Jacobus Arminius · 62 of 81

EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE · Part 2

From this it is also easily proved that the fall can not be called a happy transgression, except by a catachrestic hyperbole, which, while it may be adapted to declamations, panegyric orations, and rhetorical embellishments, should be far removed from the solid investigation of truth. To these is always to be added the remark, which I have made, frequently and with reiteration, that redemption could not have resulted from transgression, except as the latter might afford an occasion for it, by the arrangement of God, in accordance with His will, that the transgression should be expiated, and washed away by a Redeemer of such character and dignity.

But the distinction which you make between "the permission of the fall" and "the permitted fall" seems to me to be of no force. For the permission of the fall is not less by the Divine arrangement than the permitted fall. For God ordained His own permission for a certain end. But consider whether it is not absurd to distinguish between "the permission of the fall" and "the permitted fall." In the latter case, I speak of the fall, not considered in that it is a fall, but in that it is a permitted fall: as you must, of necessity, consider, when you style it "the means of the decree," which appellation is not appropriate to the fall except on account of the adjunct "permitted." For not the fall but the permission of the fall, tended to the glory of God; not the act of many which is the fall, but the act of God, which is permission, having immediate reference to that act of man according to the prescript of the Divine arrangement, tended to His glory. But I acknowledge that permission is the means of the decree, not of predestination, but of providence, as the latter is distinguished from the former. I speak now of providence, as governing and administrative, which is not only not prior, in nature and order, to predestination, but is also the cause of the mission of the Son as the Redeemer, who is our head, in whom predestination is made, as the apostle teaches, (Ephes. 1.)

But how can it be true that the fall is permitted by God, and yet that "it would not have occurred unless God had willed it" I wish that it might be explained how God could, at once, will that the fall should occur, and permit the same; how God could be concerned, by His volition, with the fall both mediately and immediately—mediately by willing the permission, and immediately by willing the fall itself. I wish also that these things may be harmonized, how the fall could occur by the will of God, and yet the will of God not be the cause of the fall, which is contrary to the express declaration of God’s word, "Our God is in the heavens; He hath done whatever He pleased," (Psalm cxv. 3.) Also, in what way could God will the fall, and yet be "a God that hath no pleasure in wickedness," (Psalm v. 4,) since the fall was wickedness. The distinctions which are presented are not sufficient to untie the knot, as I shall show in the case of each of them separately. For they distinguish between the fall and the event of the fall; between the will of open intimation and that of His good-pleasure, revealed or hidden; between the fall as it was sin, and as it was the means of illustrating the divine glory. They say that God willed that the fall should occur, but did not will the fall; that He willed the fall according to His good-pleasure and His hidden will, not according to His will, of open intimation, revealed and approving; that He willed the fall, not as it was sin, but as it was the means of illustrating His own glory.

The first distinction is verbal, and not real. He, who willed that the fall should occur, willed also the fall. He who willed that the fall should occur, willed the event of the fall, and He, who willed the event of the fall, willed the fall. For the event of the fall is the fall, as the event of an action is the action itself. But if He willed the fall, He was the cause of the fall. For "He hath done whatsoever He pleased," (Psalm cxv. 3.) If any one replies, that He willed that the fall should occur by the act of another, not by His own act, I answer—it could not be that God should will that the fall should occur by the act of another, and not by His own act: for it would not happen by the act of another, unless He should interpose with His own act, and, indeed, with an act, such that, from it, the act of another should necessarily exist; otherwise that, which He wished should occur by the act of another, would not be effected or occur by that act of another. The force of the argument is not increased: whether God willed that the fall should occur, mediately, by the act of another, or, immediately, by His own act. These are mediately connected—the act of God and the act of another, that is, of man, or the fall. The fall proceeded from the act of man, but that depends of necessity on the act of God; otherwise it could happen that the act of another should not be performed, and thus it could happen that the fall should not occur, which, nevertheless, God willed should occur. It is not, therefore, denied that God is the cause of the fall, except immediately; it is conceded that He is so, mediately. No one, indeed, ever wished to deduce, from the declaration of any one, that God is the immediate cause of the sin perpetrated by man, for he would deduce a contradiction in terms, as they say in the schools, unless, indeed, the subject might be the general concurrence of God with man, in producing an act which can not be produced by man without sin.

