John Tillotson · 11 of 37

Sermon CCXVIII. Of the Nature of Faith in General. · Part 1

But without faith it is impossible to please God.—Heb. xi. 6.

BEFORE I come to the words themselves, in order to our better understanding of them, we will take into consideration the design of this Epistle, that so we may see more clearly the relation that these words have to the foregoing discourse. Who the penman of this Epistle was, I shall not tell you, be cause I do not know, nor is it much material to know it; but whoever wrote it, he had this very good design in the writing of it, to persuade the Jews to hold fast the profession of the gospel, not withstanding all the sufferings and persecutions it exposed them to. And to this purpose he shews, at large, what prerogatives the gospel had above the legal administration. “The law was given by the disposition of the angels, in the hand of a ,” that is, Moses: but the gospel is revealed to us by the Son of God; a person, not only above Moses, who was a mere man; but above angels. The gospel is the substance and reality of the types and ceremonies, and the very good things themselves, that were obscurely represented by those shadows. It is “a testament established upon better promises,” the clear promises of eternal life, which were but darkly revealed in the Old Testament, that being established either solely or principally upon temporal promises; and it is a perfect and complete dispensation, that hath in it all things requisite to attain its end, and therefore shall never stand in need of any farther change or alteration. These are the heads of those arguments which the author of this Epistle does largely discourse upon.

Now the gospel having in these respects the advantage of the legal dispensation, the apostle doth all along in this Epistle earnestly exhort the Jews to a constant profession and steadfast belief of the gospel, and not to return back from Christianity to Judaism, which was a fur less perfect institution: (chap. ii. 1.) “Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest at any time we should let them slip;” παραῤῥυῶμεν, “lest we should fall away,” so the word may be rendered. And, (chap. iii. 12.) “Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God.” And, (chap. iv. 1.) “Let us therefore fear, lest a promise being left us of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it.” And, (chap. x. 23.) “Let us hold fast the profession of our faith without wavering.

After which he declares the danger of apostacy, or falling off from the belief and profession of the gospel which they had entertained; (ver. 26.) “For if we sin wilfully, after we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin.” He tells them they would be shrewdly tempted to apostacy by the reproaches, afflictions, and persecutions, that they would meet withal: but the promises of the gospel were sufficient to sup port and bear up good men under these, if they were but firmly persuaded of the truth of them; and though they did not for the present receive the things promised, yet a firm belief of them would carry them through all sufferings, and make them hold out under them. “The just shall live by faith,” (ver. 38.)

And having mentioned the power of faith; that is, of a confident persuasion of the truth and reality of the promises of the gospel to support men under sufferings, he gives an account how faith uses to have this influence; (ver. 1.) “Faith is the substance of things hoped for;” so we render the word ὑπόστασις: but it might be much better rendered, both according to the frequent use of it in the Septuagint, and in the New Testament, “a confidence of things hoped for;” that is, a confident expectation of things hoped for, or a firm persuasion that our hopes will not be frustrated. And as this is more agreeable to the scope and design of the apostle, so likewise to the common acceptation of this word in the New Testament, for which I will appeal to two places: (2 Cor. ix. 4.) “that we be not put to shame in this confidence of boasting,” ἐν τῆ ὑποστάσει ταύτη. The other text is in this Epistle, (chap. iii. 14.) “That we hold fast the beginning of our confidence,” τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴς ὑποστάσεως, which is of the very same sense with παῤῥησία, at the sixth verse. “If we hold fast the confidence,” παῤῥησίαν, “and rejoicing of the hope firm unto the end. And the evidence of things not seen,” ἔλεγχος, “the ,” as being convinced, or persuaded of the truth of those things, for which we have no ocular or sensible demonstration. Now if faith in the promises of the gospel do persuade us and give us satisfaction that we shall receive a reward, which will outweigh and countervail our present sufferings, then faith is likely to support us under sufferings.

And, that this is no strange thing which the apostle speaks of faith, he shews that, in all ages, faith hath been the principle of all holy and heroic actions. “By it the elders obtained a good report;” it is that which made the holy men of the Old Testament so famous; and this he proves throughout this chapter, by a large induction of particular instances, in which we see the power of faith, the wonderful effects of it, and the mighty works it hath done in the world.

