Hugo Grotius · 12 of 132

SECT. VII. That God is the cause of all things.

EVERY thing that is, derives its existence from God; this follows from what has been already said. For we conclude, that there is but one necessary self-existent Being; whence we collect, that all other things sprung from a being different from themselves: for those things, which are derived front something else, were all of them, either immediately in themselves, or mediately in their causes, derived front him who had no beginning, that is, from God, as was before evinced. And this is not only evident to reason, but in a manner to sense too: for if we take a survey of the admirable structure of a human body, both within and without, and see how every, even the most minute, part hath its proper use, without any design or intention of the parents, and with so great exactness, as the most excellent philosophers and physicians could never enough admire; it is a sufficient demonstration that. the Author of nature is the most complete understanding. Of this a great deal may be seen in Galen, especially where he examines the use of the hands and eyes: and the same may be observed in the bodies of dumb creatures; for the figure and situation of their parts to a certain end cannot be the effect of any power in matter. As also in plants and herbs, which is accurately observed by the philosophers. Strabo excellently well takes notice hereof in the position of water, which, as to its quality, is of a middle nature betwixt air and earth, and ought to have been placed betwixt them, but is therefore interspersed and mixed with the earth, lest its fruitfulness, by which the life of man is preserved, should be hindered. Now it is the property of intelligent beings only to act with some view. Neither are particular things appointed for their own peculiar ends only, but for the good of the whole; as is plain in water, which, contrary to its own nature, is raised upwards, lest by a vacuum there should be a gap in the structure of the universe, which is upheld by the continued union of its parts. Now, the good of the whole could not possibly be designed, nor a power put into things to tend towards it, but by an Intelligent Being, to whom the universe is subject. There are moreover some actions, even of the beasts, so ordered and directed, as plainly discover them to be the effects of some small degree of reason: as is most manifest in ants and bees, and also in some others, which, before they have experienced them, will avoid things hurtful, and seek those that are profitable to them. That this power, of searching out and distinguishing, is not properly in themselves, is apparent from hence, because they act always alike, and are unable to do other things which do not require more pains; wherefore they are acted upon by some foreign reason; and what they do, must of necessity proceed from the efficiency of that reason impressed upon them: which reason is no other than what we call God. Next, the heavenly constellations, but more especially those eminent ones, the sun and moon, have their courses so exactly accommodated to the fruitfulness of the earth, and to the health of animals, that nothing can be imagined more convenient: for though, otherwise, the most simple motion had been along the equator, yet are they directed in an oblique circle, that the benefit of them might extend to more places of the earth. And as other animals are allowed the use of the earth, so mankind are permitted to use those animals, and can by the power of his reason tame the fiercest of them. Whence it was that the stoics concluded that the world was made for the sake of man. But, since the power of man does not extend so far as to compel the heavenly luminaries to serve him, nor is it likely they should of their own accord submit themselves to him, hence it follows, that there is a superior understanding, at whose command those beautiful bodies afford their perpetual assistance to man, wile, is placed so far beneath them; which understanding is none other than the Maker of the stars and of the universe. The eccentric motions of the stars, and the epicycles, as they term them, manifestly show, that they are not the effects of matter, but the appointment of a free agent; and the same assurance we have from the position of the stars, some in one part of the heavens, and some in another: and from the unequal form of the earth and seas: nor can we attribute the motion of the stars in such a direction, rather than another, to any thing else. The very figure of the world, which is the most perfect, viz. round, and all the parts of it inclosed, as it were, in the bosom of the heavens, and placed in wonderful order, sufficiently declare, that these things were not the result of chance, but the appointment of the most excellent understanding: for, can any one be so foolish, as to expect any- thing so accurate from chance? He may as soon believe, that pieces of timber, and stones, should frame themselves into a house: or that, from letters thrown at a venture, there should arise a poem; when the philosopher, who saw only some geometrical figures on the sea-shore, thought them plain indications of a man’s having been there, such things not looking as if they proceeded from chance. Besides, that mankind were not from eternity, but date their original from a certain period of time, is clear, as from other arguments, so from the improvement of arts, and those desert places, which came afterwards to be inhabited, and is further evidenced by the language of islands, plainly derived from the neighbouring continents. There are, moreover, certain ordinances so universal amongst men, that they do not seem so much to owe their institution to the instinct of nature, or the deductions of plain reason, as to a constant tradition, scarcely interrupted in any place, either by wickedness or misfortune: of which sort were formerly sacrifices, amongst holy rites; and now shame in venereal things, the solemnity of marriage, and the abhorrence of incest.