John Owen · 28 of 157

Of toleration; and the duty of the magistrate about religion. · Part 4

[2.] If any persons whatsoever, under any pretence whatsoever, shall offer violence or disturbance to the professors of the true worship of God, so owned, established, and confirmed as above said, in and for the profession of that true, so-owned worship, service, and declaration of the mind of God; such persons are to fear that power which is the minister of God, and a revenger to them that do evil. Let us suppose of them what they suppose, and for their own justification and support in irregular ways bear out of themselves, — that they enjoy the truth, others walking in paths of their own; yet then this practice is contrary to that prime dictate of nature which none can pretend ignorance of, viz., “Do not that to another which thou wouldst not have done unto thyself.” If men that would not think it equitable to be so dealt with as they deal with others, supposing themselves in their condition, do yet so deal with them, they are αὐτοκατάκριτοι, and do pronounce sentence against themselves out of their own mouths. This, then, deserveth punishment; and breaking out to the disturbance of public order ought to be punished. We before proved the protection of public places to belong to the magistrate; so that he not only may, but, if he will not be false to Him by whom he is intrusted, he must, put forth his authority for the safe-guarding and revenging of them. Yea, also, and this rule may pass, when some things in the way publicly established are truly offensive. What the ancient Christians thought of the zeal of Audas, a Christian bishop, who would needs demolish a Pagan temple in Persia, I know not; but I am sure his discretion is not much extolled who, by that one fiery act of destroying πυρεῖον, — that is, “a temple of fire” (for the Persians looked upon fire as a god, as the historian observes), — occasioned a cruel persecution of thirty years’ continuance, Theod. Eccles. Hist., lib. v. cap. 38.

[3.] When any have entertained any singular opinion in matters of great weight and importance, — such as nearly concern the glory of God, and the minds of Christians, in reverence of his holy name, are most tenderly affected withal, so that without much horror of mind they can scarce hear those errors whereby those grand truths are opposed, — yet those persons who have entertained such uncouth opinions shall not be content so to have done, and also in all lawful ways (as to civil society) endeavoured to propagate the said opinions to others; but, in the pursuit of this their design of opposing truth, shall publicly use such expressions, or perform such acts, as are fit to pour contempt and scorn upon the truth which they do oppose, — reviling it also, or God himself so represented as he is in the truth they abominate, with odious and execrable appellations (as, for instance, the calling the holy Trinity, “Tricipitem Cerberum”; — if the question be put, Whether in this case the magistrate be not obliged to vindicate the honour of God by corporeal restraints, in some degrees at least, upon the persons of those men? — truly, for my part, I incline to the affirmative. And the reason hereof is this:— Though men, through the incurable blindness of their minds, falling into error of judgment and misinterpretation of the word, may disbelieve the Deity of Christ, and the Holy Spirit; yet that any pretence from the word, persuasion of conscience, or dictate of religion, should carry them out to reviling, opprobrious speeches of that which of God is held out contrary to their apprehensions, is false and remote from reason itself. For this cause Paul says he was a blasphemer; — not because, being a Jew, he disbelieved the gospel; but because, so disbelieving it, he moreover loaded the truths thereof with contumelious reproaches Such expressions, indeed, differ not from those piercing words of the holy name of God which he censured to death, Lev. xxiv. 15, but only in this, that there seemeth in that to be a plain opposition unto light, in this not so. The like may be said of a Jew’s crucifying a dog.

