John Owen · 27 of 157
Of toleration; and the duty of the magistrate about religion. · Part 3
It is true, in the three first centuries many fond, foolish, corrupt opinions were broached by sundry brain-sick men; but they laid little hold of the churches, kept themselves in the breasts of some few disorderly wanderers, and did very little promote the mystery of : but afterward, when the Roman emperors, and the great men of the earth, under and with them, began to interpose in the things of religion, and were mutually wooed, instigated, and provoked by the parties at variance (as indeed it is a shame to consider, upon all meetings, assemblies, disputes, councils, what running, what flattering, what insinuation at court, were used on all hands), what root did divers heresies take! how far were they propagated! Witness Arianism, which had almost invaded the whole world.
Furthermore, by the ways which were invented, oft from the rule, for the extirpation of errors, when, by the instigation of prelates, the emperors were (to their own ruin) persuaded to them, the man of sin walked to his throne. Those very laws, edicts, and declarations, which were obtained against erring persons, did the bishops of Rome invert and use against all the witnesses of Jesus. The devil durst not be so bold as to employ that his grand agent in his apprenticeship against the ; but he first suffers him to exercise his hand against heretics, intending to make use of him afterward to another purpose. In most of those contests which the Roman pontiffs had with their fellow-bishops, by which they insensibly advanced their own supremacy, it was the defence of Catholics they undertook; as in the case of Athanasius and others.
Neither did the Christians of old at once step into the persuasion of punishing corporeally in case of religion. Constantine makes a decree at first, Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ζρησκείας οὐκ ἀρνητέαν εἶναι, “that liberty of worship is not to be denied; and therefore the Christians, as others, should have liberty to keep the faith of their religion and heresy,” Euseb., Eccles. Hist., lib. x. cap. 5. And in the same edict he saith (how truly I know not, but yet great Constantine said it), “That it is most certain, that this is conducing to the peace of the empire, that free option and choice of religion be left to all.” Afterward, when he began a little farther to engage himself in the business of religion, being indeed wearied with the petitions of bishops and their associates for the persecution of one another, what troubles in a few years did he intricate himself withal! Perplexed he was in his spirit to see the untoward revengefulness of that sort of people; insomuch that he writes expressly to them, being assembled in council at Tyre, “That they had neither care of the truth, nor love to peace, nor conscience of scandal, nor would by any means be prevailed on to lay down their malice and animosities,” Socrat. Hist., lib. i. cap. 34. At length an Arian priest curries favour with his sister Constantia: she gets him into the esteem of her brother: after some insinuations of his, new edicts, new synods, new recallings, new banishments of other persons, follow one upon the neck of another, Rufin. Eccles. Hist., lib. i. cap. 11. And when this knack was once found out of promoting a sect by imperial favour, it is admirable to consider how those good princes, Constantine and his sons, were abused, misled, enraged, engaged into mutual dissensions, by the lies, flatteries, equivocations of such as called themselves bishops, Rufin., lib. i. cap. 15, 16, etc. As also, how soon, with the many, the whole business of religion was hereupon turned into a matter of external pomp and dominion. But it is beside my purpose to rake into that hell of confusion which by this means brake in upon the churches in succeeding ages. Only for the following imperial edicts and constitutions in the behalf of the catholic faith, and for the punishing of erring persons, I desire to observe, —
(1.) That the emperors were stirred up to them by turbulent priests and aspiring prelates. Let the pope’s letters to them witness this. Leo, Epist. lxxv. etc.
(2.) That they were still bottomed upon such and such councils, that were not to be opposed or spoken against, when all of them were spent for the most part about things quite beside and beyond the Scripture (as feasting, and lastings, and bishops’ jurisdictions); and some of them were the very ulcers and imposthumations of Christian religion, as those of Nice and Ephesus, both the second; and in general all of them the sea upon which the whore exalted her seat and throne. And these things did those good men, either deceived by the craft of heretics, or wearied by the of the orthodox.
