Samuel Clarke · 37 of 54

Proposition XIV. · Part 1

XIV. Proposition XIV. Fifthly, As this revelation, to the judgment of right and sober reason, appears of itself highly credible and probable, and abundantly recommends itself in its native simplicity, merely by its own intrinsic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most rational and considering men, who are desirous in all their actions to have satisfaction and comfort and good hope within themselves, from the conscience of what they do: So it is moreover positively and directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible signs and miracles which the author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine commission, by the exact completion both of the prophecies that went before concerning him, and of those that he himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after; and by the testimony of his followers, which in all its circumstances was the most credible, certain, and convincing evidence, that was ever given to any matter of fact in the world.

First, The Christian revelation is positively and directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible signs and miracles which the author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine commission.

Of the life and character of our Saviour, as an evidence of the truth of the Christian revelation. Besides the great excellency and reasonableness of the doctrine considered in itself, of which I have already treated, it is here of no small moment to observe, that the author of it (separate from all external proof of his divine commission) appeared in all his behaviour, words, and actions, to be neither an impostor nor an enthusiast. His life was innocent and spotless, spent entirely in serving the ends of holiness and charity, in doing good to the souls and bodies of men, in exhorting them to repentance, and inviting them to serve and glorify God. When his bitterest enemies accused him, in order to take away his life, they could not charge him with any appearance of vice or immorality. And so far was he from being guilty of what they did accuse him of, namely, of vain-glory and attempting to move sedition, that once, when the admiring people would by force have taken him and made him their king, he chose even to work a miracle to avoid that, which was the only thing that could be imagined to have been the design of an impostor. In like manner, whoever seriously considers the answers he gave to all questions whether moral or captious, his occasional discourses to his disciples, and more especially the wisdom and excellency of his sermon upon the mount, which is as it were the system and summary of his doctrine, manifestly surpassing all the moral instructions of the most celebrated philosophers that ever lived; cannot, without the extremest malice and obstinacy in the world, charge him with enthusiasm.

Of the miracles of Christ as the evidence of his divine commission. These considerations cannot but add great weight and authority to his doctrine, and make his own testimony concerning himself exceedingly credible. But the positive and direct proof of his divine commission are the miracles which he worked for that purpose; his healing the sick,—his giving sight to the blind,—his casting out devils,—his raising the dead,—the wonders that attended his crucifixion,—his own resurrection from the dead,—his appearance afterwards to his disciples,—and his ascension visibly into heaven.

These, and the rest of his stupendous miracles, were, to the disciples that saw them, sensible demonstrations of our Lord’s divine commission: And to those who have lived since that age, they are as certain demonstrations of the same truth, as the testimony of those first disciples, who were eye-witnesses of them, is certain and true.

To the disciples that saw them, these miracles were sensible and complete demonstrations of our Lord’s divine commission, because they were so great, and so many, and so public, and so evident, that it was absolutely impossible they should be the effect of any art of man, of any chance, or fallacy; and the doctrine they were brought to confirm was of so good and holy a tendency, that it was impossible he should be enabled to work them by the power and assistance of evil spirits; so that, consequently, they must of necessity have been performed, either immediately or mediately by God himself.

Of miracles in general. But here, because there have been many questions raised, and some perplexity introduced by the disputes and different opinions of learned men, concerning the power of working miracles, and concerning the extent of the evidence which miracles give to the truth of any doctrine, and because it hath been much controverted, whether true miracles can be worked by any less power than the immediate power of God; and whether, to complete the evidence of a miracle, the nature of the doctrine pretended to be proved thereby is requisite to be taken into the consideration or no; it may not perhaps be improper, upon this occasion, to endeavour to set this whole matter in its true light, as briefly and clearly as I can.

1st, That in respect of the power of God, all things are alike easy. then; In respect of the power of God, and in respect to the nature of the things themselves, absolutely speaking, all things that are possible at all, that is, which imply not a direct contradiction, are equally and alike easy to be done. The power of God extends equally to great things as to small, and to many as to few; and the one makes no more difficulty at all, or resistance to his will, than the other.

