John Tillotson · 13 of 37

Sermon CCXVIII. Of the Nature of Faith in General. · OF THE FAITH OR PERSUASION OF A DIVINE REVELATION.

But without faith it is impossible to please God.—Heb. xi. 6.

I HAVE observed, that a religious and Divine faith comprehends under it three things:

First, A persuasion of the principles of natural religion, which are known by the light of nature.

Secondly, A persuasion of things supernatural and revealed.

Thirdly, A persuasion of supernatural revelation.

The two former of these I have considered, and now proceed to the

Third sort of faith, which I call Divine or religious; viz. a persuasion concerning a Divine revelation, that it is such: which I distinguish from the former thus. The former is a persuasion concerning the things which are revealed from God, that they are true: this is a persuasion concerning the revelation itself, that it is Divine and from God.

For the opening of this there are many things to be taken into consideration.

I. What we understand by a Divine revelation.

II. The several kinds of it.

III. Whether a persuasion concerning a Divine revelation be properly faith.

IV. How we may come to be assured of a Divine revelation, or by what arguments a faith or persuasion of a Divine revelation is wrought in us.

V. The degrees of this persuasion or assurance.

VI. The effects of it.

VII. In what sense it may be said to be a Divine faith; under which I shall speak something concerning the testimony of the Spirit.

I. What we are to understand by a Divine revelation.—Answer. A supernatural discovery or manifestation of things to us. I say supernatural, because it may either be immediately by God, or by the mediation of angels: as most, if not all the revelations of the Old Testament were; a super natural discovery, or manifestation, either immediately to our minds, and inward faculties; (for I do not so well understand the distinction between understanding and imagination, as to be careful to take notice of it;) or else mediately to our understandings, by the mediation of our outward censes; as, by an external appearance to our bodily eyes, or by a voice and sound to the sense of hearing. But of this I have discoursed in a former sermon, and therefore shall add no more here.

II. For the several kinds of Divine revelation; of this also I have formerly discoursed at large.

III. Whether a persuasion of a Divine revelation may properly be called faith? To this I answer, that, according to the strait and narrow notion of faith which the schools have fixed, which is an as sent to any thing grounded upon the testimony and authority of God revealing it, a persuasion of a Divine revelation cannot properly be called faith; because it is irrational to expect that a man should have another Divine revelation to assure him that this is a Divine revelation: for then, for the same reason, I must expect another Divine revelation to assure me of that, and so without end. But I have sufficiently shewn, that this is not the true notion of faith in general, but only of a particular kind of faith; viz. that which is wrought by the argument, which we call testimony or authority. But according to the true and general notion of faith, which is a persuasion of the mind concerning any thing, a persuasion of the mind concerning a Divine revelation, may as properly be called faith, as any thing else, if men will but grant, that a man may be so satisfied, Concerning a Divine revelation, as verily to believe and be persuaded that it is so.

IV. How we may come to be persuaded of a Divine revelation, that it is such; or by what arguments this persuasion is wrought in us? For answer to this, it will be requisite distinctly to consider,

First, The persons to whom a Divine revelation is immediately made, what assurance they can have of it. And,

Secondly, What assurance other persons can have of it. I say these are distinctly to be considered, because there is a very different account to be given of them.

First, As to those persons to whom the revelation is immediately made, the question is, by what arguments or means they may come to be assured, that any revelation which they have, is really and truly such, and not a delusion or imposture. The Jewish doctors tell us, that some kind of Divine revelations do not carry full assurance along with them that they are Divine; such are dreams and visions, as they are distinguished from prophecy: and as to that kind of revelation, which they strictly call prophecy, they give several characteristical notes to distinguish true Divine revelation from delusion; such as these that the spirit of delusion only works upon the imagination, and the lower faculties; the Divine spirit of prophecy upon the understanding and reasonable part of the soul: that delusive inspirations were accompanied with alienation of mind, which did discover itself either in rage and fury, or melancholy; but the true prophetical spirit is always consistent with the use of reason and understanding. They distinguish them likewise by the manner of their seizing upon them; that in the beginning of inspirations the prophets use to have some apparition, or to hear some voice, either articulate in words, or inarticulate by thunder, or the sound of a trumpet, which in the Revelations doth frequently precede St. John’s visions; and by these they were assured that they were Divine. And, lastly, that a Divine inspiration did always carry along with it a strong evidence of its original, and that by the vigour and strength of its impression, they were fully assured and satisfied beyond all doubt and hesitation: thus they. But all that I shall say by way of answer to this question, shall be in these two propositions:

1. If we believe any such thing as Divine revelation, we cannot doubt but those who have it are some way or other fully satisfied of it. The reason is evident; because otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose, and could not possibly attain its end. A Divine revelation cannot possibly signify any thing, or in reason have any effect upon a man, unless he be satisfied it is such: for so long as he does not know but that it is a delusion, he will not attend to it, or regard it. So that the distinction of the Jewish doctors between dreams and visions, and prophecy, that this carries always full assurance with it, the other not, is vain and unreasonable.

