Adolf Harnack · 3 of 19

1. From the Beginning of the Controversy to the Council of Nicæa · Part 1

1. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONTROVERSY TO THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA.

At the great Oriental Council which met at Antioch about the year 268, the Logos doctrine was definitely accepted, while the “Homoousios” on the other hand was rejected. The most learned man whom the East at that time possessed, Lucian (of Samosata) took up the work of the excommunicated metropolitan, Paul of Samosata. First educated at the school of Edessa, where since the days of Bardesanes a free and original spirit had prevailed, then a follower of Paul, he got from the latter his dislike to the theology of “the ancient teachers”, and with this he united the critical study of the Bible, a subject in which he became a master. He founded in Antioch an exegetical-theological school which, during the time of the three episcopates of Domnus, Timäus and Cyril, was not in communion with the Church there, but which afterwards, shortly before the martyrdom of Lucian, made its peace with the Church.

This school is the nursery of the Arian doctrine, and Lucian, its head, is the Arius before Arius. Lucian started from the Christology of Paul, but, following the tendency of the time, and perhaps also because he was convinced on exegetical grounds, he united it with the Logos Christology, and so created a fixed form of doctrine. It is probable that it was only gradually he allowed the Logos doctrine to have stronger influence on the Adoptian form. This explains why it was not till towards the end of his life that he was able to bridge over his differences with the Church. He was revered by his pupils both as the teacher par excellence, and in his character as ascetic; his martyrdom, which occurred in the year 311 or 312, increased his reputation. The remembrance of having sat at the feet of Lucian was a firm bond of union amongst his pupils. After the time of persecution they received influential ecclesiastical posts. There was no longer anything to recall the fact that their master had formerly been outside of the Church. These pupils as a body afterwards came into conflict more or less strongly with the Alexandrian theology. So far as we know, no single one of them was distinguished as a religious character; but they knew what they wanted; they were absolutely convinced of the truth of their school-doctrine, which had reason and Scripture on its side. This is what characterises the school. At a time when the Church doctrine was in the direst confusion, and was threatening to disappear, and when the union of tradition, Scripture, and philosophical speculation in the form of dogma had been already called for, but had not yet been accomplished, this school was conscious of possessing an established system of doctrine which at the same time permitted freedom. This was its strength.

The accounts of Lucian’s Christology which have been handed down are meagre enough, still they give us a sufficiently clear picture of his views. God is One; there is nothing equal to Him; for everything besides Him is created. He has created the Logos or Wisdom—who is to be distinguished from the inner divine Logos—out of the things that are not (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων), and sent him into the world. This Logos has taken a human body though not a human soul, and accordingly all the feelings and spiritual struggles of Christ are to be attributed to the Logos. Christ has made known the Father to us, and by being man and by his death has given us an example of patience. This exhausts his work, by means of which—for so we may complete the thought—he, constantly progressing, has entered into perfect glory. It is the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, but instead of man it is a created heavenly being who here becomes “Lord”. Lucian must have put all the emphasis on the “out of the things that are not” (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) and on the “progress” (προκοπή). The creaturehood of the Son, the denial of his co-eternity with the Father, and the unchangeableness of the Son achieved by constant progress and constancy, constitute the main articles in the doctrine of Lucian and his school. Just because of this he refuses to recognise in the Son the perfectly equal image of the ousia or substance of the Father (Philost. II. 15). There can be no doubt as to the philosophy to which Lucian adhered. He worked with the means supplied by the critical and dialectic philosophy of Aristotle, although indeed his conception of God was Platonic, and though his Logos doctrine had nothing in common with the teaching of Aristotle. His opponents have expressly informed us that his pupils turned to account the Aristotelian philosophy. If one recollects that in the third century the Theodotian-Adoptian Christology was founded by the help of what was supplied by Aristotelianism, and that the Theodotians were also given to the critical study of the Bible, the connection between Arianism and Adoptianism thus becomes clear. It is incorrect to trace the entire opposition between the Orthodox and the Arians to the opposition between Platonism and Aristotelianism, incorrect if for no other reason because a strong Platonic element is contained in what they possess in common—namely, the doctrine of God and of the Logos; but it is correct to say that the opposition cannot be understood if regard is not had to the different philosophical methods employed. In Lucian’s teaching Adoptianism is combined with the doctrine of the Logos as a creature (κτίσμα), and this form of doctrine is developed by the aid of the Aristotelian philosophy and based on the critical exegesis of the Bible. Aristotelian Rationalism dominated the school. The thought of an actual was put in the background. The Christian interest in monotheism is exhausted by the statement that the predicate “underived” attaches to one single being only. This interest in the “unbegotten begetter”, and also, what is closely connected with it, the ranging of all theological thoughts under the antithesis of first cause or God, and creation, are also Aristotelian. Theology here became a “Technology”, that is, a doctrine of the unbegotten and the begotten which was worked out in syllogisms and based on the sacred codex.

