Hugo Grotius · 13 of 132

SECT. VIII. The objection concerning the cause of evil, answered.

NOR ought we to be in the least shaken in what has been said, because we see many evils happen, the original of which cannot be ascribed to God, who, as was affirmed of him, is perfectly good. For when we say, that God is the cause of all things, we mean of all such things as have a real existence; which is no reason why those things themselves should not be the cause of some accidents, such as actions are. God created man, and some other intelligences superior to man, with a liberty of acting; which liberty of acting is not in itself evil, but may be the cause of something that is evil. And to make God the author of evils of this kind, which are called moral evils, is the highest wickedness. But there are other sorts of evils, such as loss or pain inflicted upon a person, which may be allowed to come from God, suppose for the reformation of the man, or as a punishment which his sins deserve: for here is no inconsistency with goodness; but, on the contrary, these proceed from goodness itself, in the same manner as physic, unpleasant to the taste, does from a good physician.