John Owen · 69 of 73

Chapter XVII. A review of passages in scripture adduced to prove the apostasy of saints. · Part 3

And this is all our author offers as to the person spoken of in the place of Scripture under consideration; wherein, though he hath taken some pains, to little or no purpose, to take off the exposition of the words and the description of the person given by others, yet he hath not attempted to give so much as one argument to confirm the sense he would impose on us concerning the condition of the person spoken of; and I must crave leave to say, that naked assertions, be they never so many, in the chair or out, weigh not so much with me as one good argument, much less as many.

There is nothing remains for consideration hut only the comminatory part of the words, or the expression of the punishment allotted of God to such as walk in the ways of apostasy here expressed, “In his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die;” that is, “He shall be dealt withal as many of his nation were in the land of Israel My judgments shall overtake him. It shall not advantage him that either he had godly parents that have walked with me, or that he himself had so behaved himself in a way of righteousness, as before described. If he turn to the profaneness and abominations which are laid down as the ways of wicked men, or into any paths like them, he shall even die, or be punished for his sins;” according to the tenor of the truth laid down in the entrance of the chapter, and repeated again verse 20, “The soul that sinneth, it shall die.” But now, whereas it might be replied, “Such an one, notwithstanding his degeneracy, might yet perhaps recover himself to his former way of walking, obedience, and righteousness in conversation, and is there then no hope nor help for him, but having once so apostatized he must suffer for it?” to prevent any such misprision of the mind of God, there is added the term of his duration in that state of apostasy; that is, even unto death: “If he committeth iniquity, and dieth in it,” that is, repents not of it before his death, “the judgments of God shall find him out,” as was before expressed; “If by his repentance he prevent not his calamities, he shall end his sinning in destruction;” — in which expressions of the person’s continuance in his apostatized condition, and of the judgments of God falling on him on that account, there is not the least appearance of any tautology or incongruity in the sense. The same word is used to express diverse concernments of it, which is no tautology. Though the same word be used, yet the same thing is not intended. Tautology reflects on things, not words; otherwise there must be a tautology wherever there is an ἀντανάκλασις, as John i. 3. “To commit iniquity, and to die therein,” is no more but to continue in his iniquity impenitently until death. Now, to say that [this], “A man was put to death for his fault, because he committed it, and continued impenitent in it, even unto the death which he was adjudged to, and which was inflicted on him for his fault,” is an incoherent expression, it seems will puzzle as great a master of language as Mr Goodwin to make good.

Mr Goodwin endeavours to make the punishment threatened in the words, “He shall die for his iniquity,” precisely and exclusively to signify eternal death (which the former interpretation doth not exclude); which he is no way able to make good. What he offers, sect. 3, concerning the incongruity of the sense, and tautology of the expression of it, [if it] be not so understood, hath been already removed. The comparison ensuing, instituted between these words and those of 1 Cor. vi. 10, should have been enforced with some consideration of the coincidence of the scope of either place, with the expressions used in them. And though repentance (which is also added) will not deliver them from temporal or natural death, yet it may and will, as [it] did Ahab in part, from having that death inflicted in the way of an extraordinary judgment.

Sect. 4. Mr Goodwin offers sundry things, all of the same importance and tendency, all animated by the same fallacies or mistakes, to make good the sense he insists on, exclusively to all others, of these words, “He shall die;” and he tells you that “if the righteousness such a man hath done shall come into no account, if it shall not profit him as to his temporal deliverance, then it is impossible it should profit him as to his eternal salvation.” But, first, according to our interpretation of the words, there is no necessity incumbent on us to affirm that the person mentioned shall obtain salvation, though we say that eternal death is not precisely threatened in the words. But yet, that a man may not by the just hand of God, be punished with temporal death for his faults and iniquities (as Josiah fell by the sword), and yet have his righteousness reckoned to him as to his great recompense of reward, is a strain of doctrine that Mr Goodwin will scarce abide by. I dare not say that all who died in the wilderness of the children of Israel went to hell and came short of eternal life, and yet they all fell there because of their iniquities. But he adds, —

Sect. 4. “Again; that which God here threateneth against that double or twofold iniquity of backsliding is opposed to that life which is promised to repentance and perseverance in well-doing; but this life is confessed by all to be eternal life: therefore the death opposed to it must needs be eternal, or the second death. When the apostle saith, ‘The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord,” Rom. vi. 23, is it not evident from the antithesis, or opposition in the sentence between the death and life mentioned in it, that by that death which he affirms to be the wages of sin is meant eternal death? how else will the opposition stand?”