A pupil of Lucian named Arius, perhaps a Lybian by birth, became when already well up in years, first deacon in Alexandria, and afterwards presbyter in the church of Baukalis. The presbyters there at that period still possessed a more independent position than anywhere else. Owing, however, to the influence of the martyr bishop Peter (+ 311) a tendency had gained ascendency in the episcopate in Alexandria, which led to Christian doctrine being sharply marked off from the teachings of Greek philosophy (μαθήματα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας) the presence of which had been observed in Origen, and in general shewed itself in a distrust of “scientific” theology, while at the same time the thought of the distinction between the Logos and the Father was given a secondary place. Arius nevertheless fearlessly advanced the views he had learned from Lucian. The description we get of him is that of a man of grave appearance and a strict ascetic, but at the same time affable and of a prepossessing character, though vain. He was highly respected in the city; the ascetics and the virgins were specially attached to him. His activity had been recognised also by the new bishop Alexander who began his episcopate in 313. The outbreak of the controversy is wrapped in obscurity, owing to the fact that the accounts are mutually contradictory. According to the oldest testimony it was an opinion expressed by Arius when questioned by the bishop on a certain passage of Scripture, and to which he obstinately adhered, which really began the controversy, possibly in the year 318. Since the persecution had ceased, the Christological question was the dominant one in the Alexandrian Church. Arius was not the first to raise it. On the contrary he was able later on to remind the bishop how the latter had often both in the Church and in the Council of Presbyters (ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ συνεδρίῳ πλειστάκις) refuted the Valentinian Christology, according to which the Son is an emanation,—the Manichæan, according to which the Son is a consubstantial part of the Father (μέρος ὁμοούσιον τοῦ πατρός),—the Sabellian, according to which the Godhead involves the identity of the Son and Father (ὑιοπάτωρ),—that of Hieracas. according to which the Son is a torch lighted at the torch of the Father, that Son and Father are a bipartite light and so on,—and how he, Arius, had agreed with him. It was only after considerable hesitation and perhaps vacillation too, that Alexander resolved on the excommunication of Arius. It took place at a Synod held in 321 or 320 in presence of about one hundred Egyptian and Lybian bishops. Along with Arius some presbyters and deacons of Alexandria, as well as the Lybian bishops Theonas and Secundus, were deposed. This did not quieten Arius. He sought and forthwith found support amongst his old friends, and above all, got the help of Eusebius of Nicomedia. This student-friend had an old cause of quarrel with Alexander, and, contrary to ecclesiastical law, had been transferred to Nicomedia by Berytus, the most influential bishop at the court of the Empress, a sister of Constantine. Arius, driven out of Alexandria “as an atheist”, had written to him from Palestine. He was able to appeal to a number of eastern bishops, and above all, to Eusebius of Cæsarea; in fact he asserted that all the eastern bishops agreed with him and had on this account been put under the ban by Alexander (?). Eusebius of Nicomedia espoused the cause of Arius in the most energetic fashion in a large number of letters. Alexander on his part also looked about for allies. He wrote numerous letters to the bishops, two of which have been preserved—namely, the Encyclica, i.e., the official report of what had occurred, and the epistle to Alexander, Bishop of Constantinople. (?) In the latter letter, which is written in a very hostile tone, Alexander sought to check the powerful propaganda of Arianism. He appealed to the bishops of the whole of Egypt and the Thebaid and further to the Lybian, Pentapolitan, Syrian, Lycio-Pamphylian, Asiatic, Cappadocian, and other bishops. Arius betook himself to Nicomedia and from there addressed a conciliatory epistle to the Alexandrian bishop which we still possess. He also composed at that time his “Thalia,” of whose contents which were partly in prose and partly in verse, we cannot form any very correct idea from the few fragments handed down to us by Athanasius. His supporters thought a great deal of this. work while his opponents condemned it as profane, feeble, and affected. A Bithynian Synod under the leadership of Eusebius decided for Arius, and Eusebius of Cæsarea entered into communication with Alexander of Alexandria in the character of , in order to induce him to take a more favourable view of the doctrine of the excommunicated presbyter. It may have been, more than anything else, the political state of things which allowed Arius to find his way back once more to Alexandria. Under the patronage of some distinguishes bishops with whom he had entered into correspondence, but who were not able to bring about any amicable arrangement with Alexander, Arius resumed his work in the city. In the autumn of 323 Constantine, after his victory over Licinius, became sole ruler in the Roman Empire. The controversy had already begun to rage in all the coast-provinces of the East. Not only did the bishops contend with each other, but the common people too began to take sides, and the dispute was carried on in such a base manner that the Jews scoffed at the thing in the theatres, and turned the most sacred parts of the doctrine of the Church into ridicule. Constantine forthwith interfered. The very full letter which he sent to Alexander and Arius, in 323-24, is one of the most important monuments of his religious policy. The controversy is described as an idle wrangle over incomprehensible things, since the opponents are, he says, at one as regards the main point. But the letter had no effect, nor was the court-bishop, Hosius of Cordova, who brought it, and who as an Occidental appeared to be committed to neither side, able to effect a between the parties. In all probability, however, Hosius had already come to an understanding in Alexandria with Alexander, and the latter shortly after took a journey to Nicomedia, thoroughly completed the understanding, talked over some other bishops there, and so prepared the way for the decision of the Council of Nicæa. The Emperor was won over by Hosius after he perceived the fruitlessness of his union-policy. He now summoned a General Council to meet at Nicæa, apparently on the advice of Hosius, and the latter had the main share also in determining the choice of the formula proposed.

