John Tillotson · 12 of 37

Sermon CCXVIII. Of the Nature of Faith in General. · OF A RELIGIOUS AND DIVINE FAITH.

But without faith it is impossible to please God.—Heb. xi. 6.

IN my last discourse I came to treat of a religious and Divine faith, which, I told you, comprehends under it three things, which I now proceed to consider distinctly.

First, A persuasion of the principles of natural religion which are known by the light of nature.

Secondly, A persuasion of things supernatural and revealed.

Thirdly, A persuasion of supernatural revelation.

First, A persuasion of the principles of natural religion, such as the light of nature could discover; such are the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and a future state. The things to be inquired concerning this kind of faith are these:

I. Whether this be truly and properly called faith.

II. What are the arguments whereby it is wrought.

III. Whether it admit of degrees or not, and what differences are observable in them.

IV. What are the proper and genuine effects of it.

V. In what sense it may be said to be Divine faith.

I. Whether it may truly and properly be called faith, or not? If the general notion of faith which I have fixed before, viz. That it is a persuasion of the mind concerning any thing, be a true notion of faith, then there is no doubt but this may as properly be called faith, as any thing can be; because a man may be persuaded in his mind concerning these things, that there is a God, that our souls are immortal, that there is another state after this life.

But besides this, if the Scripture speaks properly, as we have reason to believe it does, especially when it treats professedly of any thing, as the apostle here does, then this question is fully decided: for it is evident to any one that will but read this verse, out of which I have taken my text, that the apostle doth here in this place speak of this kind of faith; that is, a belief or persuasion of the principles of natural religion. For after the apostle had said, that “without faith it is impossible to please God,” he immediately instanceth in the belief of the principles of natural religion, as necessary to the pleasing of God, that is, to make a man religious. “He that cometh to God must believe that he is;” there is the existence of God, the first principle of natural religion; “and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him;” which implies the other two, the immortality of the soul, and a future state; for if good men shall be rewarded, there must be a subject capable of such rewards, which brings in the immortality of the soul; and there must be a season for these rewards, which because they are seldom bestowed in this world, there must be a season when they shall, which brings in a future state after this life. So that whoever denies that a persuasion of these principles of natural religion may properly be called faith, he quarrels with the apostle, and does not correct me, but the Scriptures.

II. What are the arguments whereby this faith, or the persuasion of these principles of natural religion, is wrought? You may remember that I reduced all those arguments, whereby any kind of faith or persuasion is wrought in us, to these four heads; sense, experience, reasons drawn from the thing, and the testimony or authority of some person. Now a faith or persuasion of these principles cannot be wrought in us by sense; for “no man hath seen God at any time,” and being a pure spirit, he cannot be the object of any corporeal sense. Nor can the soul, or any mode of its existence, fall under any of our senses; nor a future state; because sense is only of things present. Nor can it be wrought in us merely by experience: for no man can conclude from any thing he experienceth in himself that there is a God, unless he be first persuaded of it by other arguments: and the immortality of the soul, and a future state, are things which none in this life can experience. Nor can the authority or testimony of any person be the argument that induceth that persuasion. Not any human authority: for these things are of such consequence, and so much depends upon them, that is, the belief of them puts us upon so many things which men would not do if they did not believe them; as particularly the venturing of our lives upon the account of religion, and all our worldly interests, if occasion call for it; that it were a fond thing to take matters of such moment and importance upon any man’s bare word, without other assurance of them. Nor can the testimony or authority of God be the argument that persuades me of the existence of a God. I grant that for the other two, the immortality of the soul, and a future state, it is an excellent, and may be a sufficient argument. Though that these may be proved like wise by other arguments without a revelation, is evident in the heathens, who by the light of nature did assent to them without a revelation. But a Di vine revelation cannot possibly be an argument inducing me to believe the existence of a God, for this plain reason; because a Divine revelation can be no argument to any that is not persuaded that it is a Divine revelation: but before I can be persuaded that any revelation is from God, I must be persuaded there is a God; and if so, there is no need of this argument to prove to me that there is one: and therefore, you do not find it any where revealed in all the Scripture, that there is a God. The Scripture often declares that Jehovah is the true and living God, and that “besides him there is no other:” but it doth not reveal, but every where suppose, that there is one.