Ans. It is true, the life and death here mentioned, the one promised, verse 9, the other threatened in those insisted on, are opposed, and of what nature and kind the one is, of the same is the other to be esteemed. It is also confessed that the life promised in the covenant of mercy to repentance is eternal life, and the wages of sin mentioned in the law is eternal death; but that therefore that must be the sense of the words when they are made use of in answer to an objection expressed in a proverb concerning the land of Israel, and when it was temporal death that was complained of before in the proverb, “The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge” (they did not complain that they were damned for their fathers’ sins), that Mr Goodwin doth not attempt to prove; and I do not blame him for his silence therein. He says yet again, —

“When God in the Scriptures threatens impenitent persons with death for their sins, doubtless he intends and means eternal death, or that death which is the wages of sin; otherwise we have no sufficient ground to believe or think that men dying in their sins without repentance shall ‘suffer the vengeance of eternal fire,’ but only a temporal or natural death, which those who are righteous and truly eminent themselves suffer as well as they. Therefore, to say that God threatens impenitent apostates (in the place in hand) with a temporal death only, when, as elsewhere, he threatens impenitency under the lightest guilt of all with eternal death, is in effect to represent him as vehement and sore in his dissuasives from ordinary and lesser sins, and as indifferent and remiss in dissuading from sins of the greatest provocation.”

Ans. The sum of this reason is, “If the death there threatened to those men of our present contest be not death eternal, we have no sufficient ground to believe that God will inflict any death on impenitent apostates but only that which is temporal or natural, which others die as well as they.” And why so, I beseech you? Is there no other place of Scripture whence it may be evinced that eternal death is the wages of sin? or is every place thereof where death is threatened to sin so circumstantiated as this place is? is the threatening everywhere given out upon the like occasion, and to be accommodated to the like state of things? These discourses are exceedingly loose, sophistical, and inconclusive. Neither is a violent death counted natural, though it be the dissolution of nature.

Neither is there any thing more added by Mr Goodwin, in all his considerations of the words of this passage of the Scriptures, than what we have insisted on. That [argument] he nextly mentioneth, “That if God here threateneth impenitent sinners only with temporal death, then why should the most profligate sinners fear any other punishment?” is of [no?] more energy for the confirmation and building up of the sense which he imposeth on the words than that which went before. They with whom he hath to do will tell him that he doth all along most vainly assume and beg the thing in question, namely, that the persons intimated are absolutely impenitent sinners, and not so under some considerations only, — that is, that do never recover themselves from their degeneracy from close walking with God, — nor do the words indeed necessarily import any thing else. And for impenitent sinners in general (not those who are only so termed), there are testimonies sufficient in the Scriptures concerning God’s righteous judgment in their eternal condemnation.

And this is the first testimony produced by Mr Goodwin for the proof of the saints’ apostasy, — a witness which of all others he doth most rely upon, and which he bringeth in with the greatest acclamation of success (before the trial) imaginable. But when he hath brought him forth, he gives us no account in the least whence he comes, what is his business, or what he aims to confirm, nor can make good his speaking one word on his behalf! Indeed, as the matter is handled, I something question whether lightly a weaker argument hath been leaned on, in a case of so great importance, than that which from these words is drawn for the apostasy of the saints; for as we have not the least attempt made to give us an account of the context, scope, and intendment of the place (by which yet the expressions in the verses insisted on must be regulated), so no more can any one expression in it be made good to be of that sense and signification which yet alone will or can yield the least advantage to the cause for whose protection it is so earnestly called upon. Now, the leaders and captains of the forces Mr Goodwin hath mustered in this 12th chapter being thus discharged, the residue, or the followers thereof, will easily be prevailed with to return every one to his own place in peace.

The next place of Scripture produced to consideration, Mr Goodwin ushers in (sect. 11) with a description of the adversaries with whom in this contest he hath to do; and sets them off to public view with the desirable qualifications of “ignorance, ““prejudice,” and “partiality,” having, it seems, neither ingenuity enough candidly and fairly themselves to search into and to weigh the scriptures wherein the case in question is clearly determined, nor skill enough to understand and receive them when so dexterously opened to their hand by Mr Goodwin. What they are the Lord knoweth, will judge, determine, and in the appointed time declare; and it may be the day that shall manifest all things will vindicate them from these reproaches. In the meantime, such expressions as these lie in the middle between all parties at variance, exposed to the use of any one that is pleased to take them up. The place insisted on in the sequel of this preface is the parable of our Saviour, Matt. xviii. 32–35; the whole extent of the parable is from verse 21 to the end of the chapter. Hence Mr Goodwin thus inferreth, sect. 11:—

“Evident it is, from our Saviour’s reddition or application of the parable, ‘So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if,’ etc., speaking unto his disciples, verse 1, and to Peter more particularly, verse 21, that persons truly regenerate and justified before God (for such were they to whom in special manner he addressed the parable and the application of it, and indeed the whole carriage of the parable showeth that it was calculated and formed only for such) may, through high misdemeanours in sinning (as, for example, by unmercifulness, cruelty, oppression, etc.), turn themselves out of the justifying grace and favour of God, quench the Spirit of regeneration, and come to have their portion with hypocrites and unbelievers.”