[4.] There are a sort of persons termed in Scripture ἄτακτοι, 1 Thess. v. 14; ἀγοραῖοι. Acts xvii. 5; ἄτοποι, 2 Thess. iii. 2; ἀνυπότακτοι, 1 Tim. i. 9, and the like, — disorderly, vagabond, wandering, irregular persons, fixed to no calling, abiding in no place, taking no care of their families; that, under a pretence of teaching the truth, without mission, without call, without warrant, uncommanded, undesired, do go up and down, from place to place, creeping into houses, etc. Now, that such ways as these, and persons in these ways, may be judicially inquired into, I no way doubt. The story is famous of Sesostris, king of Egypt, who made a law, that all the subjects of his kingdom should once a year give an account of their way and manner of living, and if any one were found to spend his time idly, he was certainly punished; and the laws of most nations have provided that their people shall not be wanderers, and whosoever hath not a place of abode and employment is by them a punishable vagabond. And in this, by much experience of the ways, walking, and converse of such persons, I am exceedingly confirmed in. I did as yet never observe any other issue upon such undertakings, but scandal to religion, and trouble to men in their civil relations.

[5.] When men, by the practice of any vice or sin, draw others to a pretended religion; or, by pretence of religion, draw men to any vice or known sin, let them be twice punished, — for their real vice, and pretended religion. The truth is, I have been taught exceedingly to disbelieve all the strange imputations of wickedness and uncleanness that are imposed upon many, to be either the end or the medium of the practice of that communion in religion which they do profess and embrace. I remember that, when I was a boy, all those stories were told me of Brownists and Puritans which afterward I found to have been long before the forgeries of Pagans, and imposed on the primitive Christians. I dare boldly say, I have heard stories of them a hundred times, holding out that very thing, and those deeds of darkness, which Minutius Felix holds out in the tongue of an infidel concerning the Christians of those days; but yet, because sundry venerable persons, to whom antiquity hath given sanctuary from being arraigned on the point of false testimony, have left it upon record of sundry heretics in their days, — as the Gnostics and others, that they were conjoined into “societates tesserâ pollutionis,” and some assert that the like iniquities are not wholly buried, I made the supposition, and hope that, if they depose themselves from common sense and reason, the magistrate will never exalt them to the privilege and exemption of religion.

In these, and such like cases as these, when men shall break forth into disturbance of common order and enormities against the light of nature, beyond all positive command of any pretended religion whatsoever, that the magistrate ought to set hedges of thorns in their ways, sharpened according to their several delinquencies, I suppose no man not abhorred of common sense can once hesitate or doubt. And I am the more inclined to assert a restraint to all such as these, because it may be established to the height without the least prejudice unto the truth, though persons erring should enjoy the place of authority.

3. That which now remaineth in this head to be considered, is concerning persons maintaining and upholding any great and pernicious errors, but in such ways as are not, by any of the former disorders, to be brought under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, but good, honest, allowable, and peaceable in themselves; not at all to be questioned, but in reference to the things that are carried on in and by those ways, — as communication by discourse and private preaching, and the like.

Now, concerning these, it is generally affirmed, that persons maintaining any error in or against any fundamental article of faith or religion, and that with obstinacy or pertinacy after conviction, ought to be proceeded against by the authority of the civil magistrate, whether unto death or banishment, imprisonment or confiscation of goods.

(1.) Now unto this — supposing what I have written heretofore concerning the incompetency of all and the non-constitution of any judge in this case, with the answers given at the beginning of this treatise to most of the places produced usually for the affirmative — I shall briefly give in my thoughts; reserving the consideration of pressing conformity to the next head to be handled. And, —

[1.] That I cannot but observe, that, in the question itself, there are sundry things gratis assumed; as, —

1st. That it is known and confessed what articles in religion are fundamental, and this also to the magistrate; when no one thing among Christians is more questionable, most accounting them so (be they what they will) wherein they differ from others. So that, one way or other, all dissenters shall be hooked in, directly or indirectly, to clash upon fundamentals. In this Papists are secure, who make the church’s propositions sufficient to make an article fundamental.