The distinction of the will into that of hidden and revealed, while it may have place elsewhere, can not avail here. For the hidden will of God is said to be efficacious; but if, in its exercise, God willed that the fall should occur, it is certainly a necessary conclusion, also, that He effected the fall, that is, He must be the cause of the fall; for whatever God wills, even by His hidden will, the same, also, He does both in heaven and on the earth; and no one can resist His will, namely, that which is hidden. But I may remark concerning that distinction in the will, that I think that it may be said, that neither of these can be so contrary, or opposed to the other, that God, by one, wills that to be done, which, by the other, He wills not to be done, and vice versa. God wills by His revealed and approving will, that man should not fall, it can not, therefore, be true that God, by any will, considered in any way whatever, can will that man should fall; for though there may be distinction in the will of God, yet no contradiction can exist in it. But it is a contradiction, if God, by any act of His own will, should tend towards an object, and at the same time towards its contrary.

The third distinction, in which it is said that God wills sin, not as such, but as the means of illustrating His own glory, defends God from the charge of efficiency in sin no more than the two preceding. For that assertion remains true God doeth whatsoever He wills, but He wills sin, therefore, He effects sin, not indeed as it is such, but as it is the means of illustrating His own glory. But if God effects sin, as it is the means to such an end, it can not be effected, unless man commits sin as such. For sin can not be made a means, unless it is committed. There exists, indeed, that distinction of sin into separate and diverse respects, not really, and in fact, but in the mode of considering it. But that we may make that distinction correctly, as it is indeed of some use, it must be said that God permits sin as such, but for this reason, because He had the knowledge and the power to make it the means, yea, rather, to use it as the means of illustrating His own glory. So that the consideration of sin as such was presented to the Divine permission, the permission itself being, in the mean time, caused both by the consideration that the sin could be the means of illustrating the Divine glory, and by the arrangement that the sin, permitted, should be, in fact, the means for illustrating that same glory.

The simile, which you present, of the mutable decaying house is not apposite for many reasons. For in the first place, in its fall, the house is passive; but in the fall of man he is active, for he sins. Secondly, that house is, not only mutable, that is, capable of decay, but subject to decay; but man, though capable of sinning, was still not subject to sin. Thirdly, that house could not stand if attacked by the winds; but man could preserve his position, even though tempted by Satan. Fourthly, the necessary props were not placed under that house; but man received strength from God, sufficient for steadfastness against the onset of Satan, and was supported by the assistance of divinity itself. Fifthly, the builder anticipated the ruin of the house, and in part willed it, because he was unwilling to prevent the fall when he could have done it; God, indeed, foresaw sin, but He did not will it; indeed, He endeavoured to prevent it by precept and the bestowment of grace, necessary and sufficient for the avoidance of sin. Farther than this, He must not prevent, lest He should destroy the constitution which He had established. The ideas, I will the ruin, and I will it, so far as I will not to prevent it, do not agree. For the ruin and the permission of the ruin can not be at the same time the immediate object of the will. For God can not be concerned in the fall, at the same time, both by an affirmative and by a negative act of the will. The act of willing the fall was affirmative, the act of not willing to prevent is negative, intermediate between two opposite affirmative acts, namely, between the act of volition and that of nolition concerning the fall. It is altogether true, that so much causality or efficiency is to be attributed to the builder as there is of will, directed to the ruin of the house, attributed to him. Let us now consider the application of the similitude. God left Adam to himself, but yet Adam was not deserted by God; for He placed under him as it were a triple prop, lest he might sin or fall. He gave him a precept, that he might, in obedience, not choose to sin; He added a threat that he might fear to sin on account of the annexed and following punishment; He bestowed grace that he might be able in fact to fulfill the precept, and avoid the threatened punishment. It may be lawful, also, to call the promise, which was placed in opposition to the threatening, and which was sealed by the symbol of the tree of life, a fourth prop. The reason, in view of which, God left man to himself, was not that his ability might be tested by temptation, for from the actual occurrence of the fall, his inability to stand could be neither proved nor disproved; but because it was suitable that there should be such a trial of the obedience of him whom God had made the ruler of his own will, the lord and the head of his own voluntary sets. Nor was permission instituted to this end, that it might be seen what the creature could do, if the Divine aid and government over him, should cease for a time, both because the Divine aid and government was not deficient, and because it was already certain that man could do nothing without the government and general aid of God, and nothing good without the special aid of His grace.