Ans. 1. This is not the only occasion whereupon we have to deal with this parable. The Socinians wrest it also with violence to disprove the satisfaction of Christ, from the mention that is made in it of the free forgiveness of sins, and the Lord’s enjoining others to do what he did; — they, doubtless, being [ready] to forgive without satisfaction given or made as to any crimes committed against them! Mr Goodwin, with much less probability of drawing nigh to the intendment of our Saviour in this place, makes use of it, or rather abuses it, to countenance his doctrine of the apostasy of the saints. To both I say, parables have their bounds and limits, their lines and proportions, scope and peculiar intendment, beyond which they prove nothing at all. To wring the nose of a parable or similitude, to force it to an universal compliance, will bring forth blood. There is nothing so sottish, or foolish, or contradictious in and to itself, as may not be countenanced from teaching parables to be instructive and proving in every parcel or expression that attends them. The intendment of the parable here used, that whereas, from the proportion and answerableness of the comparates, it argueth, is neither that God forgives without satisfaction to his justice, being the judge of all the world, nor that believers may fall away by sins of unmercifulness and oppression, and so perish everlastingly; but that men, upon the account of mercy and forgiveness received from God in Christ, ought to extend mercy and kindness to their brethren, God threatening and revenging unmercifulness and oppression in and on whomsoever it is found. Whether it be ignorance in us or what it be, the Lord knows and will judge; but we are not able to stretch the lines of this parable one step towards what Mr Goodwin would lengthen them unto. That no persons whatever must or ought to expect the grace and pardoning mercy of God to them, who have no bowels of compassion towards their brethren, is clearly taught. In making the rest of the circumstances of the parable argumentative, we cannot join with our adversary, he himself in his so doing working merely for his own ends.

2. Finding his exposition of this parable liable and obnoxious to an exception, in that it renders God changeable in his dealings with men, and a knot to be cast on his doctrine which he is not able to untie, he ventures boldly to cut it in pieces, by affirming “that indeed God loves no man at all with any love but the approbation of the qualifications that are in him, and that he cannot be said to change in reference to that which is not in him at all.” This he sets out and illustrates variously with the dealings of men, and the laws that are made amongst them, rewarding what is good and punishing what is evil, etc., — words fully fitted, in his apprehension, to the clearing of God from any shadow of alteration in that course of proceeding which to him he ascribes, — and tells you, “The root of the mistake concerning the love of God” towards any man’s person lies in that “capital error of personal election,” or a purpose of God to give grace and glory to any one in Christ. Κακοῦ κόρακος κακίον ὠόν. That Mr Goodwin doth at all understand the love of God, if his apprehension of it be uniform to what he expresseth here in disputation, I must question. An eternal, unchangeable love of God to some in Christ is not now my task to demonstrate; it may, through the patience and goodness of God, find a place in my weak endeavours for the Lord ere long, when it will be a matter of delight to consider the scriptures and testimonies of antiquity that Mr Goodwin will produce for the eversion of such a personal election. For the present, I shall only take notice of the force of his judgment in the thing which, sect. 13, he here delivers: “All the love which God bears to men, or to any person of man, is either in respect of their nature and as they are men, in respect of which he bears a general or common love to them; or in respect of their qualifications as they are good men in one degree or other, in respect whereof he bears a more special love to them.” What that “common love” is in Mr Goodwin’s doctrine which God bears to “all men, as men,” we know full well; he also himself is not unacquainted how often it hath been demonstrated to be a vain and foolish figment (in the sense by him and his associates obtruded on us), derogatory to all the glorious properties of the nature of God, and inconsistent with any thing that of himself he hath revealed; the demonstration and farther eviction whereof waits its season, which I hope draweth on. The “special love” which he bears persons “in respect of their qualifications” is only his approbation of those qualifications, wherever they are, and in whomsoever. That these qualifications are, faith, love, repentance, gospel obedience, etc., is not called into question. I would fain know of Mr Goodwin on what account and consideration some men, and not all, are translated from the condition of being objects of God’s common love to become objects of his peculiar love, or from whence spring those qualifications which are the procurement of it, — whether they are from any love of God to them in whom they are. If not, on what account do men come to have faith, love, obedience, etc.? If they are from any love of God, whether it be from the common love of God to man, as men? and if so, why are not all men endowed with these qualifications? If from his peculiar love, how come they to be the effects and causes of the same thing? Or whether, indeed, this assertion be not destructive to the whole covenant of grace, and the effectual dispensations of it in the blood of Christ? And to his second testimony I shall add no more.