It remains, then, that it must be another kind of argument whereby we must be persuaded of the existence of a God, and that is, by such reasons as may be drawn from things themselves to persuade us hereof; as, either from the notion and idea which we have of a God; that he is a being that hath all perfections, whereof necessary existence is one, and consequently that he must be; or else from the universal consent of all nations, and the generality of persons agreeing in this apprehension, which cannot be attributed reasonably to any other cause, than to impressions stamped upon our understandings by God himself; or (which is most plain of all) from this visible frame of the world, which we cannot, without great violence to our understandings, impute to any other cause than a Being endowed with infinite goodness, and power, and wisdom, which is that we call God.

As for the other two principles of natural religion, the immortality of the soul, and a future state, after we believe a God, we may be persuaded of these from Divine revelation; and that doth give us the highest and firmest assurance of them in the resurrection of Christ from the dead. Yet I do not find but that these also are rather supposed, than expressly revealed, in the Bible. Indeed, the immortality of the soul may be inferred from several places of Scripture, and the tenor of the whole Bible: and so a future state, which, as for the thing itself, seems to be supposed as a thing acknowledged by natural light; only the Scripture hath revealed the circumstances of it more particularly to us, and given us higher assurance of the thing: but if there were no revelation, men might be persuaded of these; and so the heathens were by arguments drawn partly from the operations of the soul, which would almost persuade any man that the soul is immortal; it being altogether unimaginable how a principle that is nothing else but matter, can either understand, or determine itself by its own will; all the motions of matter that we know of, or can imagine, being necessary; and partly from the justice and goodness of God. The consideration of God’s goodness would persuade a man, that as he made all things very good, so he made them of the longest duration they were capable of; and the justice of God would easily induce a man to believe, seeing the providence of God doth generally in this life deal promiscuously with good and bad men, that there shall be a day which make a difference, and every man shall receive according to his works.

But J do not intend to insist upon these arguments; all that I design is, to shew what kind of arguments do work a faith and persuasion in men concerning these principles of natural religion; and they are reasons drawn from the thing.

And it is not always necessary to the working of this faith or persuasion, that these reasons should necessarily, yea, or truly conclude the principle to be believed; if they do it probably, and it appear so to me, it is enough to beget a persuasion in me of such a thing. There are many men entertain the greatest truths, and are firmly persuaded of them, upon an incompetent argument, and such as might persuade them of any thing else as well; and such persons, if they have capacity and understanding, they are rather happy than wise in their religion. It falls out well that they happen to be in the right; for they might have been in the wrong upon the same terms. But if the persons who believe the principles of religion on insufficient arguments, and their belief have a real effect upon them, as it will if it be true and permanent, if they be ignorant, and such as want the ordinary advantage of improving their knowledge, they are wise enough; that is, they are as wise as God’s providence hath made them, and the circumstances of their education, and the condition of their life, will let them be.

The third thing to be inquired is, Whether this faith or persuasion of the principles of natural religion admit degrees or not? And what differences are observable in them? That it does admit degrees, that is, that a man may be more or less persuaded of the truth of those principles, is evident from the heathens; some of whom did yield a more firm and unshaken assent to them; others entertained them with a more faint persuasion of them, especially of the immortality of the soul, and a future state, about which most of them had many qualms and doubts. Of all the heathens, Socrates seems to have had the truest and firmest persuasion of these things; which he did not only testify in words, but by the constancy, and calmness, and sedate courage which he manifested at his death. Indeed in his discourse before his death, he says, “He did not know whether his soul shall remain after his body, and whether there be a happiness reserved for good men in another world: but he thought so, and had such hopes of it, that he was very willing to venture his life upon these hopes.” Which words, though they seem to be spoke doubtingly, as the manner of the Academy was; yet, considering his manner of speaking, which was modest, and not peremptory and dogmatical, they signify as great a confidence as he had of any thing, and they are high expressions of assurance. For we may believe that the man who dies for any thing, how modestly soever he may express himself, is very well assured of the truth of it. So that this faith and persuasion admits of degrees, the difference whereof is to be resolved partly into the capacity of the persons who believe, and partly into the strength, or at least appearance of strength, in the arguments whereby it is wrought.

