Jonathan Edwards · 279 of 409

CHAPTER IV. Concerning Efficacious Grace · Part 2

And on the other hand, as to those that go farthest in their endeavours, still they fail, in numberless instances, of exercising this kind of sincerity, consisting in reality of will. For such are guilty of innumerable sins; and every man that commits sin, by so doing, instead of being sincerely willing to do his duty, sincerely wills the contrary. For so far as any actions of his are his sin, so far his will is in what he does. No action is imputed to us any further than it is voluntary, and involves the real disposition of the heart. The man, in this painful endeavour, fails continually of his duty, or (which is the same thing) of perfect obedience. And so far as he does so, he fails of sincerity of endeavour. No man is any further defective in his obedience, than as he is defective in sincerity; for there the defect lies, viz. in his will, and the disposition of his heart. If men were perfect in these, that would be the same thing as to be perfect in obedience, or complete in holiness. Nothing, either of omission or commission, is sin, any farther than it includes the real disposition and will; and therefore, no men are any farther sinful, than as they are sincere in sinning; and so far as they are sincere in sinning, so far they are deficient of sincerely endeavouring their duty. Now, therefore, where are the bounds to which men must come in order to be entitled to the promise? Some have a faint sincerity of endeavour, who none do suppose are entitled to the promise. And those that have most sincerity of endeavour, do greatly fail of that degree of sincerity that they ought to have, or fall short of that which God requires. And there are infinite degrees between these two classes. And if every degree of strength of endeavour is not sufficient, and yet some certain degree of it, greatly short of that which God requires, is sufficient, then let it be determined what that degree is.

Some have determined thus, that if men sincerely endeavour to do what they can, God has promised to help them to do more, &c. But this question remains to be resolved, whether the condition of the promise be, that he shall sincerely endeavour to do what he can, constantly, or only sometimes. For there is no man that sincerely endeavours to do his duty to the utmost constantly, with this sort of sincerity consisting in reality of will so to do. If he did, he would perfectly do his duty at all times. For, as was observed before, nothing else is required but the will; and men never fail of their duty, or commit sin, but when their real will is to sin.

But if the condition of the promise be sincerely doing what they can sometimes, then it should be declared how often, or how great a part of the time of man’s life, he must exercise this sincerity. It is manifest that men fail of their duty every day, yea continually; and therefore, that there is a continual defect of sincerity of endeavour in the practice of duty.

If it should be said that the condition of the promise of saving grace is, that, take one time with another, and one duty with another, the sincerity of their will should be chiefly in favour of their duty; or, in other words, that they should be sincere in endeavours to do more than half their duty, though they sincerely neglect the rest; I would inquire where they find such promises as these in the Bible? Besides, I think it can be demonstrated that there is not a man on earth, that ever comes up halfway to what the law of God requires of him; and consequently, that there is in all more want of sincerity, than any actual possession of it. But whether it be so or no, how does it appear, that if men are sincere in endeavours with respect to more than half their duty, God has promised them saving mercy and grace, though, through a defect of their sincerity, the rest be neglected?

But if we suppose the sincerity to which divine promises are made, implies a true freedom of the heart in religious endeavours and performances, consisting in love to God and holiness, inclining our hearts to our duty for its own sake, here is something determinate and precise; as a title to the benefit promised does not depend on any particular degree of sincerity to be found out by difficult and unsearchable rules of mathematical calculation, but on the nature of it; this sincerity being a thing of an entirely distinct nature and kind from any thing that is to be found in those men who have no interest in the promises. If men know they have this sincerity, they may know the promises are theirs, though they may be sensible they have very much of a contrary principle in their hearts, the operations of which are as real as of this. This is the only sincerity in religion that the Scripture makes any account of. According to the word of God, then, and then only, is there a sincere universal obedience, when persons love all God’s commands, and love all those things wherein holiness consists, and endeavour after obedience to every divine precept, from love and of free choice. Otherwise, in scripture account, there is nothing but sincere disobedience and rebellion, without any sincerity of the contrary. For their disobedience is of free choice, from sincere love to sin, and delight in wickedness. But their refraining from some sins, and performing some external duties, is without the least degree of free choice or sincere love.