But before we take up the Council of Nicæa, we must get some idea of the doctrines of the contending parties.

We still know what were the Christological formulæ of Bishop Alexander which were attacked by Arius. They were the words: Ἀεὶ θέος, ἀεὶ υἱός, ἅμα πατήρ, ἅμα υἱός, συνυπάρχει ὁ υἱὸς ἀγεννήτως τῷ θεῷ, ἀειγενής, ἀγενητογενής, οὔτ᾽ ἐπινοία, οὔτ᾽ ἀτόμῳ τινὶ προάγει ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ὑιοῦ, ἀεὶ θεός, ἀὲι υἱός, εξ αὐτοῦ τοὺ θεοῦ ὁ υἱός; always God, always Son, at the same time Father, at the same time Son, the Son exists unbegotten with the Father, everlasting, uncreated, neither in conception nor in any smallest point does God excel the Son, always God, always Son, from God Himself the Son.

Alexander thus maintains the beginningless, eternal co-existence of Father and Son: the Father is never to be thought of without the Son who springs from the Father. It is not improbable that Alexander was led thus to give prominence to the one side of the Logos doctrine of Origen, owing to the influence of the theology of Irenæus or Melito. The doctrine which Arius opposed to this is above all dominated by the thought that God, the Only One, is alone eternal, and that besides Him there exists only what is created, and that this originates in His will, that accordingly the Son also is not eternal, but a creation of God out of the non-existent. From this thesis there necessarily follows the rejection of the predicate ὁμοούσιος for the Son. Arius and his friends already before the Council of Nicæa give expression to it, incidentally indeed, but without ambiguity.

The doctrine of Arius is as follows:

(a) God, the Only One, besides whom there is no other, is alone unbegotten, without beginning and eternal; He is inexpressible, incomprehensible, and has absolutely no equal. These are the notes which express His peculiar nature. He has created all things out of His free will, and there exists nothing beside Him which He has not created. The expression “to beget” is simply a synonym for “to create”. If it were not, the pure simplicity and spirituality of God’s nature would be destroyed. God can put forth nothing out of His own essence; nor can He communicate His essence to what is created, for this essence is essentially uncreated. He has accordingly not been Father always; for otherwise what is created would not be created, but eternal.