The fourth thing to be inquired is, What are the proper and genuine effects of this faith or persuasion? Now that, in a word, is natural religion, which consists in apprehensions of God suitable to his nature, and affections towards him suitable to these apprehensions, and actions suitable to both. He that believes there is such a being in the world as God, that is, one infinitely good, and wise, and powerful, and just, and holy, and (in a word) clothed with all excellency, will have a great esteem and reverence for him, and love to him, which he will testify in those outward expressions of respect which we call worship. He that believes that this being is the original of all good, that he made the world, and all the creatures in it, and preserves and governs them, he will depend upon him, and seek to him for every good thing, and acknowledge him for the author of them; which brings in prayer and thanks giving. He that believes that he owes his being to God, and all the blessings of his life, will think it reasonable that he should be at his disposal, will be willing to be governed by his laws, and ready to submit to his pleasure; which brings in obedience and submission to the will of God. He that believes there is another life after this, wherein men shall be rewarded or punished, according as they have demeaned themselves well or ill in this world, he will be encouraged to piety and virtue, and afraid to do any thing which his own reason tells him is displeasing to the Deity, as he cannot but believe every thing is, that is contrary to the nature of God, or the perfection of his own nature, or the good order and happiness of the world; which brings in temperance and justice, and all other real virtues. And that the belief of these principles had this effect upon several of the heathens, to make them in a good degree religious and virtuous, I doubt not; the moral and honest lives of many of them, give real testimony of this; which natural religion and morality of theirs, how far it may avail them for their good, we are not concerned to determine. This we are sure of, that it will make their condition more tolerable in another world; and if they fall under condemnation, it will mitigate and allay their misery.

V. In what sense this faith or persuasion of the principles of natural religion may be said to be Divine? In these two respects:

1. In respect of the object of it, or matters to be believed, which are Divine, and do immediately concern religion, in opposition to that which I call a civil and human faith, which is of such things as do not immediately concern God and religion.

2. In respect of the Divine effect of it, which are to make men religious, and like God. And a faith may as properly be said to be Divine in respect of the object of it, as in respect of the argument whereby it is wrought; so that a faith of the principles of natural religion is as truly Divine, though it be not wrought in us by the arguments of Divine testimony and authority, as a faith of the matters of Divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures: for why a faith may not as well be said to be Divine for its relation to God as the object of it, as for its relation to the testimony of God, as the cause of it, I cannot understand.

Secondly, The second sort of faith, which I call Divine or religious, is a persuasion of things supernaturally revealed, of things which are not known by natural light, but by some more immediate manifestation and discovery from God. Thus we find our Saviour (Matt. xvi. 15-17.) opposeth Divine revelation to the discovery of natural reason and light. He asks his disciples whom they believed him to be, “Whom say ye that I am? And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art the Christ, (that is, the Messias) the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed this unto thee; but my Father which is in heaven;” where a revelation or discovery from flesh and blood, is opposed to a revelation from God; “flesh and blood” being a Hebrew phrase or manner of speaking, signifying a mere man, or some thing merely human; so we mid the phrase used, Eph. vi. 12. “We wrestle not against flesh and blood; but against principalities, and powers, and spiritual wickedness;” that is, the enemies we are to contend with, are not only men, but devils; and which is nearer to our purpose, (Gal. i. 16.) where the apostle would express to us, that he received not his commission from men, but immediately from the Lord Jesus Christ, he tells us, that “when it pleased God, who separated him from his mother’s womb, and called him by his grace, to reveal his Son in him, that he might preach him among the heathen, immediately he conferred not with flesh and blood;” the word is προσανεθέμην, “I did not apply myself to flesh and blood;” that is, I did not go to men to receive my commission from them: for so he explains it in the next words, “neither went I up to Jerusalem, to them that were apostles before me:” that is, I did not apply myself to the apostles, to derive any authority from them to preach the gospel, because he had no need of that, being called immediately by Christ to this work; which words are nothing else but a farther explication of what he had said before, (ver. 11, 12.) “I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached by me, is not after men: for I neither received it of man, neither was taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ.” So accordingly here our Saviour tells Peter, that this truth, that Christ was the Messias, the Son of the living God, was not revealed to him by man, nor by any mere human principle or testimony, “but by his Father which was in heaven;” that is, by the testimony which God himself gave of him in the holy and Divine gospel which he taught, and those miracles which he wrought in confirmation of it.

