Jacobus Arminius · 65 of 81

EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE · Part 5

What you observe concerning "the human and the divine will of Christ," does not affect our present subject of discussion. It is true that there was such a difference; but this is not strange, since those wills belonged not to one origin, though they did belong to one person, embracing, in himself two natures and two wills. I may add, also, that Christ willed both to be freed and not to be freed from death. For as a man, he said, "O, my Father, let this cup pass from me," and as a man, also, he corrected himself, "nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi. 39). That this is to be understood of the human will, is apparent, because there is one and the same will, as there is one nature to the Father and to the Son, as divine. I may say, in a word, that Christ, as to the outward man, willed to be freed from immediate death, but according to the inward man, he subjected himself to the divine will. And, if you will permit, I will say, that there was, in him, a feeling and a desire to be freed, not a volition. For volition results from the final decision of the reason and of wisdom, but desire follows the antecedent decision of the senses or the feelings.

That "Abraham was favourably inclined towards the Sodomites, who were devoted, by the decree of God, to destruction," the Scripture does not assert. It also does not seem to me to be very probable that "he could pray in faith" for those whom he knew to be devoted, by the decree of God, to irrevocable destruction. For prayer was not to be offered in behalf of such persons. God commands Jeremiah not to pray for the people, which He had, by an irrevocable decree, and by His will as its consequent, destined and devoted to captivity and destruction. For although it may not be requisite in prayers, offered for any thing whatever, that one should certainly believe that the thing, which he seeks, shall be granted, it is necessary that the mind of him, who prays, should certainly believe that God, in His omnipotence and mercy, is both able and willing to do that which is asked, if He knows that it will be in accordance with His own grace. But that, which God has decreed not to do, and what He has signified, absolutely, that He will not do, He neither can do, nor will He ever will to do, so long as the decree stands, and it is not right for a believer to intercede with God in his prayers for that thing, if the decree of God has been known to him.

Your third answer is, that "God, as a creditor, can require what Himself may not will to effect." But there is an equivocation or ambiguity in the words, "what Himself may not will to effect." They may be understood, either in reference to that concurrence of God, which is necessary to the doing of that, which He commands, or in reference to that efficacious concurrence by which that, which He commands, is certainly done. If in reference to the latter, it is true.

There is no kind of conflict or contrariety between these two

"demand or command that any thing should be done," and "yet not to do it efficaciously." If in reference to the former, it is not true. For God does not command that, in

reference to which He denies the aid necessary to effect it,

unless any one, of his own fault, deprives himself of that grace, and makes himself unworthy of that aid. The right of creditor remains, if he, who is in debt, is not able to pay by his own fault. But it is not so with the command, in which faith is prescribed; for faith in Christ is not included in the debt which a man was bound to pay according to his primitive creation in the image of God, and the primitive economy under which he lived. For it began to be necessary, after God changed the condition of salvation from legal obedience to faith in Christ.

We come now to "the presentation of the Mediator." consisted both in the fact that the Mediator presented himself to God, the Father, as a victim for the sin of the world, and that the Father, by the word and His spirit, presents the Mediator, having performed the functions of that office, and having obtained remission of sins and eternal redemption to the world, reconciled through him. The former pertains to the provision of salvation, the latter to its application by faith in the same Mediator. The former is the execution of the act of appointment and promise, the latter coincides with the actual offering, which we have previously considered in discussing the promise. But the presentation, as it is defined by you, not immediately antecedent to the application, for between that presentation, and the application, there intervenes the offering of the Mediator by the word and the Holy Spirit.