(b) Wisdom and Logos dwell within this God as the powers (not persons) which are coincident with His substance, and are by their very nature inseparable from it; there are besides many created powers.

(c) Before the world existed, God of His free will created an independent substance or hypostasis (οὐσία, ὑπόστασις) as the instrument by means of which all other creatures were to be created, since without it the creatures would not have been able to endure the contact of the Godhead. This Being is termed in Scripture Wisdom, also Son, Image, Word; this Wisdom, which, compared with the inner divine Wisdom, is called Wisdom only in a loose sense, has like all creatures been created out of nothing. It originates in God only in so far as it has been created by God; it is in no sense of the substance or essence of God. It has had a beginning; it accordingly did not always exist, there was a time in which it was not. That the Scriptures use the word “begotten” of this Substance does not imply that this is peculiar to it any more than is the predicate “Son”; for the other creatures are likewise described here and there as “begotten,” and men are called “sons of God”.

(d) As regards his Substance, the “Son” is consequently an unrelated and independent being totally separated from, and different from, the substance or nature of the Father. He has neither one and the same substance together with the Father, nor a nature and constitution similar to that of the Father. If he had, then there would be two Gods. On the contrary, like all rational creatures he has a free will and is capable of change. He might consequently have been good or bad; but he made up his mind to follow the good, and continued in the good without vacillation. Thus he has by means of his own will come to be unchangeable.

(e) Since the Son is, as regards his substance, unrelated to the Godhead, he is not truly God, and accordingly has not by nature the divine attributes; he is only the so-called Logos and Wisdom. As he is not eternal, neither is his knowledge in any sense perfect; he has no absolute knowledge of God, but only a relative knowledge, in fact he does not even know his own substance perfectly, accordingly he cannot claim equal honour with the Father.

(f) Still the Son is not a creature and a product like other creatures; he is the perfect creature, κτίσμα τέλειον; by him everything has been created; he stands in a special relation to God, but this is solely conditioned by and ; the bestowal of grace on the other hand, is based on the steadfast inclination of this free being to the good which was foreseen by God. Through God’s bestowal of grace and by his own steady progress he has become God, so that we may now call him “only-begotten God”, “strong God” and so on.

(g) All that Scripture and tradition assert in reference to the and the humanity of this being holds good; he truly took a human body (σῶμα ἄψυχον); the feelings shewn by the historical Christ teach us that the Logos to whom they attach—for Christ had not a human soul—is a being capable of suffering, not an absolutely perfect being, but one who attains by effort absolute perfection.

(h) Amongst the number of created powers (δυνάμεις) the is to be placed beside the Son as a second, independent Substance or Hypostasis, (οὐσία, ὑπόστασις); for the Christian believes in three separate and different substances or persons, (οὐσίαι, ὑποστάσεις); Father, Son and Spirit. Arius apparently, like his followers, considered the Spirit as a being created by the Son and subordinate to him.

Alexander expressly notes that the Arians appeal to Scripture in support of their doctrine, and Athanasius says that the Thalia contained passages of Scripture. The passages so frequently cited later on by the Arians; Deut. VI. 4, XXXII. 39; Prov. VIII. 22; Ps. XLV. 8; Mt. XII. 28; Mk. XIII. 32; Mt. XXVI. 41, XXVIII. 18; Lk. II. 52, XVIII. 19; John XI. 34, XIV. 28, XVII. 3; Acts II. 36; 1 Cor. I. 24, XV. 28; Col. I. 15; Philipp. II. 6 f.; Hebr. I. 4, III. 2; John XII. 27, XIII. 21; Mt. XXVI. 39, XXVII. 46, etc., will thus already have been used by Arius himself. Arius was not a systematiser, nor were his friends systematisers either. In this respect their literary activity was limited to letters in which they stirred each other up, and which were soon put together in a collected form. The only one amongst them before Eunomius and Aëtius who undertook to give a systematic defence of the doctrinal system, was the Sophist Asterius, called by Athanasius the advocate (συνήγορος) of the sects. He was a clever, clear-headed man, but he was quite unable to wipe out what was in everybody’s eyes the blot on his character, his denial of the Faith during the time of persecution. There were various shades of opinion amongst the followers and supporters of Arius. In Arianism in its more rigid form the tradition of Paul of Samosata and Lucian predominated, in its milder form the subordination doctrine of Origen. Both types were indeed at one as regards the form of doctrine, and the elements traceable to Origen won over all enlightened “Conservatives”. We may count Asterius too amongst. the latter, at all events the unbending Philostorgius was not at all pleased with him, and Asterius subsequently approached near to the Semiarians.