But because he had said before, that “faith is the evidence (or conviction) of things not seen,” as well as a confident expectation of things hoped for, before he comes to instance in the effects of faith, upon particular persons in the Old Testament, he proves it to be “the evidence of things not seen,” that is, being convinced and persuaded of things of which we have no sensible and ocular demonstration: (ver. 3.) “Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear;” that is, though we were not present at the making of the world, nor did see it framed; yet we are satisfied, and do believe that it was made by the powerful word of God, and that all those things which we see, were not produced out of things which do now appear, but either immediately out of nothing, or a dark confused chaos.

And having thus proved that we may be persuaded of things we do not see, of things past or future, he comes to the particular instances of the holy men of the Old Testament, in whom the power of faith did appear. He begins with Abel, who being persuaded of the being of God, and the perfection and excellency of the Divine nature, and consequently that he was worthy to be served with the best, by virtue of this faith “offered up to God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain.” The second instance is in Enoch, who being persuaded of the being of God, and of his goodness to reward them that serve him, was a righteous man, and studious to please God; and as a reward of this faith and obedience, “God translated him, that he should not see death;” upon which the apostle assumes, (ver. 6.) “but without faith it is impossible to please God.” As if he had said, Unless a man do believe, and be persuaded of some principles, it is impossible any man should be religious, or endeavour to do any thing that is pleasing or acceptable to God: for religion, and the service of God, and an endeavour to please him, do suppose at least that I believe and am persuaded of these two things—of the being, and of the goodness of God; that there is such a being as I serve and seek to please, and that his goodness is such, that it will not be in vain to serve him, he will not let me be a loser by it.

And that here, by pleasing, we are to understand in general, the performing any action of religion, is evident from the equivalent terms which are used in the next words; “For he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him;” where coming to God, and seeking of him, are of the same importance with pleasing him. Now, to come to God, and seek him, in Scripture phrase, signify the sum of religion, it being usual in the language of the Scripture, to express the whole of religion by any eminent principle, or part, or effect of it, as by the knowledge, remembrance, or fear of God, in the Old Testament; by the love of him, and faith in him, in the New, by coming to him, seeking him, calling upon his name, and pleasing of him.

Now, that coming to God, and seeking him, are of the same importance here with pleasing him, will be clear to any that consider the apostle’s reasoning here in the text, which supposeth those to be the same, otherwise there would be no force in his argument. For the proposition which he proves, is, that “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” The argument he useth is this, “If every one that comes to God must believe that he is,” &c. then “without faith it is impossible to please him;” but “every one that comes to God must believe that he is.” Now, unless coming to God, and seeking him, be the same thing with pleasing him, this would be no good argument; for there would be four terms in it; but if these phrases be made equivalent, then the argument is good. Thus, if “every one that comes to God,” that is, that will please him, “must believe that he is,” &c. then “without faith it is impossible to please him:” but “every one that comes to God,” that is, that will please him, “must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him,” or that endeavour to please him; therefore “without faith it is impossible to please him.”

Which proposition doth not only signify that faith is necessary to religion, and a condition with out which it cannot be; but implies likewise, that it is a cause or principle of it; not only the foundation upon which all religion must be built; but the fountain from it springs. For this I take to be implied in the words—not only that there can be no religion unless we believe a God; but supposing this truth firmly believed, that there is a God, it will have a great influence upon men to make them religious. For the apostle having before spoken of the power of faith upon Abel and Enoch, that it put them upon pleasing God, he assumes in the next words, “but without faith,” &c. As if he had said, That ye may know what was the principle of their religion, of their and obedience, let us imagine that a man should believe nothing concerning the being of a God, or the blessedness of those that serve him; what would be the issue? Why this, certainly—there would be no religion, no such thing as serving of God, or endeavouring to please him; for unless we believe that he is, and that he will reward those that seek to please him, it is impossible, that is, it is unreasonable to think men should attempt to please him. So that faith is the cause and principle of religion; it is the thing, quo posito, ponitur effectus; et quo sublato, tollitur. Do but suppose and admit that a man truly believes there is a God, and he will seek to please him: but if you suppose a man believes no such thing, he will cast off all religion. This is the plain meaning of the words; not, as some have thought, that with out faith a man may perform religious actions, but then they would not be accepted, or pleasing to God: but that which the apostle means is, Without faith it is impossible there should be any religion: not that religious acts should be performed in an acceptable manner; as if Cain had offered as good a sacrifice as Abel, only faith made the difference; but Cain did not believe, was not persuaded of the being of God and his excellency, therefore thought to put God off with any thing; Abel believed, and did offer a more excellent sacrifice, not more excellent because it was mixed with faith, but it was more excellent in itself.