If here it should be said, that men who have no piety of heart in a saving degree, yet may have some degree of love to virtue; and it should be insisted that mankind are born with a moral sense, which implies a natural approbation of and love to virtue; and therefore, men that have not the principle of love to God and virtue established to that degree as to be truly pious men, and entitled to heaven, yet may have such degrees of them as to engage them, with a degree of ingenuous sincerity and free inclination, to seek after farther degrees of virtue, and so with a sincerity above that which has been mentioned, viz. a real willingness to use endeavours from fear and self-interest. It may be replied, If this be allowed, it will not at all help the matter. For still the same question returns, viz. what degree of this sincerity is it that constitutes the precise condition of the promise? It is supposed that all mankind have this moral sense; but yet it is not supposed that all mankind are entitled to the promises of saving mercy. Therefore the promises depend, as above noticed, on the degree of sincerity, under the same difficulties, and with the same intricacies, and all the forementioned unfixedness and uncertainty. And other things concerning this sincerity, besides the degree of it, are undetermined, viz. how constant this degree of sincerity of endeavour must be; how long it must be continued; and how early it must be begun.

Thus, it appears that, on the supposition of God’s having made any promises of saving grace to the sincere endeavours of ungodly men, it will follow, that such promises are made to an undetermined condition.

But a supposed promise to an undetermined condition, is truly no promise at all. It is absurd to talk of positive determinate promises made to something not determined, or to a condition that is not fixed in the promise. If the condition be not decided, there is nothing decisive in the affair.

If the master of a family should give forth such a pre tended promise as this to his servants, “I promise, that if any of you will do something, though I tell you not what, that I will surely give him an inheritance among my children:” would this be truly any promise at all?

I proceed now to observe,

II. On the supposition, that the promises of saving grace are made to some other sincerity of endeavour, than that which implies truly pious sincerity, the sovereign grace and will of God must determine the existence of the condition of the promises; and so the whole must still depend on God’s determining grace; and that, of whatever kind this sincerity, short of truly pious and saving sincerity, is supposed to be; whether it consists only in a reality of will, arising from foreign motives, for a certain degree of endeavours or use of means; or whether it be a certain sincerity or reality of willingness to use endeavours, arising from a natural love of virtue. For all suppose the sincerity, to which the promises are made, to be that in which some are distinguished from others; none supposing that all mankind, without exception, have this sincerity which is the condition of the promises. Therefore, this sincerity must be a distinguishing attainment. And how is it that some attain to it, and not others? It must be in one of these two ways; cither by the sovereign gift of God’s will, or by their endeavours. To say the former, is to give up the point, and to own that the sovereign grace and will of God determines the existence of the condition of the promises. But if it be said, that this distinguishing sincerity of endeavour is obtained by men’s own endeavour, then I ask, what sort of endeavour is it attained by? Sincere endeavour, or insincere? None will be so absurd, as to say, that this great condition of saving promises is attained to by insincere endeavours. For what tendency, either natural or moral, can the exercise of insincerity have, to produce or attain to sincerity 1 But if it be said, that distinguishing sincerity of endeavour is attained to by distinguishing sincere endeavour, this is to run round in a ridiculous circle; and still the difficulty remains, and the question returns, how the distinguishing sincerity that first of all took place in the affair came to have existence, otherwise than by the determining grace of God?

And if it be said, that there is no need of supposing any such thing as any previous, habitual sincerity, or any such sincerity going before, as shall be an established principle, but that it is sufficient that the free will does sincerely determine itself to endeavour after holiness I answer, whether we suppose the sincerity that first entitles to the promises, to be a settled habit or established principle, or not, it does not in the least remove the difficulty, as long as it is something, in which some men are distinguished from others, that precedes the distinguishing endeavour which entitles to the promises, and is the source and spring of those endeavours. This first distinguishing sincerity, which is the spring of the whole affair, must have existence by some means or other; and it must proceed either from some previous sincere endeavour of the man’s own, which is a contradiction; or from God, which is the point required; or it must be the effect of chance, in other words, of nothing.

If we suppose that distinguishing sincerity of endeavour by which some men are interested in the promises of saving grace, and not others, to be some certain degree of love to virtue, or any thing else in the disposition or exercise of the heart; yet it must be owned, that all men either are alike by nature, as to love to virtue, or they are not. If they are not, but some have naturally a greater love to virtue than others, and this determines some, rather than others, to the requisite sincerity of endeavour after saving grace; then God determines the affair by his sovereign will; for he, and not men themselves, determines all distinguishing qualifications or advantages that men are born with. Or if there be no difference naturally, but one man is born with the same love to virtue as another; then, how do some men first attain to more of this love to virtue than others, and so possess that distinguishing sincerity of endeavour which consists in it 1 To say it arises from a previous, distinguishing sincerity of endeavour, attempt, desire, or will, is a contradiction. Therefore, it must proceed from the determining grace of God; which being allowed, the great point in dispute is allowed.