Previous to the Council of Nicæa, the letters of the bishop Alexander are, for us at all events, the sole literary manifestos of the opposite party. The Encyklica already shews that the writer is fully conscious he has got to do with a heresy of the very worst type. The earlier heresies all pale before it; no other heretic has approached so near to being Antichrist. Arius and his friends are the enemies of God, murderers of the divinity of Christ, people like Judas. Alexander did not enter into theoretical and theological explanations. After giving a brief but complete and excellent account of the Logos doctrine of Arius, he sets in contrast with the statements contained in it, numerous passages from the Gospel of John and other quotations from Scripture. The sole remarks of a positive kind he makes are that it belongs to the substance or essence of the Logos, that he perfectly knows the Father, and that the supposition of a time in which the Logos was not, makes the Father ἄλογος καὶ ἄσοφος. The latter remark, which for that matter of it does not touch Arius, shews that Alexander included the Logos or Son in the substance of the Father as a necessary element. The second epistle goes much more into details, but it shews at the same time how little Alexander, in solving the problem, was able definitely to oppose fixed and finished formulæ to those of the Arians. The main positions of Arius are once more pertinently characterised and refuted.

Alexander is conscious that he is contending for nothing less than the divinity of Christ, the universal Faith of the Church, when he refutes the statements that the Son is not eternal, that He was created out of the non-existent, that He is not by nature (φύσει) God, that He is capable of change, that He went through a moral development (προκοπή), that He is only Son by adoption, like the sons of God in general, and so on. He not only adduces proofs from the Bible in large numbers, he has unmistakably in his mind what is for him a central, religious thought. Christ must belong to God and not to the world, because all other creatures require such a being in order to attain to God and become the adopted sons of God. In order to make clear the possibility of such a being, Alexander uses by preference for the Son the expression which had been already preferred by Origen—“the perfect image,” “the perfect reflection.” But even this expression does not suffice him; it gains deeper meaning by the thought that the Son as the image of the Father at the same time first clearly expresses the peculiar character of the Father. In the Wisdom, the Logos, the Power, the “Son is made known and the Father is characterised. To say that the reflection of the divine glory does not exist is to do away also with the archetypal light of which it is the reflection; if there exists no impress or pattern of the substance of God, then he too is done away with who is wholly characterised by this pattern or express image:”—γνωρίζεται ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ χαρακτηρίζεται. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπαυγάσμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λέγειν συναναιρεῖ καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον φῶς, οὗ ἐστιν ἀπαύγασμα . . . τῷ μὴ εἶναι τὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ χαρακτῆρα συναναιρεῖται κᾳκεῖνος, ὁ πάντως παῤ αὐτοῦ χαρακτηριζόμενος. While in laying down this thesis and others of a similar kind, e.g., that the Son is the inner reason and power of the Father Himself, he approaches “Sabellianism,” the latter doctrine is repudiated in the most decided and emphatic way. But on the other hand again, not only is the supposition of two unbegottens (αγεν[ν]ητα) rejected as a calumny, but he repeatedly emphasises in a striking fashion the fact that the begetting of the Son is not excluded by the application to Him of the predicate always (ἀεὶ), that the Father alone is unbegotten, and that He is greater than the Son. Alexander thus asserts both things—namely, the inseparable unity of the substance of the Son with that of the Father and their difference, and yet the one is held to be unbegotten and the other to be not unbegotten. In order to be able to maintain these contradictory theses he takes up the standpoint of Irenæus, that the mystery of the existence and coming forth of the Son is an inexpressible one even for Evangelists and angels, and is no proper object of human reflection and human statement. Even John did not venture to make any pronouncement regarding the ἀνεκδιήγητος ὑπόστασις τοῦ μονογενοῦς Θεοῦ,—the ineffable substance of