and disposes species and natures themselves, but the privations of species and the defects of natures he does not make, He only ordains." Therefore God is always righteous, but we are unrighteous.

To the second question, namely, why did God create in us this will, and with such a character? I reply; -- it was the work of the highest goodness and wisdom in the universe. Why should we, with our ungrateful minds, who have already made an ill use of those minds, obstruct the fountain of goodness and wisdom? It was the work of goodness to impress his own image on both natures, in the superior, on that of angels, and in the inferior, on that of men: since, while other things in nature are moved by instinct, or feeling, as with a dim trace of the Deity, these alone, in the freedom of their own will, have the principle of their own ways in their own power by the mere goodness of God. It was the work of wisdom to make these very species, endued with His own image, together with so many other objects, and above the others, as the most perfect mirror of His own glory, so far as is possible in created things. But why did he make them of such a character, with mutable freedom? He made His own image, not himself.

The only essential image of God, the Father, is the Lord Jesus Christ, one God, eternal and immutable, with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Whoever thou mayest be, who makest objections to this, thou hearest the serpent whispering to thee, as he whispered once to Eve, to the ruin of our race. Let it suffice thee that thou wast made in the image of God, not possessing the divine perfection. Immutability is peculiar to the divine perfection. This pertains by nature to God. The creature had in himself His image, communicated by God, and placed in his will: but he, whether angel or man, who fell, rejected it of his own will. Not to say more, this whole question was presented by Marcion, and Tertullian, with the utmost fluency and vigour, discussed it in its whole extent, in a considerable part of his second book against Marcion, the perusal of which will, I trust, be satisfactory to you.

You remark, finally, that they are not freed from the necessity of that conclusion "by the distinctions of the act, and the evil in the act, of necessity and creation, of the decree and its execution, &c." Indeed, my brother, I think that, from those things, which have just been said, you will sufficiently perceive in what respects your reasoning is fallacious. For God does not make, but ordains the sinner, as I say, with Augustine, that is, He ordains the iniquity of the sinner not by commanding or decreeing particularly and absolutely that he should commit sin, but by most wisely vindicating His own order, and the right of His infinite providence, even in evil which is peculiar to the creature.

For it was necessary that the wisdom of God should triumph in this manner, when He exhibited His own order in the peculiar and voluntary disorder of His own creature. This disorder and alienation from good the creature prepared for himself by the appropriate motion of free-will, not by the impulse of the Deity. But that freedom of the will, says Tertullian against Marcion (lib. 2, cap. 9) "does not fix the blame on Him by whom it was bestowed, but on him by whom it was not directed, as it ought to have been." Since this is so, it is not at all necessary that I should speak of those particular distinctions, which, in their proper place, may perhaps be valid; they do not seem to me to pertain properly to this argument, unless other arguments are introduced, which I cannot find in your writings. Besides all those distinctions pertain generally to the subject of providence, not particularly to this topic. I am not pleased that the discussion should extend beyond its appropriate range. But here some may perhaps say; "Therefore, the judgments of God depend on contingencies, and are based on contingencies, if they have respect to man as a sinner, and to his sin." That consequence is denied: for, on the contrary, those very things which are contingencies to us, depend on the ordination of God, according to their origin and action. To their origin, for God has established the contingency equally with the necessity: To their action, for He acts in the case of that which is good, fails to act in that which is evil, in that it is evil, not in that it is ordained by His special providence. They are not, therefore, contingencies to the Deity, whatever they may be to us; just as those things, which are contingent to an inferior cause, can by no means be justly ascribed to a superior cause. But I have already stated this matter with sufficient clearness, in the discussion of the fourth fundamental principle. Let us, therefore, pass to other matters.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION

The meaning of the first theory is that which I have set forth in the third proposition. But it is of little importance to me, whether the object, generally and without distinction, or with a certain distinction, and invested with certain circumstances, is presented to God, when predestinating and reprobating, for that is not, now, the point before me. If, however, it may be proper to discuss this also in a few words, I should say that it cannot seem to one who weighs this matter with accuracy, that the object is considered in general and without any distinction by God, in the act of decreeing, according to the sentiment of the authors of the first theory. For the object was considered by God, in the act of decreeing, in the relation which it had at the time. when it had, as yet, been affected by no external act of God, executing that decree; for this, in a pure and abstract sense, is an object, free from every other consideration, which can pertain to an object, through the action of a cause operating in reference to it. But since, according to the authors of the first theory, the act of creation pertains to the execution of the decree, of which we now treat, it is, therefore, most certainly evident, that man, in that he was to be made, was the object of predestination and reprobation. If any one considers the various and manifold sets of that decree, it is not doubtful that some of these must be accommodated and applied to this and others to that condition of man, and in this sense, I would admit the common and general consideration of the object. But all those acts, according to the authors of that first theory, depend on one primary act, namely, that in which God determined to declare, in one part of that unformed "lump," from which the human race was to be made, the glory of his mercy, and, in another part, the glory of his justice, and it is this very thing which I stated to be displeasing to me in that first theory; nor can I yet persuade myself that there exists, in the whole Scripture, any decree, by which God has determined to illustrate his own glory, in the salvation of these and in the condemnation of those, apart from foresight of the fall.