§ 15. Ephesians ii. 8. “By grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God.” Mr. Beach observes, ” this text does not mean that their faith is so God’s gift, as not to be of themselves, as is most evident to any who reads the original.” This is certainly a great mistake. What I suppose he means, is, that the relative that, being of the neuter gender, and the word Greek of the feminine, they do not agree together. But if he would translate the Greek relative that thing, viz. the thing last spoken of, all the difficulty vanishes. Vid. Bezn, in loc. Such Scriptures as these, 1 Cor. xv. 10. “Not I, but the grace of God that was with me;” Gal. ii. 20. “Not I, but Christ liveth in me;” prove efficacious grace. The virtuous actions of men that are rewardable, are not left to men’s indifference, without divine ordering and efficacy, so as to be possible to fail. They are often in the Scripture the matter of God’s promises. How often does God promise reformations! How often does God promise that great revival of religion in the latter days! Dr. Whitby seems to deny any physical influence at all of the Spirit of God, on the will; and allows an influence by moral suasion and moral causes only, p. 344. This is to deny that the Spirit of God does any thing at all, except inspiring the prophets, and giving the means of grace, will] God’s ordination of this in his providence. If God do any thing physically, what he does must be efficacious and irresistible. Such an assistance Dr. Whitby maintains, and, concerning it, says the following things p. 221, 222.

1st, “Then I say it must be granted, that in raising an idea in my brain by the Holy Spirit, and the impression made upon it there, the action is truly physical. 2d, That in those actions I am wholly passive; that is, I myself do nothing formally to produce those ideas; but the good Spirit, without my operation, doth produce them in me. 3d, That these operations must be irresistible in their production, because they are immediately produced in us without our knowledge of them, and without our will, and so without those faculties by which we are enabled to act.”

Though it should be allowed that God assists man with a physical assistance, and yet an obliged and promised assistance only; then God does not do, or effect, or give the thing assisted to, any more than if he operated and assisted men only according to the established laws of nature; and men may as properly be said to do it of themselves, and of their own power. The doing of the thing, is in the same manner in their power. The assistance by which God assists a drunkard that goes to the tavern, and there drinks excessively, or by which he assists an adulterer or pirate in their actions, is, that he upholds the laws of nature, the laws of the nature of the human soul, whereby it is able to perform such and such acts in such order and dependence; and the laws of the union of soul and body; and moves the body in such a slated manner in consequence of such acts of the soul, and upholds the laws of motion, and causes that there shall be such and such effects in corporeal things, and also of men’s minds in consequence of such motions. All the difference is, that the assistance which he grants in the duties of religion, is according to a newer establishment than the other, according to a method established a little later; and also, that the method of assistance, in the one case, is written and revealed by way of promise or covenant, and not in the other.

But if it be said, that though God has promised assistance, yet he has not promised the exact degree, as, notwithstanding his promise, he has left himself at liberty to assist some, much more than others, in consequence of the very same endeavour. I answer, that this will prove a giving up of their whole scheme, and will infallibly bring in the Calvinistical notion of sovereign and arbitrary grace; whereby some, with the very same sincerity of endeavour, with the same degree of endeavour, and the same use of means, nay, although all things are exactly equal in both cases, both as to their persons and behaviour; yet one has that success by sovereign grace and God’s arbitrary pleasure, that is denied another. If God has left himself no liberty of sovereign grace in giving success to man’s endeavours, but his consequent assistance be always tied to such endeavours precisely, then man’s success is just as much in his own power, and is in the same way the fruit of his own doings, as the effect and fulfilment of his endeavours to commit adultery or murder; and indeed much more. For his success in those endeavours is not tied to such endeavours, but may be providentially disappointed. Although particular motions follow such and such acts of will, in such a state of body, exactly according to certain laws of nature; yet a man’s success in such wickedness is not at all tied to his endeavours by any divine establishment, as the Arminians suppose success is to man’s endeavours after conversion.

For the Spirit of God, by assisting in the alleged manner, becomes not the efficient cause of those things, as the Scriptures do certainly represent him. If God be not the proper bestower, author, and efficient cause of virtue, then the greatest benefits flow not from him; are not owing to his goodness; nor have we him to thank for them.