the only begotten God. “How could anyone waste his labour on the substance of the Logos of God, unless indeed he were afflicted with melancholy?” Πῶς ἄν περιεργάσαιτό τις τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου ὑπόστασιν, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ μελαγχολικῇ διαθέσει ληφθεὶ τυγχάνοι. Alexander’s actual standpoint is undoubtedly plainly expressed here. He does not wish to speculate; for the complete divinity of Christ is for him not a speculation at all, but a judgment of faith, and the distinction between Father and Son is for him something beyond doubt. But he sees that he is under the necessity of opposing certain formula to the doctrine of Arius. These are partly vague and partly contradictory: “The Son is the inner reason and power of God,” “Father and Son are two inseparable things” (δύο ἀχώριστα πράγματα), “Between Father and Son there is not the slightest difference” (διάστημα), “not even in any thought” (οὐδ᾽ ἄχρι τινὸς ἐννοίας), “There is only one unbegotten,” “The Son has come into being in consequence of a γένεσις καὶ ποίησις” (an act of generation and production), “The Son has, compared with the world, an ineffable substance peculiarly his own” (ἰδιότροπος ἀνεκδιήγητος ὑπόστασις), “He is μονογενὴς Θεὸς” (only begotten God), “His Sonship is by its nature in possession of the deity of the Father” (κατὰ φύσιν τυγχάνουσα τῆς πατρικὴς θεότητος), “Father and Son are two natures in the hypostasis” (τῃ ὑποστάσει δύο φύσεις), between the Underived and he who has come into being out of the non-existent there is a μεσιτεύουσα φύσις μονογενής (the Son) δι᾽ ἦς τὰ ὅλα ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος πατρὸς γεγέννηται,” (a mediating only begotten nature by which the Father of the God-Logos has made all things out of the non-existent, and which has been begotten out of the existent Father), “The Son has not proceeded out of the Father κατὰ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ὁμοιότητας, ταῖς τομαῖς ἤ ταῖς ἐκδιαιρέσεων ἀπορροίαις (in the manner in which bodies are formed, by separation or by the emanation of parts divided off);” still we may speak of a fatherly generation! (πατρικὴ θεογονία) which certainly is beyond the power of human reason to grasp.” “The expressions ἦν, ἀεὶ, etc., (was, always), used of the Son, are undoubtedly too weak, but on the other hand, they are not to be conceived so as to suggest that the Son is unbegotten (ἀγέννητος); the unbeginning genesis from the Father (ἄναρχος γέννησις παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς) is his,—“the Father is greater than the Son, to Him honour in the strict sense (οἰκεῖον ἀξίωμα) is due, to the Son the dignity that is fitting (τιμὴ ἁρμόζουσα).”

These confused thoughts and formulæ contrast unfavourably with the clear and definitely expressed statements of Arius. Alexander’s opponents had a better right to complain of the chameleon-like form of this teaching than he had of that of theirs. When they maintained that it offered no security against dualism (two unbegotten, [ἀγένητα]), or against Gnostic emanationism (προβολή, ἀπόρροια), or against Sabellianism (ὑιοπάτωρ), or against the idea of the corporeality of God, and that it contained flagrant contradictions, they were not far wrong. But they cannot have been in the dark as to what their opponents meant to assert, which was nothing else than the inseparable, essential unity of Father and Son, the complete divinity of Christ who has redeemed us and whom every creature must necessarily have as redeemer. Along with this they taught a real distinction between Father and Son, though they could assert this distinction only as a mystery, and when they were driven to describe it, had recourse to formulæ which were easily refuted.

We may at this point give an account of the doctrine of Athanasius; for although it was not till after the Nicene Council that he took part in the controversy as an author, still his point of view coincides essentially with that of Bishop Alexander. It underwent no development, and considered from the stand-point of technical theology it partly labours under the same difficulties as that of Alexander. Its significance does not lie in the nature of his scientific defence of the faith, but solely in the triumphant tenacity of the faith itself. His character and his life are accordingly the main thing. The works he composed, like all the theological formulae he uses, were wrung out of him. The entire Faith, everything in defence of which Athanasius staked his life, is described in the one sentence: God Himself has entered into humanity.