2dly. That the persons holding the error are convinced, when perhaps they have been only confuted; between which two there is a wide difference. He that holds the truth may be confuted; but a man cannot be convinced but by the truth. That a man should be said to be convinced of a truth, and yet that truth not shine in upon his understanding to the expelling of the contrary error, to me is strange. To be convinced, is to be overpowered by the evidence of that which before a man knew not. I myself once knew a scholar invited to a dispute with another man about something in controversy in religion. In his own, and in the judgment of all the bystanders, the opposing person was utterly confuted; and yet the scholar, within a few months, was taught of God, and clearly convinced that it was an error which he had maintained, and the truth which he opposed: and then, and not till then, did he cease to wonder that the other person was not convinced by his strong arguments, as before he had thought. May not a Protestant be really worsted in a dispute by a Papist? hath it not so ere now fallen out? — if not, the Jesuits are egregious liars. To say a man is convinced, when, either for want of skill and ability or the like, he cannot maintain his opinion to and against all men, is a mere conceit. The truth is, I am so far from this morose severity of looking upon all erring persons as convinced that have been confuted, that I rather, in charity, incline to believe that no erring person, whilst he continues in his error, is convinced. It will not easily enter into my dull apprehension, how a man can be convinced of an error that is enlightened with a contrary truth, and yet hold that error still. I am loath to charge more corrupt and vile affections upon any than do openly appear. That of Paul, affirming that some men are self-condemned, is quite of another nature. I think a person is said to be convinced, not when there is sufficiency in the means of conviction, but when there is such an efficacy in them as to lay hold upon his understanding.

3dly. That they are obstinate and pertinacious is also a cheap supposal, taken up without the price of a proof. What we call obstinacy, they call constancy; and what we condemn them for as pertinacy, they embrace as perseverance. As the conviction is imposed, not owned, so is this obstinacy. If we may be judges of other men’s obstinacy, all will be plain; but if ever they get uppermost, they will be judges of ours. Besides, I know not what good it will do us, or how it will advantage our cause, to suppose men obstinate and convinced before we punish them, — no such qualifications being anywhere in the book of God urged in persons deserving punishment:— if they have committed the crime whereunto the penalty is annexed, be they obstinate or not, they shall be punished.

[2.] But now, supposing all this, — that we are clear in all fundamentals, — that we are convinced that they are convinced, and doubt not but that they are obstinate; — if they keep themselves in the former bounds, what is to be done? I say, besides what we spake at the entrance of this discourse, I shall, as to any ways of corporeal co-action and restraint, oppose some few things.

1st. The non-constitution of a judge in case of heresy is a thing civilly criminal. As to spiritual censures, and an ecclesiastical judgment of errors and false doctrines, we find them appointed, and a lawful judge as to the determining concerning them divinely instituted; so that in such ways they may be warrantably proceeded against, Rev. xxii. 15. But now, for any judge that should make disquisition concerning them, or proceed against them, as things criminal, to be punished with civil censures, I conceive the Scripture is silent. And indeed, who should it be? The custom of former ages was, that some persons of one sort should determine of it as to right, — viz., that such or such a thing was heresy, and such or such a one a heretic, — which was the work of priests and prelates; and persons of another sort should “de facto” punish, and determine to be punished, those so adjudged by the former, — and these were, as they called them, the secular magistrates, officers of this world. And indeed, had not the god of this world blinded their eyes, and the God of the spirits of all flesh hardened their hearts, they would not have so given up their power to the man of sin as to be made so sordidly instrumental to his bloody cruelty. We read, Jer. xxvi. 10, 11, that the priests and prophets assemble themselves in judgment, and so pronounce sentence upon the prophet Jeremiah that he should die for a false prophet; verse 12, Jeremiah makes his appeal to the secular magistrate, and all the people; who, taking cognizance of the cause, pronounce sentence in the behalf of the condemned person against the priests and prophets, and deliver him whether they will or not, verse 16. I spare the application of the story: but that princes and magistrates should, without cognizance of the thing or cause, proceed to punishment or censure of it, upon the judgment of the priests condemning such or such a man for a heretic or a false prophet, — blessed be the Lord, we have no warrant. Had this proceeding been regular, Jeremiah had died without mercy for a false prophet, as thousands since, standing before the Lord in his spirit, have done. This course, then, that the civil magistrate should proceed to sentence of corporeal punishment upon others judging of the fault, is vile, sordid, unwarrantable, and exceedingly unworthy of any rational man, much more such as are set over the people of the land. That the same persons must determine of the cause and appoint the punishment is clear.