“Christ upbraids the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, that they were worse than Sodom, &c. and the Jews of that generation, that they were worse than the men of Nineveh; and the Pharisees, that the publicans and harlots went into the kingdom of God before them. But why did he do this, if the only reason was, that the one was brought to repent by effectual grace, and the other not?” (See Whitby, p. 169, 170, 171.) I answer, the unbelief and impenitence of those cities, of that generation, and of those Pharisees, when, on the contrary, the publicans and Nineveh repented, and the men of Sodom would have repented, was an argument that they were worse, more perverse, and hard-hearted than they. Because, though repentance is owing to special, efficacious assistance, yet in his ordinary methods of proceeding with men, God is wont much more rarely to bestow it on those that are more perverse, hard-hearted, and rooted in evil, than others. So much the more as their hearts are hardened, so much the less likely are they to be brought to repentance. And though there be oftentimes exceptions of particular persons, yet it still holds good as a general rule; and especially with regard to societies, nations, cities, and ranks of men: so that Christ might well, from the fact that he mentions, draw an argument of the greater perverseness and stubbornness of those societies and ranks of men that he spoke of.

§ 16. A command and a manifestation of will are not the same thing. A command does not always imply a true desire that the thing commanded should be done. ‘So much at least is manifest by the instance of Abraham commanded to offer up Isaac. That command was not such an effect of the divine will, as the commands to believe and repent, Sec.

§ 17. Either the stronger the habitual inclination to good is, the more virtuous; and the stronger the disposition to evil, the more vicious; or, if it be otherwise, then indifference or want of inclination is essential to both virtue and vice.

§ 18. Dr. Whitby’s inconsistence appears in that one while, when he is disputing against the decree of election, he maintains that the epistles, where the apostle speaks to the elect, are not written to the converted only; because then it suits his turn that the persons addressed should not be converted. But afterwards, when disputing against efficacious grace, he maintains that where the apostle says, “God worketh in you both to will and to do,” &c. Philip. ii. 13. he speaks only to them that are converted, p. 228. Again, when it suits the Doctor’s turn, when writing about perseverance, then all whom the apostles write to are true saints. As particularly those the apostle Peter writes to, that had precious faith, p. 399. And the Galatians addressed in Paul’s epistle, p. 401, 402.

§ 19. When the psalmist prays, “Make me to go in the way of thy statutes; ” is it indeed meaning that God would give him the general grace which he gives to all, and which is sufficient for all if they will but improve it? And is this all?

§ 20. Arminians argue that God has obliged himself to bestow a holy and saving disposition, on certain conditions, and that what is given in regeneration, is given either for natural men’s asking, or for the diligent improvement of common grace; because, otherwise, it would not be our fault that we are without it, nor our virtue that we have it. But if this reasoning is just, the holy qualities obtained by the regenerate, are only the fruits of virtue, not virtues themselves. All the virtue lies in asking, and in the diligent improvement of common grace.

§ 21. Prov. xxi. 1. “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will.” This shows that the Arminian notion of liberty of will, is inconsistent with the scripture notion of God’s providence and government of the world. See also Jer. xxxi. 18. “Turn me, and I shall be turned.” Matt. vii. 18. “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.” Let us understand this how we will, it destroys the Arminian notion of liberty, and virtue, and vice. For, if it means only a great difficulty; then so much the less liberty, and therefore so much the less virtue or vice. And the preceding verse would be false, which says ” every tree bringeth forth good fruit,” &c. Rom. viii. 6, 7, 8, 9. “For to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace: because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But we are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his.” The design of the apostle in this place overthrows Arminian notions of liberty, virtue, and vice. It appears from Scripture, that God gives such assistance to virtue and virtuous acts, as to be properly a determining assistance, so as to determine the effect; which is inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty. The Scripture shows that God’s influence in the case is such, that he is the cause of the effect; he causes it to be: which shows that his influence determines the matter, whether it shall be or not. Otherwise innumerable expressions of Scripture are exceedingly improper, and altogether without a meaning.

§ 22. Dr. Whitby’s notion of the assistance of the Spirit is of the same sort with inspiration. Whereas that which I suppose is the true notion, is entirely different. Consequently their notion is much more enthusiastical, does much better agree with, and much more expose to, pernicious enthusiasm, than ours. Hence we find that the grossest enthusiasts, such as Quakers and others, are generally Arminians in the doctrine of free will, &c.