That therefore miracles ought not to be defined by any absolute difficulty in the nature of the things themselves to be done. It is not therefore a right distinction to define or distinguish a miracle by any absolute difficulty in the nature of the thing itself to be done; as if the things we call natural were absolutely and in their own nature easier to be effected, than those that we look upon as miraculous; on the contrary, it is evident and undeniable, that it is at least as great an act of power to cause the sun or a planet to move at all, as to cause it to stand still at any time: Yet this latter we call a miracle; the former not. And to restore the dead to life, which is an instance of an extraordinary miracle, is in itself plainly altogether as easy as to dispose matter at first into such order as to form a human body in that which we commonly call a natural way. So that, absolutely speaking, in this strict and philosophical sense, either nothing is miraculous, namely, if we have respect to the power of God; or, if we regard our own power and understanding, then almost every thing, as well what we call natural, as what we call supernatural, is in this sense really miraculous; and it is only usualness or unusualness that makes the distinction.

2. What degrees of power God may have communicated to created beings is not possible for us to determine. What degrees of power God may reasonably be supposed to have communicated to created beings, to subordinate intelligences, to good or evil angels, is by no means possible for us to determine. Some things absolutely impossible for men to effect, it is evident may easily be within the natural powers of angels; and some things beyond the power of inferior angels may as easily be supposed to be within the natural power of others that are superior to them; and so on. So that, (unless we knew the limit of communicable and incommunicable power) we can hardly affirm, with any certainty, that any particular effect, how great or miraculous soever it may seem to us, is beyond the power of all created beings in the universe to have produced.

That therefore a miracle is not rightly defined to be such an effect as could not have been produced by any less power than the divine omnipotence. It is not therefore a right distinction to define a miracle (as some very learned and very pious men have done,) to be such an effect as could not have been produced by any less power than the divine omnipotence. There is no instance of any miracle in scripture, which, to an ordinary spectator, would necessarily imply the immediate operation of original, absolute, and underived power: And consequently such a spectator could never be certain that the miraculous effect was beyond the power of all created beings in the universe to produce. There is one supposition, indeed, upon which the opinion of all miracles being necessarily the immediate effects of the divine omnipotence, may be defended; and that is, if God, together with the natural powers wherewith he hath indued all subordinate intelligent beings, has likewise given a law, or restraint, whereby they be hindered from ever interposing in this lower world, to produce any of those effects which we call miraculous or supernatural: But then, how certain soever it is, that all created beings are under some particular laws and restraints, yet it can never be proved that they are under such restraints universally, perpetually, and without exception: And, without this, a spectator that sees a miracle can never be certain that it was not done by some created intelligence. Reducing the natural power of created beings to as low a degree as any one can desire to suppose, will help nothing in this matter; for, supposing (which is very unreasonable to suppose) that the natural powers of the highest angels were no greater than the natural powers of men, yet, since thereby an angel would be enabled to do all that invisibly, which a man can do visibly, he would even in this supposition be naturally able to do numberless things which we should esteem the greatest of miracles.

3. All things that are done in the world, are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being capable of no laws or powers. And consequently there is, properly speaking, no such thing as the course or power of nature. All things that are done in the world are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent beings; matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence, excepting only this one negative power, that every part of it will, of itself, always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is; so that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the effects of God’s acting upon matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligent beings: (Which observation, by the way, furnishes us, as has been before noted, with an excellent natural demonstration of Providence.) Consequently, there is no such thing as what men commonly call the course of nature, or the power of nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or manner of acting being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, is as easy to be altered at any time as to be preserved. And if (as seems most probable,) this continual acting upon matter be performed by the subserviency of created intelligences appointed to that purpose by the supreme Creator, then it is as easy for any of them, and as much within their natural power, (by the permission of God,) to alter the course of nature at any time, or in any respect, as to preserve or continue it.