Now, who must these be?

(1st.) Are they the ministers of the gospel? — of all others, they are the most likely to be the most competent judges in spiritual causes. Let it be so; but then, also, they must be the determiners and inflicters of the punishment upon default. Now, let them pour out upon obstinately erring persons all the vengeance that God hath betrusted them withal, “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God,” etc. By this course, admonition, avoiding, rejection, excommunication, will be the utmost that can be inflicted on them; which, for my part, I desire may be exercised to the utmost extent of the rule.

(2dly.) Shall the magistrate be made judge of the cause as well as of the person? Is he intrusted to determine what is error, what not, — what heresy, what not, — who is an heretic, who not; and so what punishment is due to such and such errors, according to the degrees wherein they are?

[1st.] I desire an institution of this ordinance in the church. Where is the magistrate intrusted with such a power? where are rules prescribed to him in his proceedings?

[2dly.] Is not a judiciary determination concerning truth and error (I mean truths of the gospel) a mere church act? and that church power whereby it is effected? Must not, then, the magistrate, “quâ talis,” be a church officer? Will men of this mind tolerate Erastianism?

[3dly.] If there be a twofold judicature appointed for the same person, for the same crime, is it not because one crime may in divers respects fall under several considerations? and must not these considerations be preserved immixed, that the formal reason of proceeding in one court may not be of any weight in the other? We proved before, and it is granted of all, that the church is judge in case of heresy and error, as such, to proceed against them, as contrary to the gospel; — their opposition to the faith delivered to the saints is the formal reason upon which that proceedeth to censure. If, now, this be afterward brought under another sentence, of another judicature, must it not be under another consideration? Now, what can this be, but its disturbance of civil society; which, when it doth so, — not in pretence, but really and actually, — none denies it to be the magistrate’s duty to interpose with his power.

[4thly.] If the magistrate be judge of spiritual offences, and it be left to him to determine and execute judgment, in such proportion as he shall think meet, according to the quality and degrees thereof, — it is a very strange and unlimited arbitrariness over the lives and estates of men: and surely they ought to produce very clear testimonies that they are intrusted from the Lord herewith, or they can have no great quiet in acting.

[5thly.] It seems strange to me, that the Lord Jesus Christ should commit this architectonical power in his house unto magistrates, foreseeing of what sort the greatest number of them would be, yea, determining that they should be such, for the trim and affliction of his own. View the times that are past, consult the stories of former ages, take a catalogue of the kings and rulers that have been, since first magistrates outwardly embraced Christian religion in this and other nations where the gospel hath been planted; and ask your own consciences whether these be the men to whom this high trust in the house of God is committed? The truth is, they no sooner left serving the dragon in the persecution of the Pagans, but presently, in a very few years, they gave up their power to the beast, to set up another state in opposition to the Lord Jesus Christ and his gospel; in the supportment whereof the most of them continue labouring till this very day. “Hæ manus Trojam exigent?” What may be added in this case, I refer to another opportunity.