2. The means whereby this assurance of a Divine revelation is wrought, is most probably the evidence it carries along with it, whereby it did fully satisfy the person that had it of its Divine original. That God can accompany his own revelations with such a clear and overpowering light as shall discover to us the divinity of them, and satisfy us be yond all doubt and scruple, I think no man can doubt, that considers the vast power and influence which he must needs have over our understandings who made them, and knows the frame of them: and if this be granted, it is not necessary to explain the particular way how it is done, it being a thing not to be expressed in words, but to be felt and experienced. So that the argument, whereby this persuasion of a Divine revelation is wrought in those that have it, is inward experience of the full satisfaction and assurance, which they find to be supernaturally wrought in them; that is, of which they can give no account from themselves. And this is not a stubborn belief, and an obstinate conceit of a thing: but a good man, who is inspired, when he reflects upon himself, and this assurance which he finds in himself, he can give a rational account of it to himself. Thus he finds that it is a foreign impression, and doth not spring from himself, nor hath its rise from thence; therefore he ascribes it to some spirit without himself; and he believes that there is a God that can communicate himself to the minds and spirits of men: and that his goodness is such, that he will not suffer them to be under a necessity of delusion, which they must be, if, when they have the highest assurance and satisfaction, that such a thing is a Divine revelation, they maybe deceived. And then likewise he considers the matter of the revelation, which if it do not contradict any essential and necessary fundamental notion of his understanding, he thinks himself bound to entertain it upon this assurance.

I say, good men may give themselves this rational satisfaction: for I grant a wicked man, that rejects and disobeys the truth of God, may so provoke him, as “to give him up to strong delusions, to believe lies;” and he may be as confident of a lie, as a good man is of truth. But as this is not unjust from God in reference to the persons, so it is no prejudice to the assurance which good men may have of Divine revelation.

And this assurance is such, as it is not in the power of any evil spirit to convey to us, concerning a delusion; or if it be in his power, he is not permitted to do it to any who have not highly provoked God, by rejecting the truth, “to give them up to strong delusions, to believe lies:” and that such persons should be obnoxious to such delusions, as it is not unjust in reference to them, so neither is it any prejudice to the assurance which good men may have of such revelations which are truly and really Divine.

But for the other ways of discerning true revelation from false, which the Jews mention; as, that the Spirit of God always works upon the under standing, as well as the imagination, and in consequence with the use of reason and understanding, and gives some sensible notice of its seizing upon men, I think all these to be uncertain if they be examined. And if the last which they mention, viz. this that I have insisted upon, be true, all the other are superfluous. For what need of any other sign to assure a man that that is a Divine revelation, which carries along with it a clear satisfaction and full assurance that it is such?

So that it remains now, that we fix upon some particular ways where by the person that hath a Di vine revelation may be assured of it; and this I shall do by these propositions.

First, That God can work in the mind of man a firm persuasion of a thing, by giving him a clear and vigorous perception of it; and if so, then God can accompany his own revelations with such a clear and overpowering light, as shall discover to us the divinity of them, and satisfy us thereof be yond all doubt and scruple. And this no man can doubt of, that considers the vast power and influence which God, who made the soul of man, and perfectly knows the frame of it, must needs have upon the mind and understanding of man.