So that this kind of faith is a persuasion of such things, as are not known by natural light, nor discovered to us by men; but some way or other revealed by God: I say, some way or other, for the ways of God’s revealing and manifesting himself to us, are various and arbitrary. God may choose what ways he pleaseth to discover himself to us by. So the apostle tells us, (Heb. i. 1.) “God who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets.” God revealed himself, as at several times, by several steps and degrees, so in various manners; sometimes by visions, sometimes by dreams, sometimes by oracles, sometimes by a spirit of prophecy, sometimes by a voice from heaven, and sometimes by a secret and gentle inspiration. Now it matters not which of these ways God chooseth to reveal himself to us, provided we have sufficient evidence and grounds of assurance that the thing is revealed by God.

As to us, these extraordinary ways of revelation are now ceased, and we have a fixed and a standing revelation, that is, the records of those revelations which God formerly made to holy men; and this is the Holy Scriptures, or the Bible, which is a system or collection of things supernaturally revealed.

Now if this faith be considered as restrained to a part of Divine revelation, viz. the doctrine of the gospel, revealed to the world by Jesus Christ, then it is properly Christian faith, which frequently, in the New Testament, is called faith, κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν, by way of excellency and eminency, this being the most eminent and perfect revelation which God hath made of himself to the world, which the apostle, at the beginning of this Epistle, advanceth above all those former revelations which God had made of himself to the fathers, those being by his servants and ministers, prophets and angels: “But in these last days God hath revealed himself to us by his Son, whom he hath made heir of all things,” and advanced to a dignity above that of men or angels.

And with relation to this faith of the gospel, Christians are peculiarly and eminently called believers: (I Thess. ii. 10.) “You know how unblameably we behaved ourselves among you that believe,” that is, among you Christians. (2 Thess. i. 10.) “When he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that believe,” meaning the Christians that entertain the gospel. And upon the same account, the apostle calls the whole society, or body of Christians, “the household of faith,” (Gal. vi. 10.)

But now I am considering faith, not in this more narrow and restrained sense, for a belief or persuasion of the doctrine of the gospel; but in a more large and comprehensive sense, for a persuasion of all things that are supernaturally revealed, that is, of all things contained in the Holy Scriptures.

Now, all the matters of Divine revelation, which are contained in the book of Holy Scripture, may, I think, be reduced to one of these six heads:

1. They are either a history or relation of some person, or matter of fact; and a faith of the historical part of Scripture, is nothing else but a persuasion that those narrations, or relations, are true. Or,

2. A prophecy, or prediction of some event. Now a faith of the prophetical part of Scripture, is a persuasion that the event foretold will certainly come to pass. Or,

3. A doctrine: such as are all those propositions in Scripture, which declare to us the nature or properties of God, the nature and office of Christ, that he is the eternal Son of God, that is, true God, the Messias, or Saviour of the world, the king, priest, and prophet of his church, and the like. Now a faith of the doctrinal part of Scripture, is a persuasion, that those propositions which contain these doctrines are true. Or,

4. Laws for the ordering and governing of our spirits and lives, under which I comprehend all the precepts and prohibitions of Scripture, which are the matter of our duty. Now a faith of these, is a persuasion, that God hath commanded, and forbid den such things; and consequently that they are necessary to be observed by us. Or,

5. Promises of good things, either with relation to this life or the other. Now a faith of the promises, is a persuasion or confident expectation that they will be accomplished. And thus the apostle describes the faith of the promises of another world, at the first verse of this chapter, that it is “the substance of things hoped for.” ὑπόστασις, that is, a “confident expectation” that the promises of the gospel, which are the matter of our hope, shall be accomplished; “and the evidence of things not seen,” a being convinced of the certainty and reality of future and invisible things. And thus likewise, the apostle explains to us the faith of Abraham, in reference to the promises of God, to give him a son: (Rom. iv. 21.) “He was fully persuaded, that what he had promised he was able to perform.” Or,

6. Threatenings. Now a faith of the threatenings, is a persuasion of the danger we incur, if we neglect our duty; that is, a belief that God justly may, and will (having confirmed his threatenings with an oath, which is a sign of the immutable determination of the Divine will) inflict those punishments upon us, which he hath threatened, in case we disobey his laws. These six heads do, I think, contain all, I am sure the most principal matters of Divine revelation, which I have the more care fully distinguished, because some of them are of a distinct and peculiar consideration from the rest, as will afterwards appear.