The passage which you quote from Beza, on Ephes. i. 4, plainly proves that I have done no injustice to those authors in explaining their doctrine. He says, in that passage, that God, by the creation and corruption of man, opened a way for himself to the execution of that which he had before decreed."

In reference to the harmony of those theories, I grant that all agree in this, that this decree of God was made from eternity, before any actual existence of the object, whatever might be its character, and however it might be considered. For "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world." (Acts xv. 18.)

It is necessary also that all the internal acts of God should universally be eternal, unless we wish to make God mutable; yet in such a sense that some are antecedent to others in order and nature. I admit also that they agree in this, that there exists, in the predestinate or the reprobate, no cause why the former should be predestinated, the latter reprobated; and that the cause exists only in the mere will of God. But I affirm that some ascend to a greater height than others, and extend the act of decree farther. For the advocates of the third theory deny that God, in any act of predestination and reprobation, has reference to man, considered as not yet fallen, and those of the second theory say that God, in the act of that decree, did not have reference to man as not yet created. The advocates of the

first, however, openly assert and contend that God, in the first act of the decree, had reference to man, not as created, but as to be created. I, therefore, distinguished those theories according to their objects, as each one presented man to God, at the first moment of the act of predestination and reprobation, as free from any divine act predestinating and reprobating, either internal, by which he might decree something concerning man, or external, by which He might effect something in man; this may be called pure object, having as yet received no relation from the act of God, decreeing from eternity, and no form from the external act. But when it has received any relation or form from any act of God, it is no longer pure object, but an object having some action of God concerning it, or in it, by which it is prepared for receiving some further action, as was also a short time since affirmed. We will hereafter examine your idea that they substantiate their theory by the example of Jacob and Esau in Romans 9.

I may be permitted to make some observations or inquiries concerning what you lay down as fundamental principles of this doctrine, and of your reply to my arguments. In reference to the first, concerning the essence of the Deity,

God is in such a sense immutable in essence, power, intellect, will, counsel and work, that, nevertheless, if the creature is changed, he becomes to that creature in will, the application of power, and in work, another than that which he was to the same creature continuing in his primitive state; bestowing upon a cause that which is due to it, but without any change in Himself. Again if God is immutable, He has, for that very reason, not circumscribed or determined to one direction, by any decree, the motion of free-will, the enjoyment and use of which He has once freely bestowed on man, so that it should incline, of necessity, to one direction, and should not be able, in fact, to incline to another direction, while that decree remains. Thirdly, God has the form and an eternal and immutable conception of all those things which are done mutably by men, but following, in the order of nature, many other conceptions, which God has concerning those things which He wills both to do Himself, and to permit to men.

In reference to the second, concerning the knowledge of God;

I am most fully persuaded that the knowledge of God is eternal, immutable and infinite, and that it extends to all things, both necessary and contingent, to all things which He does of Himself, either mediately or immediately, and which He permits to be done by others. But I do not understand the mode in which He knows future contingencies, and especially those which belong to the free-will of creature, and which He has decreed to permit, but not to do of Himself, not, indeed, in that measure, in which I think that it is understood by others more learned than myself. I know that there are those who say that all things are, from eternity, presented to God, and that the mode, in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingencies, is this, that those contingent events coexist with God in the Now of eternity, and therefore they are in Him indivisibly, and in the infinite Now of eternity, which embraces all time. If this is so, it is not difficult to understand how God may certainly and infallibly know future contingent events. For contingencies are not opposed to certainty of knowledge, except as they are future, but not as they are present. That reasoning, however, does not exhaust all the difficulties which may arise in the consideration of these matters. For God knows, also, those things which may happen, but never do happen, and consequently do not co-exist with God in the Now of eternity, which would be events unless they should be hindered, as is evident from 1 Samuel xxiii. 12, in reference to the citizens of Keilah, who would have delivered David into the hands of Saul, which event, nevertheless, did not happen. The knowledge, also, of future events, which depend on contingent causes, seems to be certain, if those causes may be complete and not hindered in their operation. But how shall the causes of those events, which depend on the freedom of the will, be complete, among which, even at that very moment in which it chose one, it was free not to choose it, or to choose another in preference to it? If indeed at any time your leisure may permit, I could wish that you would accurately discuss, in your own manner, these things and whatever else may pertain to that question. I know that this would be agreeable and acceptable to many, and that the labour would not be useless.