And yet, notwithstanding all this (as I shall afterward declare), I cannot close with that counsel which Themistius, a philosopher, gave to Valens the emperor, and am most abhorrent from the reason of his counsel, — viz., “That he should let all sects alone, because it was for the glory of God to be honoured with diversities of opinions and ways of worship.” Yet though this reason be false and impious, the advice itself was well conducing at that time to the peace of the churches, something qualifying the spirit of that heretical emperor, who before had cruelly raged against all orthodox professors of the Deity of Christ, Socrat., lib. iv. cap 27.
5. Lastly, add unto all that hath been said, “Vice coronidis,” for the use of such as, enjoying authority, may have misapprehensions of some truths of Christ, — a sad consideration concerning the end and issue which the Lord, in his righteous judgment, hath in all ages given to persecutors and persecution.
Nero (of whom says Tertullian, “Tali dedicatore gaudet sanguis Christianus”), who was the first that employed the sword against our religion, being condemned by the senate to be punished “more majorum,” slew himself, with this exprobration of his own sordid villainy, “Turpiter vixi, turpius morior,” Sueton. in Ner. Domitian, the inheritor of his rage and folly, was murdered in his own house by his servants, Idem in Domit. Trajan, by a resolution of his joints, numbedness of body, and a choking water, perished miserably, Dio Cassius de Traj. This is he whose order not to seek out Christians to punishment, but yet to punish them appearing, you have in his epistle to Pliny, a provincial governor under him, Plin. Epist. xcvii.; which, though commended by Eusebius, Eccles. Hist., lib. iii. cap. 33, yet is canvassed by Tertullian as a foolish, impious, wicked constitution, Apol cap. ii. Hadrian, perishing with a flux and casting of blood, paid some part of the price of the innocent blood which he had shed, Ælius Spart. in Had. Severus poisoned himself, to put an end to his tormenting pains, Jul. Capitol. Maximinus, with his son yet a child, was torn in pieces of the soldiers, all crying out, “that not a whelp was to be left of so cursed a stock.” Decius, having reigned scarce two years, was slain with his children, Euseb., lib. vii. cap. 1. Valerian, being taken by Sapores king of Persia, was carried about in a cage, and being seventy years old, was at length flayed alive, Euseb., lib. vii. cap. 13. Another Valerian, of the same stamp with his brother and kindred, was murdered at Milan. Diocletian being smitten with madness, had his palace consumed with fire from heaven, and perished miserably. The city of Alexandria, in the time of Gallienus, was, for its persecution, so wasted with variety of destroying plagues and judgments, that the whole number of its inhabitants answered not the grey-headed old men that were in it before, Dionys. apud Euseb., lib. vii. cap. 21. What was the end of Julian is known to all. Now, truly, of many of these we might well say, as one of old did, “Quales imperatores.” As Trajan, Hadrian, Severus, Julian, what excellent emperors had they been, had they not been persecutors! And all this, says Tertullian, is come to pass that men might learn μὴ θεομαχεῖν. He that desires to see more of this, let him consult Tertul. Apol. et ad Scap.; Euseb. Eccles. Hist., lib. vii. cap. 21; August. de Civit. Dei, lib. xviii. cap. 52; Eutrop., lib. viii. It would be tedious to descend to examples of latter ages, our own and the neighbour nations do so much, too much, abound with them. Let this that hath been spoken suffice to cautionate mortal men how they meddle with the vessels of the sanctuary.
But now may some say, What will be the issue of this discourse? Do you, then, leave every one at liberty in the things of God? Hath the magistrate nothing to do in or about religion? Is he to depose the care thereof? Shall men, exasperated in their spirits by different persuasions, be suffered to devour one another as they please?
III. I have only showed the weakness of those grounds which some men make the bottom of their testimonies against the toleration of any thing but what themselves conceive to be truth; as also, taken away the chief of those arguments upon which such a proceeding against erring persons is bottomed as tends to blood and death. What positively the civil magistrate may, nay, ought to do, in the whole business of religion, comes in the next place to be considered, being the third and last part of our discourse.
Now, my thoughts unto this I shall hold out under these three heads.