What you say concerning the virtue and efficacy of the price, paid by Christ, needs a more careful consideration. You say, that "the efficacy of that price, as far as merit is concerned, is infinite"; but you make a distinction between "actual and potential efficacy." You also define "potential efficacy" as synonymous with a sufficiency of price for the whole world. This, however, is a phrase, hitherto unknown among Theologians, who have merely made a distinction between the efficacy and the sufficiency of the merit of Christ. I am not sure, also, but that there is an absurdity in styling efficacy "potential," since there is a contradiction in terms. For all efficacy is actual, as that word has been, hitherto, used by Theologians. But, laying aside phrases, let us consider the thing itself. The ransom or price of the death of Christ, is said to be universal in its sufficiency, but particular in its efficacy, i.e. sufficient for the redemption of the whole world, and for the expiation of all sins, but its efficacy pertains not to all universally, which efficacy consists in actual application by faith and the sacrament of regeneration, as Augustine and Prosper, the Aquitanian, say. If you think so, it is well, and I shall not very much oppose it. But if I rightly understand you, it seems to me that you do not acknowledge the absolute sufficiency of that price, but with the added condition, if God had willed that it should be offered for the sins of the whole world. So then, that, which the School-men declare categorically, namely, that Christ’s death was sufficient for all and for each, is, according to your view, to be expressed hypothetically, that is, in this sense—the death of Christ would be a sufficient price for the sins of the whole world, if God had willed that it should be offered for all men. In this sense, indeed, its sufficiency is absolutely taken away. For if it is not a ransom offered and paid for all, it is, indeed, not a ransom sufficient for all. For the ransom is that, which is offered and paid. Therefore the death of Christ can be said to be sufficient for the redemption of the sins of all men, if God had wished that he should die for all; but it can not be said to be a sufficient ransom, unless it has, in fact, been paid for all. Hence, also, Beza notes an incorrect phraseology, in that distinction, because the sin-offering is said to be absolutely sufficient, which is not such, except on the supposition already set forth. But, indeed, my friend Perkins, the Scripture says, most clearly, in many places, that Christ died for all, for the life of the world, and that by the command and grace of God.

The decree of Predestination prescribes nothing to the universality of the price paid for all by the death of Christ. It is posterior, in the order of nature, to the death of Christ and to its peculiar efficacy. For that decree pertains to the application of the benefits obtained for us by the death of Christ: but his death is the price by which those benefits were prepared. Therefore the assertion is incorrect, and the order is inverted, when it is said that "Christ died only for the elect, and the predestinate." For predestination depends, not only on the death of Christ, but also on the merit of Christ’s death; and hence Christ did not die for those who were predestinated, but they, for whom Christ died; were predestinated, though not all of them. For the universality of the death of Christ extends itself more widely than the object of Predestination. From which it is also concluded that the death of Christ and its merit is antecedent, in nature and order, to Predestination. What else, indeed, is predestination than the preparation of the grace, obtained and provided for us by the death of Christ, and a preparation pertaining to the application, not to the acquisition or provision of grace, not yet existing? For the decree of God, by which He determined to give Christ as a Redeemer to the world, and to appoint him the head only of believers, is prior to the decree, by which He determined to really apply to some, by faith, the grace obtained by the death of Christ.

You allege these reasons in favour of your views, concerning the death of Christ. "Christ did not sacrifice for those for whom also he does not pray, because intercession and sacrifice are conjoined; -- But he prays, not for all, but only for elect and for believers, (John xvii. 9,) and, in his prayer, he offers himself to the Father; -- Therefore he sacrifices not for all, and, consequently, his death is not a ransom for all men.

I reply that the Major does not seem to me to be, in all respects, true. The sacrifice is prior to the intercession. For he could not enter into the heavens that he might intercede for us in the presence of God, except by the blood of his own flesh. It is also prior, as sacrifice has reference to merit, intercession to the application of merit.

For he is called the Mediator by merit and the efficacy of its application. He acquired merit by sacrifice; he intercedes for its application. He does both, as Priest; but he makes that application as King and Head of His church. It is indeed true that Christ, in the days of his flesh, offered up prayers with tears to God, the Father. But those prayers were not offered to obtain the application of merited blessing, but for the assistance of the Spirit, that he might stand firm in the conflict. If, indeed, he then offered up prayers to obtain the application referred to, they depended on the sacrifice, which was to be offered, as though it were already offered. In this order, sacrifice and intercession are related to each other.