The observation therefore from these words is this: that faith is one great principle of all religious actions.

In the handling of this, I shall endeavour,

First, To fix and settle the true notion of faith, whereby we may come to understand the general nature of it.

Secondly, To confirm the truth of the proposition.

Thirdly, Draw some inferences from hence.

First, To settle and fix the true notion of faith, whereby we may come to understand the general nature of it. I find that most who write upon this subject have marvellously puzzled themselves with the various acceptations of this word πίστος, and the verb πιστεύειν, insomuch that some have undertaken to enumerate above twenty distinct significations of this word. I cannot find so many, it may be others may; but hereby, instead of clearing the notion of faith, they have involved it, and made it more intricate, and have made men believe, that it is a notion very remote from common understanding: whereas there is not any word that is in common use that is more plain and easy, and which any one may understand better than this of faith and believing.

Therefore, in the explication of it, I shall attend to the use of it in common speech, and in all authors, as well profane as sacred: and I shall not guide myself by terms of art, which have been received in the schools, and have confounded the meaning of words, by distorting them from the common and received use of them; but shall govern myself by the nature of the things to which this word in common use is applied.

I shall remove two acceptations of it which are less usual, and then fix the common and general notion of it, to which all the other more particular significations may be referred. The two less usual acceptations are these:

First, It is sometimes put for the particular or virtue which is called fidelity, or faithfulness in our promises and contracts; and in this sense it is sometimes used in common discourse, and in all sorts of writers. I shall only mention a text or two where it is so taken: (Matt. xxiii. 23.) “And have omitted the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith/ that is, fidelity. And (Rom. iii. 3.) with relation to God, “Shall their unbelief make the faith of God of none effect?” that is, his faithfulness in his promises. (Tit. ii. 10.) “Not purloining, but shewing all good fidelity,” πίστιν πᾶσαν, “all faith.”

Secondly, It is sometimes put for spiritual gifts, and particularly the gift of miracles, which were wrought by the power of faith. (Rom. xii. 3.) “According as God hath dealt to every man the mea sure of faith;” that is, of spiritual gifts of prophesying, or ministry, or exhortation, as it is explained afterward. (1 Cor. xii. 2.) “To another is given faith by the same Spirit;” that is, a power of miracles in general, as learned interpreters think. Nor doth that which is added afterwards, that “to an other is given the working of miracles,” prejudice this interpretation; for ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων, “the operation of powers,” which we render “of miracles,” seems to signify some special sort of miracles, not the power of miracles in general. And this seems to be favoured by the acceptation of it in the next chapter, ver. 2. “And though I had all faith, so that I could remove mountains;” where faith is undoubtedly taken for the power of miracles.

These being removed, as very alien and remote from the common and usual acceptation of the word, I come now to fix the general notion of faith, to which all other acceptations of it may easily be reduced; and it is this:

Faith is a persuasion of the mind concerning any thing; concerning the truth of any proposition; concerning the existence, or futurition, or lawfulness, or convenience, or possibility, or goodness, of any thing, or the contrary; or concerning the credit of a person, or the contrary. And this notion is not only agreeable to the proper notion of the word πίστις, which comes from πέιθω, to persuade, but is war ranted from the common use of it in this latitude. It is ordinary for men to say, they believe, or are persuaded, such a proposition is true or false, such a thing is or is not, such an event will be or will not be; that such an action is lawful or unlawful, such a thing is good or bad, convenient or inconvenient, possible or impossible to be done; or that they believe such a person, or do not believe him. And I could shew from Scripture, that believing is applied to all these matters, and many more; I will only instance in one or two.

That faith is frequently used for the persuasion of the truth of a doctrine, or of the veracity of God or Christ, I shall not need to produce any texts, there are so many.