1. What is the magistrate’s duty as to the truth, and persons professing it.
2. What in reference to the opposers and revilers of it.
3. What in respect of dissenters from it.
1. I shall begin with the first, which to me is much of chiefest importance.
His power, or rather his duty herein, I shall hold out in these ensuing propositions:—
(1.) As all men in general, so magistrates, even as such, are bound to know the mind and will of God in the things which concern his honour and worship. They are bound, I say, to know it. This obligation lies upon all creatures capable of knowing the Creator, answerably to that light which of him they have, and the means of revelation which they do enjoy. He of whom we speak is supposed to have that most and supreme of all outward teachings, the word of God, with such other helps as are thereby revealed, and therein appointed; so as he is bound to know the will of God in every thing him concerning. Wherein he foals and comes short of the truth, it is his sin; — the defect being not in the manner of the revelation, but in the corruption of his darkened mind. Now, that he is to make this inquiry in reference to his calling, is evident from that of David, 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, “He that ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the fear of God.” This fear is only taught by the word. Without a right knowledge of God and his mind, there can be no true fear of him. That command, also, for the Jewish magistrate to study it day and night, and to have the book of the law continually before him, because it was the rule of that civil polity whereof he was, under God, the head and preserver, by analogy comfirmeth this truth, Deut. xvii. 18, 19.
(2.) If he desire this wisdom sincerely, and the Lord intend him “as a light of the morning, as a rising sun, a morning without clouds” to his people, doubtless he will reveal himself to him, and teach him his mind; as he did David and Solomon, and other holy men of old. And as to this, I shall only with due reverence cautionate the sons of men that are exalted in government over their brethren, that they take heed of a lifted-up spirit, — the greatest closer of the heart against the truth of God. He hath promised to teach the humble and the lowly in mind; the proud he beholdeth afar off. Is not this the great reason that the rulers believe not on him, and the nobles lay not their necks to the yoke of the Lord, even because their hearts are lifted up within them, and so lie in an unteachable frame before the Lord?
(3.) The truth being revealed to them, and their own hearts made acquainted therewith, after their personal engagements to the practice of the power of godliness, according to the “revelation of God in the face of Jesus Christ,” three things are incumbent on him in reference thereunto.
[1.] That, according to the measure of its revelation unto him, he declare, or take care that it be declared, unto others, even all committed to his governing charge. The general equity that is in the obligation of “strengthening others when we are confirmed,” desiring them to be like ourselves in all participation of from God, — the nature of true zeal for the glory and name of the Lord, are a sufficient warrant for this, yea, demand the performance of this duty. So Jehoshaphat, being instructed in the ways of God, sent princes and priests to teach it in all the cities and towns of Judah, 2 Chron. xvii. 7–9. As also did Hezekiah, 2 Chron. xxx. 6–9. Let this, then, be our first position:—
i. It belongs to the duty of the supreme magistrate, the governor or shepherd of the people, in any nation, being acquainted with the mind of God, to take care that the truth of the gospel be preached to all the people of that nation, according to the way appointed, either ordinary or extraordinary.
I make no doubt but God will quickly reject them from their power who, knowing their Master’s will, are negligent herein.
[2.] As he is to declare it, so he is to protect it from all violence whatever. Jesus Christ is the great king of nations, as well as the holy king of saints. His gospel hath a right to be preached in every nation, and to every creature under heaven. Whoever forbids or hinders the free passage of it, is not only sinful and impious towards God, but also injurious towards men.
Certainly the magistrate is to protect every one and every thing in their own right, from the violence and injury of unruly men. In the preaching and receiving the gospel there is a right acted, superior to all earthly privileges whatever. In this, then, the magistrate is to protect it, that under him the professors thereof “may lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty.” And for this cause they to whom the sword is committed may with the sword lawfully defend the truth, as the undoubted right and privilege of those who do enjoy it, and of which they cannot be deprived without the greatest injury. Jephthah laid it down as the ground of the equity of the wars he waged against the Ammonites, that they would possess what the Lord their God gave them to possess; the defence whereof he pursued to the subversion of their (at first) invading enemies, Judges xi. 24, 33. It is no new thing to begin in defence, and end in offence. Now, if the truth be given us of the Lord our God to possess, certainly it may be contended for by those who owe protection thereunto.