In reference to the Minor, I assert, that Christ prayed also for the non-elect. He prayed for those who crucified him, for his enemies, among whom also were non-elect persons. For "the princes of this world" crucified him, and to most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, was not revealed (1 Cor. 2). Secondly, the prayer of Christ, which is contained in the 17th chapter of John, was offered, particularly for those who had believed, and those who should afterwards believe, and, indeed, to obtain and apply to them the blessings merited by the sacrifice of his death. He asks that they may be one with the Father and the Son, as the Father and the Son are one; which He could not ask unless reconciliation had actually been made, or was considered, by God, as having been made. But such is not the character of all the prayers of Christ. Thirdly, I remark that the word "world," in John xvii. 9, properly signifies those who rejected Christ, as preached to them in the word of the gospel, and those who should afterwards reject him. This is apparent from the contrast—"I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me," whom he describes as having believed (8th verse) and as believing at a future time (20th verse). The word is used similarly in many other passages—"The world knew him not" (John ii. 10); "Light has come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light" (iii, 19); "The Spirit of truth, whom the world can not receive" (xvi, 17); "He will reprove the world of sin, because they believe not on me" (xvi, 8, 9); "How is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?" (xvi, 22.) Therefore the extent of the sacrifice is not to be limited by the narrow bounds of that intercession.

I could wish to learn from Illyricus how it can be in accordance with the justice of God, and the infinite value of Christ’s sacrifice, that "prayer is expiatory and the rule of the Sacrifice [Canon Sacrificii]. "I think, not only that Christ did not ask of the Father to regard favourably his sacrifice, but that it was not possible that He should present such a petition: if that is indeed true, which our churches teach and profess with one voice, that the most complete satisfaction was made to the justice of God by the sacrifice of Christ. But that idea originated in the Polish mass, in which, also, are those words-"Canon Sacrificii."

But the words, which contain your conclusion are remarkable, and have no right meaning. What is meant by this? -- "Christ was appointed to be a ransom by the intercession and oblation of the Son." Intercession is subsequent to ransom. Therefore the latter was not appointed by the former. Oblation belongs to the ransom itself, and is therefore prior to the intercession, and could, in no way, be concerned in the appointment of the ransom. But the action itself has the character of an oblation. Hence, also, the ransom itself, as I have already often said, is prior to election. For election is unto life, which has no existence except by the oblation of the ransom; unless we may say that election is unto life, not now existing, nor as yet merited, not even in the decree of God. For he is the "lamb slain from the foundation of the world."

You proceed further, and endeavour, but in vain, to confirm the same sentiment by other arguments. They seem to have some plausibility, but no truth. You say, that "Christ is only the Mediator of those, whose character he sustained on the cross;

But he sustained the character of the elect only on the cross; Therefore he is only the Mediator of the elect." I reply to the Major, that it belongs not to the essence or the nature of Mediator to sustain the character of any one. For he is constituted a Mediator between two dissident parties. Therefore, as Mediator, he sustains the character of neither; unless, indeed, the nature of the mediation be, of necessity, such as to demand that the mediator should sustain the character of one of the parties. But this mediation has such a nature as the justice of God required. For it could enter upon no way of reconciliation with a world, guilty of sin, unless the Mediator should pledge satisfaction, and, in fact, should make it in accordance with the right of surety. This is what is said in 2 Corinthians v. 19, 21, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself—for He hath made him to be sin" for the world, that is, a sin offering. In this sense, also, it is truly said that Christ is not a Mediator, except for those, whose character he sustained. I speak here in respect to the Sacrifice; "For every high priest taken from among men, is ordained from me," &c., (Heb. v. 5, 1.) Here, also, a distinction may be made between the act, by which reconciliation is obtained, and the completion of that act, which is reconciliation. The act, obtaining reconciliation, is the oblation of Christ on the cross. Its completion is the reconciliation. In respect to the act, he sustained our character, for we deserved death, not in respect to the completion. For the effect, resulting frown the oblation, depends on the dignity and excellence of the character of Christ, not of us, whose character he sustained. Indeed, if it be proper to use distinctions of greater nicety, in this place, I may say, that Christ sustained our character, not in respect to action, namely, that of oblation, but of passion. For He was made a curse for us, and an offering for sin. From which it is evident, that, as all men are sinners and obnoxious to the curse, and Christ assumed human nature common to all, it is probable that he sustained the character of all men.