That "God was not the cause of that defection" is a Theological axiom. But you, by removing those acts, do not remove the cause of the defection from the Deity. For God can be regarded as the cause of sin, either by affirmative or negative acts. You, indeed, take from Him the affirmative acts, namely, the inclining of the mind to sin, the infusion of wickedness, and the deprivation of the gift, already bestowed, but you attributed to Him a negative act, the denial or non-bestowal of strengthening grace. If this strengthening grace was necessary to the avoidance of sin, then, by that act of denial, God became the Author of sin and of Adam’s fall. But if you attribute the denial or the non-bestowal of strengthening grace to God, not absolutely, but on account of the transgression of Adam, because he did not seek the Divine aid, I approve what you say, if you concede that it was in the power of Adam to seek that aid; otherwise it was denied to him to seek that also, and so we go on without end.

You say—"There are two parts or species of predestination, the decree of Election and that of Reprobation," concerning which it must be stated that one can not exist without the other, and that, one being supposed, the other must be also. This is signified by the word election, otherwise, predestination may be considered per se and without an opposite, and so all men universally would be predestinated unto life. In that case, there would be no election, which includes the idea of reprobation, as united to it by a necessary consequence and copula. Election and Reprobation are opposed to each other both affirmatively and negatively. Negatively, because election refers to the act of the will by which grace and glory are conferred, reprobation, that by which they are not conferred. Affirmatively, since reprobation refers to the act of the will, which inflicts punishment on account of sin.

It is worthy of consideration that God, both in the decree of Election and in that of Reprobation, was concerned with men considered as sinners. For the grace which was provided by election or predestination, is the grace of the remission of sins, and the renewal of the Holy Ghost; and the glory which He has prepared by the same decree, is out of the ignominy to which man was liable on account of sin. Reprobation, also, is a denial of that grace and a preparation of the punishment due to sin, not in that it was due, but that it was, through mercy, not taken away. Isidorus and Angelomus, quoted by you, express this condition of the object both of Election and Reprobation. The former, when be says—"the reprobate are left, and predestinated to death," the latter, when he says that—of "the unbelieving people some are predestinated to everlasting freedom, but others are left in their own impiety, and condemned to perpetual death by occult dispensation, and occult judgment."

Your definition of Election is obscure from the want of some word. It seems that the phrase to be illustrated ought to have been added, thus: "The decree of election is that by which God destines certain men to His glorious grace to be illustrated in their salvation and heavenly life, obtained through Christ," otherwise the phraseology is not sufficiently complete. But the definition, even when completed, in that way, seems to me to have been, ineptly arranged, as the parts are not arranged according to their mutual relations. For "salvation" and "heavenly life" hold the relation of the material prepared for the decree of election; "certain men" hold the place of the object or subject for which that salvation is prepared; the "illustration of His glorious grace" is the end of election;