And if this were not so, we may pray, and prevail, for the prosperity of those in authority, and yet, when we have done, not have a right to a quiet and peaceable life. Let this, then, be the second assertion:—
ii. The gospel being preached and declared, as of right it ought to be, it is the duty of the magistrate, by the power wherewith he is intrusted, to protect and defend it against all or any persons that, by force or violence, shall seek to hinder the progress or stop the passage of it, under what pretence soever.
And that a neglect of this also will be attended with the anger of the Lord, and the kindling of his wrath, shall not long be doubted of any.
[3.] The protecting, assisting, and supporting of all the professors of it in that profession, and in ways of truth’s appointment, for the practice of that which is embraced, and the furtherance of it towards them who as yet embrace it not, is also required. And of this there are sundry parts.
1st. That, seeing Christ Jesus hath appointed his disciples to walk in such societies, and requireth of them such kind of worship, as cannot be performed without their meeting together ὁμοθυμαδὸν, “in one place;” that he either provide, or grant being provided, the use of such places under his protection as may, in all or any kind, be suited and fitted for that end and purpose. And the ground of this is, —
(1st.) From the right which the gospel of Christ hath to be received amongst men, according to his own appointment; whether that be the appointment of Christ or not, amongst us is no question.
(2dly.) Because the magistrate hath the sole power of all public places, and the protection of them is committed to him alone, by virtue of that consent unto government which is among any people. This proved as above. 2dly. A protection in the use of those places, and all things exercised in them, answerable to that which he doth and is bound to grant unto men in their own private dwellings and families. The reason why I am protected from all hurt or violence in my family is, because I have a right to dispose of all things in my family, being my own; and so hath not another. It was asserted before that Christians have a right to the of Christ, and truth a right to be at liberty; and therefore, if any shall invade, disturb, or trouble them in their rights and liberties, he is bound, “ex officio,” to give them a protection, “not bearing the sword in vain.”
Now, being in my family, in my private house, the assistance of those in authority is due, —
(1st.) In respect of them without.
(2dly.) In respect of them within.
(1st.) For them without, if any one will, against my consent, intrude himself upon my family enjoyments, to share with me, or violently come to take away that is mine, or disturb me in the quiet possession of it, the magistrate takes cognizance of such disturbances, and punisheth them according to equity. Suitably, if any person or persons whatsoever shall with violence put themselves upon the enjoyment of such ordinances as those enjoying the rights of the gospel have obtained to themselves, or shall come in their celebration of them to cause disturbance, certainly that magistrate protects not every one in his undoubted rights, who doth not accommodate the wronged parties with the assistance of his power to the punishment of the .
(2dly.) For house dwellers, servants, or any others, who may break out into such offences and incorrigibleness as the amendment thereof may be beyond what I am intrusted to do to any by law of God or man, shall not the magistrate here also interpose? is not his assistance here abundantly required and always granted?
From parity of reason, is it not as due for their protection who, in the enjoyment of their public religious rights, may receive disturbance, and be under force from some incorrigible by any rule among themselves? For instance, — suppose a person justly excommunicated and ejected any society of Christians, as to any spiritual communion, yet will with outward force and violence put himself upon them in their closest acts of communion; doubtless their rights are here to be by power preserved.
3dly. That whereas the preachers of the gospel are now to be maintained in an ordinary way, and to expect their supportment in a usual course of ; and seeing that many to whom we have proved that the gospel is to be declared by the care of the magistrate, will not or cannot make such provisions for them as is needful in these last evil days of the world; it is incumbent on those nursing-fathers to provide for them, who, because of their continual labours in the work of the Lord, are disenabled to make provision for themselves. Where churches are settled according to the rule of the gospel, and not too much straitened by reason of want, there may be an alteration as to this proposal. That this engagement lies first upon the churches, was seen of old. Hence that caution or canon of the Council of Chalcedon, cap. vi., Μηδεὶς χειροτονείσθω ἀπολελυμένος, “Let none be ordained at large.” “Ne dicatur, mendicat in palæstra infelix clericus,” says the scholiast, — “lest he should be driven to beg for want of maintenance.”