We see this also in the Minor of your syllogism, which is "Christ sustained the character of the elect only on the cross," in which I notice a two-fold fault, that of falsity and that of incorrect phraseology. Its falsity consists in this, that Christ is said to have sustained on the cross the character of the Elect only. I prove it, from the fact that the Scripture no where says this; indeed it asserts the contrary in numerous passages. Christ is called "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i. 29) God is declared to have "so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son" (iii, 16). Christ declares that he will give "his flesh for the life of the world" (vi, 51). "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself" (2 Cor. v. 19). "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 John ii. 2). The Samaritans said "We know that this is indeed the Christ, the saviour of the world" (John iv. 42). Also 1 John iv. 14, "We have seen and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the saviour of the world." That, in the word "world," in these passages, all men, in general, are to be understood, is manifest from these passages and from Scriptural usages. For there is, in my judgment, no passage in the whole Bible, in which it can be proved beyond controversy that the word "world" signifies the Elect. Again, Christ it is said to have died for all, in Hebrews ii. 9, and elsewhere. He is said to be "the saviour of all men, especially of those that believe" (1 Tim. iv. 10), which declaration can not be explained to refer to preservation in this life without perversion and injury. Christ is also styled the "Mediator between God and men" (1 Tim. ii. 5). He is said to have died for those "without strength, ungodly, and yet sinners" (Rom. v. 6-8.)

What I said a little while since, is important also on this point; -- that the case of the whole human race is the same, all being alike conceived and born in sin, and the children of wrath; and that Christ assumed human nature, which is common to all men, not from Abraham only and David, as Matthew traces his genealogy, but also from Adam, to whom Luke goes back in his third chapter. He offered, therefore, the flesh which he had in common with all. "For as much then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also himself likewise took part of the same, &c." (Heb. ii. 14). He offered that flesh for the common cause and the common sin, namely, for the sin of the world, in respect to which there is no difference among men, and the Apostle adds this cause in the passage just cited, "that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death." Let the dignity and excellence of the person, which could offer an equivalent ransom for the sin of all men be added to this. Let the gracious and tender affection of God towards the human race come into consideration, which, in the Scriptures, is usually spoke of by the general term filanqrwpia as in Tit. iii. 4. Which term signifies, in general terms, the love of God towards men; which affection cannot be attributed to God, if He pursues with hatred any man, without reference to his deserts and his sin.

I know that some will reply that God indeed hates no one except on account of sin, but that He destined some to His own just hatred, that is, reprobating some without reference to sin. But in that way the order of things is inverted; for God does not hate because He reprobates, but reprobates cause He hates. He reprobates a sinner, because the sinner and sin are justly hateful and odious to Him. Hatred is an affection in the Deity by which He hates unrighteousness and the unrighteous, as there is in Him also love for righteousness and the righteous. Reprobation is an act of God, internal in purpose, external in execution, and the act is, in the order of nature, subsequent to the affection. The destination of any one to hatred, however it may be considered, has necessarily these two things preceding it, hatred against unrighteousnes, and the foresight that the individual, by his own fault, will be guilty of unrighteousness, by omission or commission.