The third place insisted on is that of the apostle, 1 Cor. ix. 27. Hence he thus argueth:—

“If Paul, after his conversion unto Christ, was in a possibility of being or becoming a ‘reprobate’ or ‘castaway,’ then may true believers fall away both totally and finally (for finally ever includes totally); but the antecedent is true, — Paul after his conversion was in the possibility mentioned: ergo. The major proposition, I presume, will pass without control.”

Ans. That Mr Goodwin is not able to make good either of the propositions in this syllogism will evidently appear in the conclusion of our examination of what he draws forth, new and old, to that purpose. Of the major he gives you only this account, “It will pass, I presume, without control.” But by his favour, unless cleared from ambiguity of expressions and fallacy, it is not like to obtain so fair a passage as is presumed and fancied.

Though the term of “possibility” in the supposition, and “may” in the inference, seem to be equipollent, yet to render them of the same significancy as to the argument in hand, they must both be used in the same respect. But if a possibility of being a reprobate (that is, one rejected of God, by a metonymy of the effect) be ascribed to Paul in respect of himself and the infirmity of his own will as to abiding with God (in which case alone there is any appearance of truth in the assumption of this supposition), and the term of “may,” in respect of believers falling totally and finally away, respects the event and purpose, decrees or promise of God concerning it (in which sense alone it is any step to the purpose in hand), I deny the inference, and thereby at the very entrance give check and control to Mr Goodwin’s procedure. That which is possible to come to pass, that term “possible” affecting the end or coming to pass, must be every way and in all respects possible; this is the intendment of the inference. That which is possible in respect of some certain causes or principles (the terms of “possibility” affecting the thing itself whereof it is spoken in its next causes) may be impossible on another account; and in this sense only is there any colour of truth contained in the supposition. So that the major proposition of this syllogism is laid up and secured from doing any farther service in this case.

The minor is, “But Paul after his conversion was in a possibility of becoming a reprobate or castaway.”

Ans. He was not in respect of the event, upon the account of the purpose and promises of God of him and to him, made in Christ, though any such possibility may be affirmed of him in respect of himself and his own will, not confirmed in grace unto an impossibility of swerving. Now, this proposition he thus farther attempts syllogistically to confirm:—

“That which Paul was very solicitous and industrious to prevent, he was in a possibility of suffering or being made; but Paul was very solicitous and industrious to prevent his being made a castaway, as the scripture in hand plainly avoucheth, — he kept under his body and brought it into subjection, in order to prevent his becoming a castaway: ergo, he was in danger or possibility of being made a castaway. The reason of the consequence in the major proposition is, because no man of understanding will be solicitous to prevent or hinder the coming to pass of such a thing, the coming to pass whereof he knows to be impossible.”

Ans. Once more the major is questioned. Paul might and ought to labour, in the use of means, for the preventing of that which, in respect of himself, he might possibly run into, God having appointed those means to be used for the prevention of the end feared and avoided, although in respect of some other preventing cause it was impossible he should so do. He who complained that “in him, that is, in his flesh, dwelt no good,” that “he had a law in his members leading him captive to the law of sin, and sin working in him all manner of concupiscence,” for whose prevention from running out into a course of sinning God had appointed means to be used, might use those means for that end, notwithstanding that God had immutably purposed and faithfully promised that in the use of those means he should attain the end aimed at. And the reason Mr Goodwin gives for the confirmation of the consequence is no other but that which we have so often exploded, — namely, that a man need not, ought not to use means for attaining of any end, though appointed and instituted of God for that end and purpose, if so be the end for which they are ordained shall certainly and infallibly be compassed and accomplished by them. Our Saviour Christ thought meet to use the ordinary ways for the preservation of his life, notwithstanding the promise of keeping him by the angels; and Hezekiah neglected not the means of life, notwithstanding the infallible promise of living so long which he had received. Paul was careful, in the use of means, to prevent that which, in [respect of] himself, it was possible for him to run into, though he had, or might have had, assurance that, through the faithfulness and power of God, in the use of those means (as an antecedent of the consequent, though not the conditions of the event), he should be preserved certainly and infallibly from what he was in himself so apt unto. So that, whatever be the peculiar intendment of the apostle in this place, taking the term ἀδόκιμος in the largest sense possible, and in a significancy of the greatest compass, yet nothing will regularly be inferred thence to the least prejudice of the doctrine I have undertaken to maintain.