This being the sum of what, as to this head, I have to assert, I shall give in the proofs of it, and then draw some farther positions.
Reason 1. The bottom of the whole ariseth from that right which the gospel hath to be preached to all nations and people; and that right, paramount to all civil sanctions and constitutions, which every soul hath to receive it in the profession thereof. And all this flows from the donation of the Father unto Jesus Christ, whereby he is made “heir of all things,” Heb. i. 2, having the “nations given him for his inheritance, the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession,” Ps. ii. 8; — being also” King of kings, and Lord of lords,” acting nothing in taking possession of his own but what his sovereignty bears him out in.
Reason 2. All this tends to the apparent good of these committed to his charge, that they may lead their lives in godliness and honesty; which is the very chief end of magistracy committed unto men. This is directly intended; all other things come in by accident, and upon suppositions.
Reason 3. No person living can pretend to the least injury by this, — none is deprived, none wronged.
Reason 4. The precepts given unto them, and the promises made concerning them, do abundantly confirm all that hath been asserted. Ps. ii. 10, 11, they are commanded as kings and judges to serve the Lord, in promoting the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ. And it is promised, Isa. xlix. 23, that “they shall be nursing-fathers and nursing-mothers to the church” of Christ, even then when she shall “suck the breasts of kings” (earthly things are the milk of kingly breasts), “when her officers shall be peace, and her exactors ,” Isa. ix. 16, 17. This, at least, reacheth to all we have ascribed to them. All is but bowing the knee of magistracy at the name of Jesus.
Hence are these positions:—
iii. The providing or granting of places requisite for the performance of that worship which in the gospel is instituted, is the duty of the Christian magistrate.
iv. Protection, as to peace and quietness in the use of the ordinances of the Lord Jesus Christ, from violent disturbers, either from without or within, is also incumbent on him.
v. Supportment and provision, as to earthly things, where regularly failing, is of him required.
And in the neglect of any of these that takes place, which is threatened, Isa. lx. 12, two or three consectaries, added hereunto, shall close this part of the magistrate’s power, or rather duty, about the things of religion. As, —
Consect. 1. Positive actings, by way of supportment and assistance, maintenance, allowance of public places, and the like, in the behalf of persons deviating from the truth, in those things wherein they deviate, are contrary to the rule of the word, and duty of them in authority. For, —
Error hath neither right nor promise; nor is any precept given in the behalf thereof.
Consect. 2. The defence and protection of erring persons from violence and injury, in those things wherein they have a right, is no acting of his duty about religious things, but a mere dealing for the preservation of human society, by the defence of persons not acting against the rules thereof.
Consect. 3. Every particular minute difference among the professors of the truth cannot be proved to come under the cognizance of the magistrate, he being to attend the worship which for the main is acceptable to God in Christ; neither do any testimonies extend his duty any farther. Hence, —
Corollary 1. The present differences about church society and the subject or seat of discipline, which are between those dissenters who are known by the names of Presbyterians and Independents, as they are in themselves (not heightened by the prejudices, lusts, corruptions, and interests of men), hinder not at all, but that the magistrate is bound to the performance of the duties before mentioned unto both parties. And the reasons of this are, because, —
Reason 1. The things wherein they are agreed are clearly as broad as the magistrate’s duty can be stretched to cover them.
Reason 2. Neither party, I am persuaded, in their retired thoughts dare avow the main of the worship by their dissenters embraced, to be, as such, rejected of the Lord.
Reason 3. No example in the world can be produced out of the Old Testament, or New, or ecclesiastical history, of a forcible decision of such minute differences. See Socrat. Eccles. Hist., lib. vi. cap. 20.
Corollary 2. All the plea of persons erring in doctrine or worship is not from what the magistrate must do, but from what he may not do.
And this for the first part shall suffice.
2. There is another part of the magistrate’s power, — the other side of his sword, — to be exercised towards the opposition of that truth which he hath embraced.
And this hath a twofold object:—
(1.) Things; (2.) Persons.