Having thus, as plainly and briefly as I could, opened to you, what I mean by this second sort of Divine faith, which is a persuasion of things supernaturally revealed, I come now to satisfy such inquiries about this as may be most material. And here I shall proceed upon those heads of inquiry which I handled when I spake of the first sort of Divine faith.

I. Whether this may truly and properly be called faith?

II. What is the argument whereby this faith is wrought?

III. Whether it admit of degrees, and what are the differences of them?

IV. What are the proper and genuine effects of this faith?

V. In what respects it may be said to be Divine?

I. Whether this may truly and properly be called faith? And that it may, is evident, because the general definition of faith agrees to it; for a man may be persuaded in his mind concerning things supernaturally revealed; and the Scripture every where calls a persuasion of these matters by the name of faith. But besides this, it seems this is the adequate and only notion of faith, as it hath been fixed by the schools, and is become a term of art. For the definition that the schools give of faith is this; that it is an assent to a thing credible, as credible. Now, say they, that is credible which relies upon the testimony of a credible person; and consequently, a human faith is that which relies upon human testimony; and a Divine faith, that which relies upon the testimony or authority of God; which definition, though it be short and imperfect, (being, indeed, not a definition of faith in general, but of a particular kind of faith, viz. that which is wrought by the argument which we call testimony or authority, and consequently excludes a belief of the principles of natural religion, and a belief that the Scriptures are the word of God, from being faith), yet this shews thus much, that all agree in this, that a persuasion of things supernaturally revealed is truly and properly faith.

II. What is the argument whereby this faith or persuasion of things supernaturally revealed is wrought in us? And this, by the general consent of all, is the testimony or authority of God, some way or other revealing these things to us; whose infallible and unerring knowledge, together with his goodness and authority, gives us the highest assurance, that he neither can be deceived himself, nor will deceive us in any thing that he reveals to ns. I say, the testimony or authority of God some way or other revealing things to us, is the argument whereby a faith of any supernatural revelation is wrought in us: but if we restrain all supernatural revelations to the Bible, as I told you we know of no other, then the particular kind of testimony whereby this faith is wrought in us, is the written word of God.

III. As to the degrees of this faith. Supposing men sufficiently satisfied that the Scriptures are the word of God, that is, a Divine revelation; then all those who are sufficiently satisfied of this, do equally believe the things contained in the Scriptures. For if men be once fully satisfied that God hath spoken any thing, I think no man makes the least doubt but what God says is true. Now, there can be no degrees of faith where there is no doubt of the contrary; all the degrees that are in faith arising from a greater or less mixture of doubting. So that those who do not at all doubt but that the Scriptures are the word of God, have the same degree of persuasion concerning the matters contained in them; and that no man doubts whether what God says is true, ariseth from the fixed and constant notion which men universally have of God, that he is infallible and true. Therefore, we find, (Matt. xxi. 25.) when our Saviour puts the dilemma to the pharisees concerning the baptism of John, “whether it were from heaven, or of men?” that “they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say unto us, Why then did ye not believe him?” Which kind of reasoning imports thus much: that it is universally acknowledged, that no man can in reason make the least doubt of that which he believes to be from God. Therefore, a man would wonder what Becanus, the Jesuit, meant, unless it were to abuse the prophets and apostles, when he says, (tom. iii.) of his school divinity, that the prophets and apostles had evidentiam revelationis, non autem evidentiam primæ veritatis: tametsi enim evidenter cognoscerent Deum esse, qui ipsis revelabat mysteria fidei, non tamen evidenter cognoscebant Deum esse summe veracem, qui nec falii potuit, nec fallere: that is, “Though it was sufficiently evident to the prophets and apostles, that those revelations which they had were from God, yet it was not evident to them, that Divine revelations are true; for though they did evidently know, that there was a God, who revealed to them the mysteries of faith, yet they did not evidently know that God was in fallible and true, who could neither deceive nor be deceived.” By which he doth not only make the prophets and apostles idiots, and destitute of one of the most common notions of human nature, which is, that God is infallible and true; but he doth likewise make all Divine revelation useless, and to no purpose. For, to what purpose is it for a man to be satisfied, that God reveals such a thing to him; if he be in the mean time unsatisfied, whether what God reveals is true? for no man that is unsatisfied, whether what God reveals be true, can, upon any tolerable ground of reason, yield a firm assent to Divine revelation. But it is pity to spend time in confuting any thing which confutes itself by its own absurdity, and its direct contradiction to the common notions of human nature. I proceed, therefore.