2dly. Gospel constitutions in the case of heresy or error seem not to favour any course of violence, — I mean, of civil penalties. Foretold it is that heresies must be, 1 Cor. xi. 19; but this for the manifesting of those that are approved, not the destroying of those that are not; — I say destroying, I mean with temporal punishment, that I may add this by the way; for, — all the arguments produced for the punishment of heretics, holding out capital censures, and these being the tendence of all beginnings in this kind, — I mention only the greatest, including all other arbitrary penalties, being but steps of walking to the utmost censures. Admonitions, and excommunication upon rejection of admonition, are the highest constitutions (I suppose) against such persons: “Waiting with all patience upon them that oppose themselves, if at any time God will give them repentance to the acknowledgment of the truth.” Imprisoning, banishing, slaying, is scarcely a patient waiting. God doth not so wait upon unbelievers. Perhaps those who call for the sword on earth are as unacquainted with their own spirits as those that called for fire from heaven, Luke ix. 54. And perhaps the parable of the tares gives in a positive rule as to this whole business: occasion may be given of handling it at large; for the present I shall not fear to assert, that the answers unto it, borrowed by our divines from Bellarmine, will not endure the trial. We hope that spiritual quiet, and inoffensiveness in the whole mountain of the Lord, which is wrapped up in the womb of many promises, will at length be brought forth to the joy of all the children of Zion.

3dly. Sundry other arguments, taken from the nature of faith, heresy, liberty of conscience, the way of illumination, means of communication of truth, nature of spiritual things, pravitious tendence of the doctrine opposed, if it should be actually embraced by all enjoying authority, and the like, I thought at present to have added; but I am gone already beyond my purposed resting place.

(2.) Come we, in a few words, to the last thing proposed (wherein I shall be very brief, the main of what I intended being already set down), — the power of the magistrate to compel others to the embracing of that religion and way of worship which he shall establish and set up; which, for the greater advantage, we shall suppose to be the very same, both for the things proposed to be believed and also practised, which God himself hath revealed, and requireth all men everywhere to embrace. What is to be done for the settling and establishing of the profession of the gospel, and the right apprehension of the mind of God therein, contradistinct from all those false and erroneous persuasions which, in these or former days, [are] or have been held forth in opposition thereunto, was before declared; — how it is to be supported, maintained, protected, defended, safe-guarded from all oppositions, disturbances, blasphemings, was then and there set down.

Now, supposing that sundry persons, living under the power, and owning civil obedience to the magistrate, will not consent to sound doctrine, nor receive in some things (fewer or more, less or greater) that form of wholesome words which he holds forth and owns as the mind of Christ in the gospel, nor communicate with him in the worship which, by the authority of those words or that truth, he hath as before established, it is inquired, What is the duty of the magistrate in reference to the bringing of them into that subjection which is due unto, and an acknowledgment of, the truth?

And to this I shall briefly give in my answer in these following positions:—

[1.] In reference unto us in this nation, the greatest difficulty in giving a full return to this question ariseth from the great disorder of the churches of God amongst us. Were the precious distinguished from the vile, churches rightly established, and church discipline [so] exercised that Christians were under some orderly view, and men might be considered in their several capacities wherein they stand, an easy finger would untie the knot of this query. But being in that confusion wherein we are, gathering into any order being the great work in hand, I suppose, under favour, that the time is scarce come for the proposal of this question; but yet something may be given in unto it, though not so clear as the former supposal, being effected, would cause it to be.

[2.] The constant practice of the churches in former ages, in all their meetings for advice and counsel, to consent unto some form of wholesome words, that might be a discriminating “tessera” [symbol] of their communion in doctrine, being used in prime antiquity, — as is manifest in that ancient symbol commonly esteemed apostolical (of the chief heads whereof mention in the like summary is made in the very first writers among them), — having also warrant from the word of God, and being of singular use to hold out unto all other churches of the world our apprehensions of the mind of God in the chief heads of religion, may be considered. If this be done by the authority of the magistrate, — I mean, if such a declaration of the truth wherein the churches by him owned and protected do consent be held out as the confession of that truth which he embraceth, — it will be of singular use unto, yea, indeed, must necessarily precede, any determination of the former question. Of the nature and use of confessions, etc., so much hath of late been learnedly disputed, that I shall not pour out any of mine own conceptions for the present about them in that hasty, tumultuary manner wherein I am enforced to expose this essay.

[3.] Those who dissent from the truth so owned, so established, so decreed, do so either in less matters of small consequence, and about things generally confessed not fundamental; or in great and more weighty heads of doctrine, acts of worship, and the like; — both agreeing in this, that they will not hold communion, either as to all or some parts and duties thereof, with those churches and persons who do embrace the truth so owned, as before, and act accordingly.