(1.) Things are of two sorts:—
[1.] Ways of worship.
[2.] Outward appearances, monuments, accommodations, and declarations of those ways.
Of the first I shall speak afterward.
By the second I mean all the outward attendances of any false or erroneous worship, which are either helps to or declarations of the superstition, idolatry, error, or falseness of it; as temples for idolatrous service, crosses, pictures, and the like abused relics of old, unwarranted zeal. Now, concerning these, I affirm, —
1st, That the magistrate ought not to make provision of any public places for the practice of any such worship as he is convinced to be an abomination unto the Lord. When I say he ought not to make provision, I understand not only a not actual caring that such be, but also a caring that such may not be. He should not have a negation of acting as to any thing of public concernment. His not opposing here is providing. For instance, he must not allow — that is, it is his duty to oppose — the setting apart of public places under his protection for the service of the mass (as of late in Somerset House), or for any kind of worship in itself disallowed, because not required, and so not accepted. This were to be bound to help forward sin, and that such sin whereof he is convinced; — which is repugnant to the whole revealed will of God. A magistrate, I told you before, is not to act according to what he may do, but what he must do. Now, it cannot be his duty to further sin.
2dly. Outward monuments — ways of declaring and holding out false and idolatrous worship — he is to remove; as the Papists’ images, altars, pictures, and the like; Turks’ mosques; prelates’ service-book. Now these are of two sorts:—
(1st.) Such things as, in their whole use and nature, serve only for the carrying on of worship in itself wholly false, and merely invented; as altars, images, crosses.
(2dly.) Such as are used for the carrying on of worship true in itself, though vilely corrupted; as praying and preaching; — such are those places commonly called churches.
The first are to be abolished; the latter aright used. I speak as to public appearances; for private disquisitions after such things I may be otherwise minded. The reason of this difference is evident to all.
Thus, in days of old, Constantine shut up Pagans’ temples, Euseb. de Vita Constant., lib. iv. cap. 23, 24; and demolished some of the most filthy of them, lib. iii. cap. 52. Theodosius utterly cast them to the ground, though not without some blows and bloodshed, Socrat. Eccles. Hist., lib. v. cap. 16. The command of God for the abolishing all monuments of idolatry, Deut. xii. 1–3, with the commendation of those kings of Judah who accordingly performed this duty, 2 Chron. xvii. 6, xxx. 14, are enough to confirm it, and to bottom this position:—
vi. It is the duty of the magistrate not to allow any public places for (in his judgment) false and abominable worship; as also, to demolish all outward appearances and demonstrations of such superstitious, idolatrous, and unacceptable service.
Let Papists, who are idolaters, and Socinians, who are anthropolatræ, plead for themselves.
(2.) Now, for persons there seems something more of difficulty; yet certain clear rules may be proposed concerning them also, to hold out when they and their proceedings come under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, and are obnoxious to the sword which he beareth. And they are these:—
[1.] Such persons as, having embraced any false principles and persuasion in or about things concerning God and his worship, do pursue the upholding or propagating of such principles in a disorderly manner, to the disturbance of civil society, are doubtless under his restraining power, to be acted and put forth in such ways as to other persons running out into the same or the like compass of disorder, upon other grounds, and from the instigation of other lusts. The pretence of disturbance and confusion, upon the bearing with differences in opinion about things commanded in religion, we before rejected, as a colour fitted chiefly for the wearing of persecution. But actual disturbances, indeed, must have actual restraints. For instance, if a man, being persuaded that the power of the magistrate is in Christian religion groundless, unwarrantable, unlawful, should thereupon stir up the people to the abolishing and removal of that power; such stirrings up, and such actings upon that instigation, are as opposite to the gospel of Christ (which opposeth no lawful regimen among the sons of men), so also prejudicial to human society; and therefore to be proceeded against by them who bear not the sword in vain. This case we know happened once in Germany, and may do so again in other places. If such as these suffer, it is “as murderers, or thieves, or evil-doers, or busy-bodies in other men’s matters;” which is a shameful thing, no way commendable or praiseworthy, 1 Pet. iv. 15.