That faith is used for a persuasion of the lawfulness of an action, the 14th chapter to the Romans doth abundantly testify. (Ver. 2.) “One believeth that he may eat all things;” that is, is persuaded in his mind that all sorts of meat are lawful without distinction. (Ver. 22.) “Hast thou faith?” that is, art thou persuaded or satisfied in thy mind of the lawfulness of those indifferent things he had been speaking of? (Ver. 23.) “He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith: for whatsoever is not of faith, is sin;” that is, what ever is not done with the persuasion and satisfaction of our minds that we may lawfully do it, “is sin.” I shall trouble you with no more instances.

Now this being the general notion of faith, that it is a persuasion of the mind concerning any thing, from hence by a metonymy it comes to be put for the argument whereby this persuasion is wrought in us. Hence it is, that among the rhetoricians πίστεις are any kind of argument or proof which orators make use of to persuade men; and there is one place in the New Testament, where in πίστις seems to be used in this sense, or very near it, (Acts xvii. 31.) “Because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world,” &c. “whereof he hath given unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead,” πίστιν παρασχὼν πᾶσιν, “having offered faith to all men;” that is, having given ns this argument for the proof of it, that “he raised Christ from the dead.”

Sometimes it is put for the object of this persuasion, or the matter or thing whereof we are persuaded. And thus frequently in the New Testament, the gospel, which is the object of our faith, the thing which we believe, is called faith. And thus you find it used in that phrase of “obedience to the faith,” that is, to the gospel, (Acts vi. 7. Rom. i. 5; xvi. 26.) And in this sense faith, that is the gospel, is frequently opposed to the dispensation of the law, (Rom. iii. 27, 31, and x. 16, Gal. i. 23.) “He that persecuted us in times past, now preacheth the faith which he once destroyed.” (Gal. iii. 2.) The hearing of the gospel is called the “hearing of faith;” (ver. 23.) “Before faith came;” (and ver. 25.) “But after that faith is come.” (Eph. iv. 5.) “There is one faith,” that is, one gospel which we believe. (1 Tim. iv. 6.) “Nourished up in the words of faith and of good doctrine.”

The opposites to faith, are unbelief and credulity. Unbelief, which is a not being persuaded of a thing, is the deficient extreme: or doubting, if it prevail to a degree of unbelief: and credulity, which is an easiness to believe things without any probable argument to induce our persuasion, is the redundant extreme.

The seat or subject of faith is the mind, or the heart, as the Scripture usually calls it. “With the heart man believes,” that is, with the soul: for I do not understand any real distinction of faculties; but if you will distinguish them, the proper seat of this persuasion is the understanding; the immediate effect of it is upon the will; by which it works upon the affections and the life.

And faith in this general notion is not opposed to error, and knowledge, and opinion: but comprehends all these under it. For if a man be persuaded of that which is false, he “believes a lie,” as the Scripture expresseth it; a man may be certainly persuaded of a thing, that is, firmly believe it, which is knowledge; a man may be probably persuaded of a thing, that is, believe it with some diffidence and uncertainty, and that is opinion.

But for our better understanding of this general notion of faith, we will take into consideration these four things:

I. The cause of it, or the argument whereby it is wrought.

II. The degrees of it, and the difference of them.

III. The natural efficacy and operation of it.

IV. The several kinds of it.

I. We will consider the cause of faith, or the argument whereby it is wrought. Now all the arguments whereby faith may be wrought in us, that is, a persuasion of any thing, will I think fall under one of these four heads; sense, experience, reason drawn from the thing, or the authority and testimony of some person.

1. Sense. Hence it is commonly said, that “seeing is believing,” that is, one of the best arguments to persuade us of any thing. That faith may be wrought by this argument, appears both from the nature of the thing, nothing being more apt to persuade us of any thing than our senses; and from several expressions in Scripture. I will instance in one for all. (John xx. 8.) “Then went in also the other disciple into the sepulchre, and he saw, and believed.” And whereas Scripture opposeth faith to sight, as, (2 Cor. v. 7.) “We walk by faith, and not by sight;” (Heb. xi. 1.) “It is the evidence of things not seen;” we are to understand that only concerning a belief of the things. of another world, which are futurities, and invisible, which the apostle is there speaking of; or of things which are of the same nature with these, as things past: not but that a man may very well be induced to believe a thing by his senses.