I know, indeed, that the love of God, referred to, is not in all respects equal towards all men and towards each individual, but I also deny that there is so much difference, in that divine love, towards men that He has determined to act towards some, only according to the rigor of His own law, but towards others according to His own mercy and grace in Christ, as set forth in his gospel. He willed to treat the fallen angels according to that rigor, but all men, fallen in Adam, according to this grace. For every blessing, in which also mercy and long suffering (Exod. xxxiii. 19 & xxxiv, 6-7) are comprehended, He determined to exhibit, in the deliverance and salvation of men. Some, however, may wish to do away with the distinction, which many Theologians make between the fall of angels and that of man. For they say that the angels fell beyond all hope of restoration, but that men could have a complete restoration, and they assign, as a reason, the fact that angels sinned, by their own motion and impulse, and man, by the instigation and persuasion of an evil angel. To all these things, we may add, by way of conclusion, the proper and immediate effect of the death and suffering of Christ, and we shall see that no one of the human race is excluded from it. It is not an actual removal of sins from these or those, not an actual remission of sins, not justification, not an actual redemption of these or these, which can be bestowed upon no one without faith and the Spirit of Christ; but it is reconciliation with God, obtainment from God of remission, justification, and redemption; by which it is effected that God may now be able, as Justice, to which satisfaction has been made, interposes no obstacle, to remit sins and to bestow the spirit of grace upon sinful men. To the communication of these effects to sinners He was already inclined, of His own mercy, on account of which, He gave Christ as the saviour of the world, but, by His justice, He was hindered from the actual communication of them. Meanwhile God maintained His own right to bestow on whom He pleased, and with such conditions as He chose to prescribe, those blessings, (which are His by nature,) the participation in which He, through His mercy, desired to bestow on sinners, but could not actually do it on account of the obstacle of His justice, but which He can now actually bestow, as His justice has been satisfied by the blood and death of Christ; since He, as the injured party, could prescribe the mode of reconciliation, which also He did prescribe, consisting in the death and obedience of His Son and because He has given him to us, to perform, in our behalf, the functions of the Mediatorial office. If we decide that any person is excluded from that effect, we decide, at the same time, that God does not remit his sins unto him, not because He is unwilling to do so, having the ability, but because He has not the ability, as justice presents an obstacle, and because He willed not to be able. He willed that His justice should be satisfied, before He should remit his sins unto any one, and because He did not will that His justice should be satisfied in reference to that person.

On the other hand, also, if we decide that the nature of the Mediation is such, as you seem to conceive, that the sins of all the Elect are taken from them and transferred to Christ, who suffered punishment for them, and, in fact, freed them from punishment, then obedience was required of him, who rendered it, and, by rendering it, merited eternal life, not for himself, but for them, not otherwise than if we had constituted him Mediator in our place, and through him had paid unto God our debt. We must also consider that, according to the rigor of God’s justice and law, immunity from punishment and eternal life are due to the elect, and they can claim those blessings from God, by the right of payment and purchase, and without any rightful claim, on the part of God, to demand faith in Christ and conversion to him. It is not easy to tell under how great absurdities, both the latter and the former opinion labour. I will refute each of them by a single argument. In reference to the former, I argue that, if God was unwilling that satisfaction, for the sins of any, should be rendered to Himself, by the death of His Son, then faith in Christ can not, justly, be demanded of them, they can not, justly, be condemned for unbelief, and Christ can not, justly, be constituted their judge. The latter, I compute by an argument, of very great strength, taken from the writings of the Apostle. The righteousness, rendered by Christ, is not ours in that it is rendered, but in that it is imputed unto us by faith, so that faith itself may be said to be "counted for righteousness" (Rom. iv. 5.) This phrase, if rightly understood, may shed the clearest light on this whole discussion. I conclude, therefore, that Christ bore the character of all men in general, as it is said, and not that of the elect only.