And this may suffice as to the utmost of what Mr Goodwin’s argument from this place doth reach unto. There is another, and that a more proper sense of the place, and accommodated to the context and scope of the apostle, wherewith the doctrine endeavoured to be confirmed from hence hath not the least pretence of communion; and this ariseth (as was before manifested) from the scope of the place, with the proper, native signification of the word ἀδόκιμος, here translated “a castaway.”

The business that the apostle hath in hand, from verse 15 of the chapter, and which he presses to the end, is a relation of his own principles, ways, and deportment, in the great work of the preaching of the gospel to him committed. In the last words of the chapter he acquaints us with one especial aim he had in the carrying on of that work, through the whole course of his employment therein; and it is, such care and endeavour after personal mortification, holiness, and self-denial, that he might no way be lifted up nor entangled with the revelations made to him; therein providing, in the midst of the great certainty and assurance which he had, verse 26, that he might approve himself “a workman not needing to be ashamed,” as not only preaching to others for their good, but himself also accepted of God in the discharge of that employment, as one that had dealt uprightly and faithfully therein. Verse 27, he acquaints us with what is the state and condition of them that preach the gospel: their work may go on, and yet themselves not be approved in the work. This he laboured to prevent, walking uprightly, faithfully, sincerely, zealously, humbly, in the discharge of his duty: Μήπως ἄλλοις κηρύξας, saith he, αὐτὸς ἀδόκιμος γνωμαι· — “Lest having preached to others, he should not himself be approved and accepted in that work,” and so lose the reward mentioned, verse 17, peculiar to them who walk in the discharge of their duty with a right foot, according to the mind of God. The whole context, design, and scope of the apostle, with the native signification of the word ἀδόκιμος, leading us evidently and directly to this interpretation, it is sufficiently clear that Mr Goodwin is like to find little shelter for his apostasy in this assertion of the apostle: and besides, whatever be the importance of the word, the apostle mentions not any thing but his conscientious, diligent use of the means for the attaining of an end, which end yet may fully be promised of God to be so brought about and accomplished.

Mr Goodwin tells us, indeed, “That the word ἀδόκιμος is in the writings of the apostle constantly translated “reprobate,” as Rom. i. 28, 2 Cor. xiii. 5–7, 2 Tim. iii. 8, Titus i. 16, or is expressed by a word equivalent, as Heb. vi. 8.” How rightly this is done, in his judgment, he tells us not; that it is so done serves his turn, and he hath no cause farther to trouble himself about it The truth is, in most of the places intimated, the word is so restrained, either from the causes of the thing expressed, as Rom. i. 28, or the conditions of the persons of whom it is affirmed, with some adjunct in the use of it, as 2 Tim. iii. 8, Titus i. 16, that it necessarily imports a disallowance or rejection of God as to the whole state and condition wherein they are of whom it is asserted, joined with a profligate disposition to farther abominations in themselves; but that in any place it imports what Mr Goodwin would wrest it here unto, “a man finally rejected of God,” — whatever may be the thought of others, he will not assert. And whatever the translation be, I would know of him whether, in any place where the word is used, he doth indeed understand it in any other sense than that which here he opposes: only with this difference, that in other places it regards the general condition and state of them concerning whom it is affirmed; here, only the condition of a man, restrained to the particular case of labouring in the ministry, which is under consideration. 2 Cor. xiii. 5–7, the word cannot be extended any farther than to signify a condition of men when they are not accepted nor approved; which is the sense of the word contended for: nor yet Heb. vi. 8, though it be attended with those several qualifications of nigh unto cursing, etc. The apostle, ascending by degrees in the description of the state of the unfruitful, barren land, says first it is ἀδόκιμος, or disallowed by the husbandman, as that which he hath spent his cost and labour about in vain; so that not only the original, first signification of the word (as is known) stands for the sense contended for, but it is also evidently restrained to that sense by the context, design, and scope of the place, with the intendment of the apostle therein, the word being the same that [is used] in all other places of the writings of the same apostle, unless where it is measured as to its extent and compass by some adjoined expression, which is interpretive of it as to the particular place, being still of the same signification.