"Christ" is here made the means of obtaining that salvation and life. The order of all these in the definition according to their mutual relations, ought to be, -- "The decree of election is that, by which God destined certain men to salvation and heavenly life, to be obtained through Christ, to the praise of His glorious grace." In this definition, however, Christ does not seem to me to obtain that place, which he deserves, and which the Apostle assigns to him. For Christ according to the Apostle is not only the means by which the salvation, already prepared by election, but, so to speak, the meritorious cause, in respect to which the election was made, and on whose account that grace was prepared. For the apostle says that we are chosen in Christ (Ephes. i. 4), as in a mediator, in whose blood salvation and life is obtained for us, and as in our "head," (Ephes. i. 22) from whom those blessings flow to us. For God chooses no one unto eternal life except in Christ, who prepared it by his own blood for them who should believe on his name. From this it seems to follow that, since God regards no one in Christ unless they are engrafted in him by faith, election is peculiar to believers, and the phrase "certain men," in the definition, refers to believers. For Christ is a means of salvation to no one unless he is apprehended by faith. Therefore, that phrase "in Christ" marks the meritorious cause by which grace and glory are prepared, and the existence of the elect in him, without which they could not be elected in him. The definition, then, is susceptible of this form. "Election is the decree of God, by which, of Himself, from eternity, He decreed to justify in (or through) Christ, believers, and to accept them unto eternal life, to the praise of His glorious grace." But you will say, "Then faith is made dependent on the human will, and is not a gift of divine grace." I deny that sequence, for there was no such statement in the definition. I acknowledge that the cause of faith was not expressed, but that was unnecessary. If any one denies it, there may be added after "believers" the phrase "to whom He determined to give faith." But we should observe whether, in our method of consideration, the decree, by which God determined to justify believers and adopt them as sons, is the same with that by which He determined to bestow faith on some, but to deny the same to others. This seems to me not very probable. For there are, here, two purposes, each determined by the certain decree of God; their subjects are also diverse, and different attributes are assigned to them. I think that this ought to have been noticed in treating correctly of the Order and Mode of Predestination. I do not much object to your statement that "the act of the divine mind is two-fold, regarding the end, and the means to the end, or to salvation," but that remark does not seem correct to me, in which you say that "the former is commonly called the decree, and the latter the execution of the decree"—for such is your marginal annotation—each of these is an act of the decree, as you acknowledge; but an act of the decree is internal, and precedes its execution whether it is in reference to the end or the means. The passage in Romans 9, does not favour your idea as you claim. For it not distinguish the purpose from election, nor does it make the election prior to the purpose of damning of conferring salvation, but it says that the purpose is "according to election," not without election or apart from election, as is clearly evident from the words of the apostle. For they are as follows—"i[na hJ kat ejklogh<n tou~ Qeou~ proqesiv menh| " that the purpose of God according to election might stand," from which it is apparent that, by these words, is described the purpose of God, which is "according to election."

But that this may be more plainly understood, we may examine briefly the design and the scope of the apostle. The Jews objected that they, by virtue of the covenant and the divine word, committed to them, were the peculiar people of God, and, therefore, that honour could not be taken away from them, without the disgrace and the violation of the divine decree. They asserted, however, that the honour referred to, and the title of the people of God was taken from them by the Apostle Paul, when he made those only, who should believe in the Christ whom he preached, partakers of the righteousness of God, and of eternal salvation. Since they had not believed in that Christ, it followed, according to the doctrine of the apostle, that they were strangers to the righteousness of God and eternal salvation, and unworthy to be longer considered the people of God. But since they considered this to be contrary to the decree and the covenant of God, they concluded that it was, at the same time, absurd and foreign to the truth. The apostle answers that the covenant, decree, or word of God hath not "taken none effect," (verse 6), but remains firm, even if many of the Jews should not be reckoned among the people of God, because that decree or covenant did not comprehend all Israelites, universally without election and distinction; for that decree was "according to election," as set forth in those words of God announcing his purpose. For God said "In Isaac," not in Ishmael, "shall thy seed be called." Also "The elder," Esau, "shall serve the younger," Jacob. The apostle asserts that God declared most clearly in these words, that He did not regard the whole progeny of Abraham, or that of Isaac, or of Jacob, or all of their individual descendants, as His people, but only those who were "the children of the promise" to the exclusion of "the children of the flesh." The Apostle reasons, most conclusively from those words of God, that the purpose of God is according to election, and that it, therefore, embraces, in itself, not all the Israelites, but, while it claims some, it rejects others. From which it follows that it is not wonderful or contrary to the purpose or covenant of God, that some of the Jews are rejected by God, and those indeed, who are specially excluded by that decree according to those words of God, as "the children of the flesh," i.e. those who were seeking to be justified "by the works of the law" and according to the flesh. Compare Rom. ix. 7-11 and 30-32, also x, 3-5 with ch. iv, 1-3.

In Romans viii. 29, those acts—I refer now to the decree and the execution of the decree—are clearly distinguished. In the decree two things are mentioned, foreknowledge and predestination, "for whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son." It is inquired—what is the import of this foreknowledge or prescience? Some explain it thus: -- "whom He foreknew," i.e. whom He previously loved, and affectionately regarded as His own, as indeed the simple word "to know" is sometimes used, as "I know you not." (Matt. xxv. 12.) "The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous." (Psalm i. 6.) Others say that foreknowledge, or prescience of faith in Christ, is here signified. You assent to the former, and reject the latter, and with good reason, if it has the meaning, which you ascribe to it. But it is worthy of consideration whether the latter meaning of the work "foreknow" may not be so explained, as not only not to impinge upon the former, but also to harmonize with it most completely so that the former cannot be true without the latter. This will be evident, if it shall be demonstrated that God can "previously love and affectionately regard as His own" no sinner unless He has foreknown him in Christ, and looked upon him as a believer in Christ.