Secondly, God never persuades a man of any thing that contradicts the natural and essential notions of his mind and understanding. For this would be to destroy his own workmanship, and to impose that upon the understanding of a man, which, whilst it retains its own nature, and remains what it is, it cannot possibly admit. For instance: we cannot imagine that God can persuade any man that there is no God; for he that believes any thing as from God, must necessarily believe there is a God; therefore it is impossible that he can be persuaded of this as from God, that there is no God; and that he is not wise and just, and good and powerful; and that he is not to be honoured and loved by all reasonable creatures: because these do clearly and immediately contradict the most essential and fundamental notions of our minds concerning God, and the respect which is due to him: not only because it is unworthy of God to go about to persuade a man of a falsehood; but be cause it is impossible in the nature of the thing, that the mind of man, which is naturally prepossessed with contrary notions, should, whilst it retains its own nature, admit of such as do clearly and immediately contradict them. For if these be natural notions, that there is a God, that he must be wise and just and good and powerful, and ought to be honoured and loved by his creatures; the mind of man cannot possibly admit of any contrary persuasions and impressions: for the former persuasions being natural to us, will always remain while our nature remains, and if any persuasions contrary to these could be wrought upon our minds, they would signify nothing, but would mutually destroy one another. For if any man that is persuaded that God is good, (as every man is, that is persuaded he is at all) could, during the persuasion, be likewise of a contrary persuasion, that he is not good; this latter persuasion would signify nothing: for he is not persuaded that God is not good, whilst he retains this persuasion that he is good.

Thirdly, Supposing the thing revealed do not contradict the essential notions of our minds, no good and holy man hath reason to doubt of any thing, whether it be a revelation from God or not, of which he hath a clear and vigorous perception, and full satisfaction in his own mind that it is such. For if a man may have reason to doubt of any thing, whereof he hath a clear perception, then no man can be certain of any thing. Now that there is such a thing as certainty, is now supposed and not to be proved. I say, a good and holy man can have no reason to doubt: for a wicked man (I grant) may, by a sinful rejection of, and disobedience to, the truth, so far provoke God, as “to give him up to strong delusions to believe lies;” and he may be as confident of a lie, as any good man is of the truth.

And as this is not unjust from God in reference to wicked men, so it is no prejudice to the assurance which good men may have concerning a Divine revelation.

Fourthly, A good and holy man reflecting upon this assurance and persuasion that he hath, may be able to give himself a reasonable account of it, and satisfy himself that it is not a stubborn belief and an obstinate conceit of things without any ground or reason. A good man is secretly and within him self persuaded, that God hath revealed to him such a thing; reflecting upon this persuasion, he finds that it is a foreign impression, and doth not spring from his own mind: how he believing that there is a God, who can, and probably doth communicate and reveal himself to the minds of good men; and being withal satisfied that his goodness is such, that he will not suffer good men, who do heartily and sincerely desire to know his will, to be under a necessity of delusion, (which they unavoidably are, if they may then be deceived, when they have the greatest assurance and clearest satisfaction that such a thing is revealed to them of God;) from hence he reasonably concludes, that he ought not to question the matter any farther. I might instance in the revelation made to Abraham, concerning the sacrificing his son, which hath the greatest difficulty in it of any case I know of: but of that I have else where discoursed at large. Thus much for the first.

Secondly, What assurance can other persons, who have not the revelation immediately made to them, have of a Divine revelation? To this I shall answer by these propositions:

1. That there are some means whereby a man may be assured of another’s revelation that it is Divine. For,

(1.) Otherwise it would signify nothing, but only to the person that immediately had it; which would make void the chief end of most revelations, which are seldom made to particular persons for their own sakes only, but, for the most part, on purpose that they may be made known to others, which could not effectually be done, unless there be some means whereby men may be assured of revelations made to another.

(2.) None could be guilty of unbelief but those who had immediate revelation made to them. For no man is guilty of unbelief that is not obliged to believe: but no man can be under any obligation to believe any thing, who hath not sufficient means whereby he may be assured that such a thing is true.

2. The private assurance and satisfaction of another concerning a revelation made to him, can signify nothing at all to me, to assure me of it. For what satisfaction is it to me, that another may say, he hath a revelation, unless I have some means to be assured that what he saith is true? For if I must believe every spirit, that is, every man that says he is inspired, I lie open to all possible impostures and delusions, and must believe every one that either foolishly conceits, or falsely pretends, that he hath a revelation: for both the conceited and pretended enthusiast will say they have revelations, with as much confidence as those who are truly and divinely inspired: and to take every man’s word in matters of such huge consequence and importance as revelation from God ought to be presumed to be, would not be faith, but credulity, that is, an ungrounded persuasion; which how severely God punished, you may see in that famous instance, (1 Kings xiii.) where the prophet that was sent to Bethel, is upon his return torn in pieces by a lion, because of his credulity and easy belief of a pretended revelation. I confess this case is somewhat different from theirs who simply believe a pretended revelation, as being complicated with some other aggravating circumstances. For he had an immediate revelation from God, “not to eat, nor drink at Bethel; nor to return the same way that he came:” upon his return an old prophet meets him, and tells him that an angel had appeared to him, and had bid him to bring him back, and to cause him to eat and drink; he believes him, and turns in with him. Now this was the aggravation of his credulity that when he himself had had an express revelation from God, concerning which he was satisfied, he hearkened to the pretended revelation of another, concerning which he had no assurance, in contradiction to a Divine revelation, which he knew to be such. Not but that the command which God had given him was in its own nature revokable, and God might have countermanded it by another immediate revelation to him, or by an equivalent, that is, a miracle wrought by the prophet who pretended to countermand it from God; Unumquodque dissolvitur eo modo qui ligatur, the obligation which was brought upon him by an immediate revelation, could not be dissolved but by another immediate revelation, or evidence equivalent to it. However, this instance serves in the general to my purpose, that a man may be faulty by credulity as well as by unbelief: and as a man ought not to disbelieve where there is sufficient evidence; so neither ought he to believe any thing without sufficient grounds of assurance.