I notice incorrectness of phraseology in the statement that he bore, on the cross, the character of the Elect, when no one is elect, except in Christ, as dead and risen again, and now constituted by God the Head of the church, and the saviour of them who should believe in him, and obey him unto salvation. Therefore, there were no elect, when he was yet hanging on the cross, that is, both of these events being considered as existing in the foreknowledge of God; hence He could not have borne, on the cross, the character of the Elect. On this account, likewise, it would be absurdity to say that Christ bore the character of the reprobate, because reprobation had there no place. But he bore the character of men as sinners, unrighteous, enemies to God, apart from any consideration or distinction between Election and Reprobation. It is evident, then, from this reply, that it can not be concluded, from that argument, that Christ is the Mediator for the Elect only, the work of the Mediator being, now, restricted to the oblation made on the cross.

You advance, also, another argument to prove the truth of your sentiment, and say; -- "Whatever Christ suffered and did as Redeemer, the same things all the redeemed do and suffer in him, and with him; -- But Christ, as Redeemer, died, rose again, ascended, sat down on the right hand of the Father;

Therefore, in him and with him, all the redeemed died, rose again, ascended, sat down at the right hand of the Father." You then assume, as a position by consequence, that "The Elect only die, rise again, ascend, sit at the right hand of the Father, in and with Christ. Therefore, they alone are redeemed." We will inspect and examine both parts of this argument in order.

The Major of this prosyllogism seems to me to be chargeable with notorious falsity, as can, also, be easily demonstrated. For it confounds the sufferings and the actions, by which redemption is effected and obtained, with the completion of redemption itself, and the application of redemption. For redemption does not refer to suffering, or to any action of Christ, but to the completion, the event, and the fruit of that suffering and action; therefore, the sufferings and the actions of Christ are prior to redemption; but redemption is prior to its application. They, however, are called redeemed from the application. Therefore, that, which Christ suffered and did to obtain redemption, the redeemed did not suffer or do. For they were not at that time redeemed, but, by those actions, redemption was obtained, and applied to them by faith, and so they, as the result, were redeemed. The very nature of things clearly proves that redeemer and redeemed are things so related, that the former is the foundation, the latter, the terminus, not vice versa, and, therefore, in the former is comprehended the cause of the other, and indeed the cause, produced by its own efficiency; whence it follows that the redeemed did not that, which was done by the redeemed, since, in that case, they were redeemed before the act of redemption was performed by the redeemer, and the redemption itself was obtained. If you say that you consider the redeemed not as redeemed, but as men to be redeemed, I reply that, in whatever way, they are considered, it can never be truly said that they did, in and with Christ, what Christ did for the sake of redeeming them. For those, who were to be redeemed were not in Christ or with Christ, therefore, they could, neither in him nor with him, suffer or do any thing. You will say that "they suffered and acted in him as a surety and pledge;" but I say in him as constituted a surety not by them, but by God for them, and on him the work of redemption was imposed by God. It is true, indeed, that he assumed from men the nature in which redemption was performed; yet He, not men in him, offered it. But, if they may be said to have suffered, because their nature suffered in the form of Christ, you see that, in this way also, the redemption is general for all those to whom the same nature belongs. Perhaps you refer to those passages of Scripture, in which we are said to be "dead with Christ, buried with him and raised with him" (Rom. vi. 3, 4, 5). Your explanation is unsatisfactory, if it regards them as having reference to our present subject. For those passages treat of the crucifixion, death, burial, and resurrection, which we each, in our own person, endure and experience. But they do not pertain to the meritorious redemption, as the crucifixion, death, &c., of Christ. Again, in those passages, the subject of discussion is that of our engraftment into Christ by faith, and our communion with him, which pertain to the application of redemption; but, here, the subject of discussion is the obtainment of redemption, and the acts which pertain to it. Those passages teach, that we, being grafted into Christ by faith, received from him the power of the Spirit, by which our old man is crucified, dead and buried, and we are resuscitated and raised again into a new life. From this it is apparent that they have no connection with our present subject.