To prove this I proceed thus: -- God acknowledges, as His own, no sinner, and He chooses no one to eternal life except in Christ, and for the sake of Christ. "He hath chosen us in Him," (Ephes. i. 4); "wherein He hath made us accepted in the Beloved," (verse 6). "Nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." (Rom. viii. 39). "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." (2 Cor. v. 19).

For, if God could will to any one eternal life, without respect to the Mediator, He could also give eternal life, without the satisfaction made by the Mediator. The actual bestowment of eternal life is not more limited, than the purpose to bestow it. God truly loved the world, and, on account of that love, gave His own Son as its Redeemer. (John iii. 16). But the love, here spoken of, is not that by which He wills eternal life, as appears from the very expression of John—for he interposes faith in Christ between that love and eternal life. Hence God acknowledges no one, in Christ and for Christ’s sake, as His own, unless that person is in Christ. He who is not in Christ, can not be loved in Christ. But no one is in Christ, except by faith; for Christ dwells in our hearts by faith, and we are engrafted and incorporated in him by faith. It follows then that God acknowledges His own, and chooses to eternal life no sinner, unless He considers him as a believer in Christ, and as made one with him by faith. This is proved by the following testimonies:

"As many as received him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." (John i. 12.) But to those, to whom He gave this power, and to them, considered in one and the same manner, He also decreed to give this power, since the decree of Predestination effects nothing in him who is predestinated, and there is, therefore, no internal change in him, intervening between the decree and the actual bestowment of the thing, destined and prepared by the decree. "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16). "They which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham." (Gal. iii. 9.) "Without faith it is impossible to please him." (Heb. xi. 6.) Hence he is not in error who says that foreknowledge or prescience of faith in Christ is signified in Rom. viii. 29, unless he adds the assertion that the faith, referred to, results from our own strength and is not produced in us by the free gift of God.

The same explanation is proved true from the following member: "whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of He Son." No one is conformed to the image of the Son of God if he does not believe on him.

Therefore, no one is predestinated by God to that conformity, unless he is considered as a believer, unless one may claim that faith itself is included in that conformity which believers have with Christ—which would be absurd, because that faith can by no means be attributed to Christ, for it is faith in him, and in God through him; it is faith in reference to reconciliation, redemption, and the remission of sins. It is true, also, since it is the means of attaining that conformity. But you say, -- "They, who are predestinated to be justified and to become the sons of God, are also predestinated to believe, since adoption and justification are received by faith." I deny that consequence; indeed I assert that just the contrary can be concluded from that argument, if the act of predestination is one and the same. This I will prove: -- If adoption and justification is received by faith, then they, who are predestinated to be justified and to become the sons of God, are, of necessity, considered as believers. For that, which is destined to any one by Predestination, will certainly be received by him. And as he is when he receives it, such he was considered to be, when he was predestinated to receive it. Therefore, the believer alone was predestinated to receive it. From which I again conclude, that no one is chosen by God to adoption and the communication of the gift of righteousness, unless he is considered by Him as a believer. You add—"It cannot be said correctly, that God foreknew that men would believe, and then predestinated them to faith, since those, whom He foreknew to believe, He thus foreknew because He decreed that they should believe. But what relation has this to the matter. Such an affirmation is not made by the defenders of the sentiment to which I have referred. You confound two kinds of Predestination, and unite together acts of a different character. The Predestination in which God decreed to justify and adopt as sons believers in Christ, is not the same with that, in which He decreed, by certain means, to give faith to these and not to those. For the decree, is in this case, concerning the bestowment of faith in that, concerning the justification and adoption of believers; which, can not, indeed, be the same decree, on account of the diversity of the subject and the attribute. Otherwise it is true, that "God first foreknew that men would believe, and then predestinated them to faith." For He foreknew that they would believe by His own gift, which decree was prepared by Predestination. These things, having been thus plainly set forth, may throw some light on this whole discussion, in reference to Predestination. This we will do, at greater extent, hereafter, when we shall subjoin our own view of the mode and order of Predestination.