2. Experience; which, though it may be sensible, and then it is the same argument with sense; yet sometimes it is not, and then it is an argument distinct from it. As for example: a man may by experience be persuaded or induced to believe this proposition—that his will is free, that he can do this, or not do it; which is a better argument than a demonstration to the contrary, if there could be one.

3. Reasons drawn from the thing; which may either be necessary and concluding, or else only probable and plausible.

4. The authority and testimony of some credible person. Now two things give authority and credit to the relation, or testimony, or assertion of a person concerning any thing; ability and integrity. Ability, if he can be presumed to have a competent knowledge of what he relates, or asserts, or testifies; and integrity, if he may be presumed to be honest in his relation, and free from any design, or will to deceive. And to these heads, I think all arguments of belief may be reduced.

II. The second thing to be considered is the degrees of faith, and the difference of them. And that there are degrees, I take for granted, though I shall afterwards have occasion to prove it in a Divine faith; and these depend perfectly upon the capacity of the person that believes, or is persuaded. Now the capacity, or incapacity of persons are infinitely various, and not to be reduced to theory; but sup posing a competent capacity in the person, then the degrees of faith or persuasion take their difference from the arguments, or motives, or inducements which are used to persuade. Where sense is the argument, there is the highest and firmest degree of faith, or persuasion. Next to that is experience, which is beyond any argument or reason from the thing. The faith or persuasion which is wrought in us by reasons from the thing, the degrees of it are as the reasons are: if they be necessary and concluding, it is firm and certain in its kind; if only probable, according to the degrees of probability, it hath more or less of doubting mixed with it. Lastly, the faith which is wrought in us by testimony or authority of a person, takes its degrees from the credit of a person, that is, his ability and integrity. Now because “all men are liars,” that is, either may deceive, or be deceived, their testimony partakes of their infirmity, and so doth the degree of persuasion wrought by it: but God being both infallible and true, and consequently it being impossible that he should either deceive, or be deceived, his testimony begets the firmest persuasion, and the highest degree of faith in its kind. But then it is to be considered, that there not being a revelation of a revelation in infinitum; that this is a Divine testimony and revelation, we can only have rational assurance; and the degree of the faith or persuasion which is wrought by a Divine testimony will be according to the strength of the arguments which we have to persuade us that such a testimony is Divine.

III. For the efficacy or operation of faith we are to consider, that the things we may believe or be persuaded of are of two sorts. Either, 1. They are such as do not concern me; and then the mind rests in a naked and simple belief of them, and a faith or persuasion of such things has no effect upon me; but is apt to have, if ever it happen that the matter do concern me: or else, 2. The thing I believe or am persuaded of doth concern me; and then it hath several effects according to the nature of the thing I am persuaded of, or the degree of the persuasion, or the capacity of the person that believes or is persuaded. If the thing believed be of great moment, the effect of the faith is proportionable, cæteris paribus; and so according to the degree of the persuasion: but if the person be indisposed to the proper effects of such a persuasion by the power of contrary habits, as it often happens, the effect will be obtained with more difficulty, and may possibly be totally defeated, by casting off the persuasion: for while it remains, it will operate, and endeavour and strive to work its proper effect. For example: a man may believe that wine is very pernicious to him; and yet a strong inclination to it may render it very difficult for this persuasion to work its proper effect upon him, which is to leave off wine, and may at length wholly defeat it, by furnishing him with some colour of argument that may persuade him otherwise.

IV. For the kinds of faith, they are several, according to the variety of objects or things believed. I shall reduce them all under these two general heads:

1. Faith is either civil or human, under which I comprehend the persuasion of things moral, and natural, and political, and the like: or,

2. Divine and religious; that is, a persuasion of things that concern religion. I know not whether these terms be proper, nor am I very solicitous, be cause I know none fitter, and tell you what I mean by them.

The first kind of faith, concerning things human and civil, I shall not speak of, it being besides my design.

The second, which I call a religious and Divine faith, comprehends three things under it, which are distinctly to be considered.

1. A persuasion of the principles of natural religion, which are known by the light of nature; as, the existence of a God, the immortality of the soul, and a future state.

2. A persuasion of things supernatural and revealed.

3. A persuasion of supernatural revelation.—These I design fully to handle. Thus I have prepared materials for a large discourse; which, though it be necessary, is, I am sensible, but too tedious, and yet possibly more tedious to me than you.