§ 23- Scripture expressions are every where contrary to the Arminian scheme, according to all use of language of the world in these days. But then they have their refuge here. They say, the ancient figures of speech are exceedingly diverse from ours; and that we in this distant age cannot judge at all of the true sense of expression used so long ago, but by a skill in antiquity, and being versed in ancient history, and critically skilled in the ancient languages; not considering that the Scriptures were written for us in these ages on whom the ends of the world are come; yea, were designed chiefly for the latter age of the world, in which they shall have their chief, and comparatively almost all their effect. They were written for God’s people in those ages, of whom at least ninety-nine in a hundred must be supposed incapable of such knowledge, by their circumstances and education; and nine hundred and ninety-nine in a thousand of God’s people, that hitherto have been saved by the Scriptures. It is easy, by certain methods of interpretation, to refine and criticise any book to a sense most foreign to the mind of the author.

§ 24. If God be truly unwilling that there should be any moral evil in the world, why does not he cause less moral evil to exist than really does? If it be answered, as is usual to such kind of objections, that though God is unwilling there should be moral evil, yet he will not infringe on man’s liberty, or destroy his moral agency to prevent it; then I ask, if this be all, why does God cause so much less to exist at some certain times; on the contrary, causes virtue gloriously to prevail? Other times are spoken of and promised, wherein it shall prevail yet vastly more. And this is spoken of as of God’s effecting, and is abundantly so spoken of and promised, as what God would do, and none should hinder, &c.

The Arminian principles, denying the efficacious, determining grace of God, as the cause of men’s virtue and piety, are wholly inconsistent with the promises and prophecies of the future flourishing of religion and virtue in the world, and never can be made consistent therewith. This flourishing of religion is spoken of as what God will effect; and is made the matter of his abundant promise; is spoken of as his glorious work, the work of his almighty power; what he will effect, and none shall hinder; what he will effect against all opposition, removing and overcoming the wickedness of men, &c.

§ 25. Dr. Stebbing says, page 104. ” So much grace as is necessary to lead us to that obedience which is indispensably required in order to salvation, God will give to every one, who humbly and devoutly prays to him for it; for this is the condition, and the only condition prescribed by our Saviour, Luke xi. 9-13. “And I say unto you, Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. If then ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children; how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him? where the promise of the Spirit is made.” Here humility and devotion are mentioned as the condition of that obedience which is indispensably required in order to salvation. By that obedience which is required in order to salvation must be meant, either, 1. That sort of virtue and obedience that is requisite, or, 2. Perseverance in it. If he means that sort of virtue which is requisite in order to salvation; then I would ask, what sort of humility and devotion is that, to which God has promised the grace which is necessary to their obtaining that virtue which is the condition of salvation? Must it not be real, sincere humility and devotion? Surely if God has promised so great a gift to any humility and devotion, it must be to that which is sincere and upright. Because that which is not sincere, is nothing; it is hypocritical; a mere show of that which is really wanting. And it would be very unreasonable to suppose that God promises such infinite rewards to hypocrisy, which he has often declared to be abominable to him, and which only provokes him the more. But if it be true, sincere, upright humility and devotion, it is unreasonable to suppose that God makes this the condition of that grace which is necessary to his obtaining that kind of virtue which is requisite to salvation. Because he, who has this humility and devotion, has that kind of virtue already. The Scripture every where speaks of uprightness and sincerity of heart, as that virtue that is saving. He that sincerely asks for grace to obey, has that sincerity and uprightness of heart that is exercised in sincere obedience; for he that sincerely asks this, is sincerely willing to obey, or sincerely desirous of obeying. Or, 2. If the Doctor, by that obedience that is indispensably required in order to salvation, means perseverance in sincere virtue, and this be promised to devoutly and sincerely asking it; then hereby must be meant, either devoutly and sincerely asking it once, or final perseverance in this sincere asking, or a certain limited continuance in that asking. If a final perseverance in asking be the condition of grace to lead us to persevere, saving virtue is, as said before, the condition of itself. For persevering sincerity is the condition of obtaining persevering sincerity. If it be only once asking, or asked a limited number of times, or a limited continuance in asking, this is contrary to the Arminian doctrine about perseverance. For it supposes a person in this life, on a past condition, to be already, before the end of the day of his probation, so confirmed in obedience that it is impossible for him to fall away.