The knowledge of God is called eternal, but not equally so in reference to all objects of knowledge. For that knowledge of God is absolutely eternal, by which God knows Himself, and in Himself all possible things. That, by which He knows beings which will exist, is eternal indeed as to duration, but, in nature, subsequent to some act of the divine will concerning them, and, in some cases, even subsequent to some foreseen act of the human will. In general, the following seems to me to be the order of the divine knowledge, in reference to its various objects. God knows

1. Himself what He, of Himself is able to do.

2. All things possible what can be done by those beings which He can make.

3. All things which shall exist by the act of creation.

4. All things which shall exist by the act of creatures and especially of rational creatures. Whether moved by those actions of His creatures and

5. What He Himself especially of His rational shall do. creatures; Or at least receiving occasion from them.

From this, it is apparent that the eternity of the knowledge of God is not denied by those, who propose, as a foundation for that knowledge, something dependent on the human will, as foreseen.

But I do not understand in what way it can be true that, in every genus, there must be one thing univocal, and from this, other things in an equivocal sense. I have hitherto supposed that those things which are under the same genus are univocal or at least analogous; but, that things equivocal are not comprehended with those which are univocal, under the same genus, either in logic, or metaphysics, and still less in physics. Then I have not thought that the univocal could be the cause of the equivocal. For there is no similarity between them. But if there exists a similarity as between cause and effect, they are no longer equivocal. Thus those things, which are heated by the fire as I should say, are heated neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically. God exists univocally, we, analogically. This they admit, who state that certain attributes of the divine nature are communicable to us according to analogy, among which they also mention knowledge.

In reference to the third, concerning the actions of the Deity; the actions of God are, in Himself, indeed eternal, but they preserve a certain order; some are prior to others by nature, and indeed necessarily precede them, whether in the same order, in which they proceed from Him, I could not easily say; but I know that there are those who have thus stated, among whom some mention George Sohnius. Some also of the internal actions in God, are subsequent in nature to the foresight of some act dependent on the will of the creature. Thus the decree concerning the mission of His Son for the redemption of the human race is subsequent to the foresight of the fall of man. For although God might have arranged to prevent the fall, if he had not known that He could use an easy remedy to effect a restoration, (as some think,) yet the sure decree for the introduction of a remedy for the fall by the mission of His Son, was not effected by God except on the foresight of the disease, namely, the fall.

The mode in which God, as the universal principle, is said to flow into His creatures, and especially his rational creatures, and concurs with their nature and will, in reference to an action, has my approbation, whatever it may be, if it does not bring in a determination of the will of the creature to one or two things which are contrary, or contradictory. If any mode introduces such a determination, I do not see how it can be consistent with the declaration of Augustine, quoted by yourself, that God so governs all things which He has created as also "to permit them to exercise and put forth their own motions," or with the saying of Plato, in which God is declared to be free from all blame.

I could wish that it might be plainly and decisively explained how all effects and defects in nature, and the will, of all kinds universally, are of the providence of God, and yet God is free from fault, the whole fault, (if any exists,) residing in the proximate cause. If any one thinks that God is exempted from fault because He is the remote cause, but that the creature, as the proximate cause, is culpable, (if there is any sin,) he does not seem to me to present a correct reason why any cause may be in fault, or free from fault, but, concerning this also, I will hereafter speak at greater length. In reference to the fourth, concerning the causes of the actions of God; the universal cause has no cause above itself, and the first and supreme cause does not depend on any other cause, for the very terms include that idea; but it is possible that there may be afforded to the universal, first and supreme cause, by another cause, an occasion for the production of some certain effect, which, without that occasion, the first cause would neither propose to be produced in itself, nor in fact produce out of itself, and indeed could neither produce nor propose or decree to be produced. Such is the decree to damn certain persons, and their damnation according to that decree.