Supposing any man be unsatisfied, and do make any doubt whether these books called the Holy Scriptures, or any of them, be the word of God, that is, a Divine revelation; proportionably to the degree of his doubting concerning the Divine authority of the Scriptures, there will be an abatement of his faith, as to the things contained in them: for he that believes a thing merely upon the credit or testimony of such a person; so much reason as he hath to doubt, whether such a person did speak, or testify such a thing, so much reason he hath to doubt whether the thing be true.

And upon this account I think it is, that the Scripture speaks of degrees of faith; of growing and increasing in faith; of a strong faith, that is, such a faith as was either wholly, or in a great measure, free from doubting; and of a weak faith, that is, such a faith as had a great mixture of doubting; by which we are not to understand, that they doubted of the truth of any thing of which they were satisfied by a Divine revelation; but that they doubted whether such things were Divine revelations or not. So that the great doubt of the disciples was, whether Christ were the true Messias, and really the Son of God; for so far as they were satisfied of that, they could not doubt of any thing he said.

IV. What are the proper and genuine effects of this faith? The proper and genuine effects of the belief of the Scriptures in general, is the conformity of our hearts and lives to what we believe; that is, to be such persons, and to live such lives, as it becomes those who do heartily believe, and are really persuaded of the truth of the Scriptures. And if this be a constant and abiding persuasion, it will produce this effect; but with more or less difficulty, according to the disposition of the subject, and the weakness or strength of contrary habits and inclinations. More particularly the effects of this faith are according to the nature of the matter believed. If it be a history or relation of things past, or prophecy of things to come; it hath an effect upon men so far as the history or prophecy doth concern them. If it be a doctrine; it hath the effect which the particular nature and tendency of such a doctrine requires. For instance: the doctrine of God’s goodness is apt to inflame us with love to him; of his power and justice, with a fear and awe of him. This doctrine, that Christ is the Saviour of the world, the proper effect of it is to make men rely upon him for salvation; and so of the rest. If it be a precept, the proper effect of it is obedience: and hence it is that unbelief and disobedience are frequently put for one another in Scripture; and disobedience is opposed to faith; (1 Pet. ii. 7.) “Unto you therefore which believe, he is precious: but unto them which be disobedient,” &c. where the disobedient are opposed to them that believe. And so likewise those who neglect any duty of religion, and do any thing notoriously unworthy of their profession, are said to deny the faith. (1 Tim. v. 8.) “But if any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith.” How does he deny the faith? In disobeying the precepts of the Christian religion, which chargeth us with such natural and moral duties. If it be a promise, the proper effect of it is encouragement to obedience by hopes of the thing promised: if a threatening, the proper effect of it is to restrain men from sin and disobedience.

V. In what sense this faith of things supernaturally revealed, may be said to be a Divine faith? Answer.—Not only in respect of the matter and object of it, which are Divine things, such as concern God and religion and in respect of the Divine effects it hath upon those who believe these things; (for in these two respects a persuasion of the principles of natural religion, may be said to be a Divine faith;) but likewise in respect of the argument whereby it is wrought, which is a Divine testimony. As for the efficient cause, the Spirit of God, that does not immediately belong to this: for the Spirit of God doth not, speaking properly, persuade us immediately of the truth of things supernaturally revealed; but mediately, by persuading us of the truth of the revelation: for to believe a thing to be true, which we are persuaded is revealed by God, is so natural and consequent upon such a persuasion, that it doth not seem to require any new work of the Spirit. And if this be all the work of the Spirit, to persuade men that such a revelation is Divine; it will be most proper to speak of this when I come to the third sort of faith, which is, a persuasion of a Divine revelation that it is such: which because it hath many difficulties in it, deserves a more large and particular consideration.