3. That miracles wrought for the confirmation of any Divine testimony or revelation made to another, are a sufficient means, whereby those who have not the Divine revelation immediately made to them, may be assured that it is Divine; I say, these are sufficient means of assurance in this case. I do not say they are the only means (for it does not become men to limit the power and wisdom of God), but I do not know of any other means of assurance upon which men can securely rely; and it is a great presumption that this is the best and fittest, if not the only means, because the wisdom of God has always pitched upon it, and constantly made use of it, and no other. Under miracles I comprehend the prediction of future events, which God claims as a peculiar prerogative to himself, because such things are out of the reach of any created understanding; and therefore in the prophet Isaiah he challengeth the idols of the heathens to give this testimony, or argument of their divinity; “Shew us things that are to come, that we may know that ye are gods.”

But here we must distinguish between doubtful and unquestionable miracles. I call those doubtful miracles, which, though a man cannot tell how they can be done by any natural power, yet do not carry that full conviction with them, as to be universally owned and acknowledged for arguments of a Di vine power. Such were those which the magicians did by their enchantments. I call those unquestionable, which, considering their quality and number, and the public manner of doing them, are out of all question. Such were the miracles of Moses, and our Saviour. Now a doubtful, and a single, and a private wonder, or miracle, as I may call it, can give no confirmation to any thing, in opposition to a revelation, or a doctrine, confirmed by many, and public and unquestionable miracles.

Upon this account Moses forbids the children of Israel to hearken to any prophet that should come to seduce them to idolatry; yea, though he should give a sign or wonder, and the “sign or wonder should come to pass,” (Deut. xiii. 1-4.) Now here lies the strength of the reason, “Because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage;” that is, because he contradicts the great revelation which God made of himself, and confirmed by such a succession of so many, and so great miracles; the credit of which revelation ought not in reason to be called in question upon the working of a single and a private wonder, which we could not distinguish from a miracle. Upon the same account St. Paul (Gal. i. 8.) says, “Though an angel from heaven should preach any other doctrine than that which had been preached unto them, he should be accursed;” that is, after so clear and great confirmation, as was given to the gospel, a contrary doctrine, though it should come from an angel, should be rejected as execrable.

But you will say, Suppose such a prophet as Moses speaks of here, such an angel as St. Paul mentions, should work as many and as great miracles as Moses and Christ wrought, should we then believe them?

I answer; This is not to be supposed: for sup posing the providence of God in the world, it can not be imagined that an equal attestation should be given to a false doctrine and a true. But that the greatest and most unquestionable miracles are to carry it, is evident; because this is all the reason why Moses was to be credited above the magicians, because he wrought more and greater wonders than they did. But if it could be supposed, that any one could work as great miracles for the confirmation of idolatry, as were wrought by way of attestation to the true worship of God, then there would be no difference, but what the reason of the thing makes; the belief of one God being more reasonable than many; and not to make an image or sensible representation of a spirit, being more reasonable than to make one. But if this could be supposed, the natural issue and consequence of it would be atheism; a man would believe neither that nor the other, nor that there is any God at all.

But a farther account of the nature and difference of miracles, I reserve to some particular discourses on that subject. At present, for the fuller opening of this matter, it will be proper to shew,—

1. That the Divine authority both of the doctrine of Moses and Christ is resolved into miracles.

2. What assurance of miracles is sufficient to persuade men to believe that testimony, for the confirmation of which they are wrought.

3. What assurance they give us, that the Scriptures are a Divine revelation.

But the consideration of these I refer to the next opportunity.