1st, For the first of these, or such as dissent about things of no great concernment, in comparison of those other things wherein they do agree with them from whom they do dissent, I am bold positively to assert, that, saving and reserving the rules and qualifications set down under the second head, the magistrate hath no warrant from the word of God, nor command, rule, or precept, to enable him to force such persons to submit unto the truth as by him established, in those things wherein they express a conscientious dissent, or to molest them with any civil penalty in case of refusal or non-submission; nor yet did I ever in my life meet with any thing in the shape of reason to prove it, although the great present clamour of this nation is punctually as to this head:— whatever be pretended, this is the Helena about which is the great contest.

What, I pray, will warrant him, then, to proceed? Will the laws against idolatry and blasphemy, with their sanctions towards the persons of blasphemers and idolaters? (For I must ingenuously confess, all that which, in my poor judgment, looks with any appearance of pressing towards Hæreticidium is the everlasting equity of those judicial laws, and the arbitrariness of magistrates from a divine rule in things of the greatest concernment to the glory of God, if free from them; and that [as] these laws, I doubt, will scarcely be accommodated unto any thing under contest now in this age of the world among Christians.) — But shall I say a warrant [may be] taken from hence for the compelling of men sound in so many fundamentals as, were it not for the contest with them, we would acknowledge sufficient for the entertainment of the Lord Jesus in their bosoms, to subject [themselves] to, and close with, the things contrary to their present light and apprehension (though under a promise of being taught of God), or to inflict penalties upon a refusal so to do? — “Credat Apella!”

Shall the examples of extraordinary judgments upon idolaters, false prophets, by sword and fire from heaven, on magicians, apostates, and the like, be here produced? Though such arguments as these have made thousands weep tears of blood, yet the consequence, in reason, cannot but provoke laughter to all men not wholly forsaken of directing principles.

What, then, shall be done? they will say. They have been admonished, rebuked, convinced, — must they now be let alone?

Something as to this I shall add in the close of this discourse; — for the present, let learned Whitaker answer for me. And first, to the first, — of their being confuted: “Possunt quidem controversiæ ad externum forum deferri, et ibi definiri; sed conscientia in eo foro non acquiescit, non enim potest conscientia sedari sine Spiritu sancto.” Let controversies (saith he) be determined how you please, — until the conscience be quieted by the Holy Spirit, there will be little peace. Unto which I shall not add any thing, considering what I said before of conviction. And to the latter, — of letting them alone to their own ways, “Ecclesiæ quidem optatius est levibus quibusdam dissensionibus ad tempus agitari, quam in perfida pace acquiescere; non ergo sufficit aliquo modo pacem conservari, nisi illam esse sanctam pacem constiterit,” Whit., Con. 4 de Rom. Pont. qu. 1, cap. 1, sect. 2. Better some trouble, than a perfidious, compelled peace. See him handle this more at large, with some excellent conclusions to this purpose, Con. 4 de Rom. Pont. qu. 1, cap. 1, sect. 19, pp. 48 et 50.

For these, then (and under this head I compare all such persons as, keeping in practice within the bounds before laid forth, do so far hold the foundation, as that, neither by believing what is not, nor disbelieving what indeed is, they do take in or keep off any such thing as wherewithal being embraced, or without which being rejected, the life of Christ cannot in any case possibly consist, nor salvation by him be obtained), as the magistrate is not bound by any rule or precept to assist and maintain them in the practice of those things wherein they dissent from the truth; so he is bound to protect them in peace and quietness in the enjoyment of all civil rights and liberties; — nor hath he either warrant or allowance to proceed against them, as to the least penalty, for their dissent in those things they cannot receive. Attempts for uniformity among saints, or such as, for aught we can conclude either from their opinions or practices, may be so, by external force, are purely antichristian.