That therefore a miracle is not rightly defined to be that which is against the course of nature or above the natural powers of created agents. It is not therefore a right distinction to define a miracle to be that which is against the course of nature, meaning, by the course of nature, the power of nature or the natural powers of created agents; for, in this sense, it is no more against the course of nature for an angel to keep a man from sinking in the water, than for a man to hold a stone from falling in the air by overpowering the law of gravitation; and yet the one is a miracle, the other not so. In like manner, it is no more above the natural power of a created intelligence to stop the motion of the sun or of a planet, than to continue to carry it on in its usual course; and yet the former is a miracle, the latter not so: But, if by the course of nature, be meant only (as it truly signifies) the constant and uniform manner of God’s acting, either immediately or mediately, in preserving and continuing the order of the world, then, in that sense, indeed, a miracle may be rightly defined to be an effect produced contrary to the usual course or order of nature, by the unusual interposition of some intelligent being superior to men, as I shall have occasion presently to observe more particularly.

The unreasonableness of those who deny the possibility of miracles in general. And from this observation we may easily discover the vanity and unreasonableness of that obstinate prejudice which modern deists have universally taken up against the belief of miracles in general: They see that things generally go on in a constant and regular method; that the frame and order of the world is preserved by things being disposed and managed in an uniform manner; that certain causes produce certain effects in a continued succession according to certain fixed laws or rules; and from hence they conclude, very weakly and unphilosophically, that there are in matter certain necessary laws or powers, the result of which is that which they call the course of nature, which they think is impossible to be changed or altered, and consequently, that there can be no such thing as miracles: Whereas, on the contrary, if they would consider things duly, they could not but see that dull and lifeless matter is utterly incapable of obeying any laws, or of being indued with any powers; and that, therefore, that order and disposition of things, which they vulgarly call the course of nature, cannot possibly be any thing else but the arbitrary will and pleasure of God exerting itself and acting upon matter continually, either immediately by itself, or mediately by some subordinate intelligent agents, according to certain rules of uniformity and proportion, fixed indeed, and constant, but which yet are made such merely by arbitrary constitution, not by any sort of necessity in the things themselves, as has been abundantly proved in my former discourse: And, consequently, it cannot be denied, but that it is altogether as easy to alter the course of nature as to preserve it; that is, that miracles, excepting only that they are more unusual, are in themselves, and in the nature and reason of the thing, as credible in all respects, and as easy to be believed, as any of those we call natural effects.

4. Some effects prove the constant providence of God, and others prove the occasional interposition either of God himself, or of some intelligent being superior to man. Those effects which are produced in the world regularly and constantly, which we call the works of nature, prove to us, in general, the being, the power, and the other attributes of God. Those effects, which upon any rare and extraordinary occasion, are produced in such manner that it is manifest they could neither have been done by any power or art of man, nor by what we call chance, that is, by any composition or result of those laws which are God’s constant and uniform actings upon matter, these undeniably prove to us the immediate and occasional interposition either of God himself, or at least of some intelligent agent superior to men, at that particular time, and on that particular account. For instance, the regular and continued effects of the power of gravitation, and of the laws of motion; of the mechanic, and of the animal powers; all these prove to us, in general, the being, the power, the presence, and the constant operation, either immediate or mediate, of God in the world. But if, upon any particular occasion, we should see a stone suspended in the air, or a man walking upon the water, without any visible support, a chronical disease cured by a word speaking, or a dead and corrupted body restored to life in a moment; we could not then doubt but there was an extraordinary interposition either of God himself, in order to signify his pleasure upon that particular occasion, or at least of some intelligent agent far superior to man, in order to bring about some particular design.

5. Whether such interposition be the immediate work of God, or of some good or evil angels, can hardly be discovered merely by the work itself. Whether such an extraordinary interposition of some power superior to men be the immediate interposition of God himself, or of some good angel, or of some evil angel, can hardly be distinguished certainly, merely by the work or miracle itself; because it is impossible for us to know, with any certainty, either that the natural power of good angels, or of evil ones, extends not beyond such or such a certain limit, or that God always restrains them from exercising their natural powers in producing such or such particular effects.

That there is no reason to suppose all the wonders worked by evil spirits to be mere delusions. It is not therefore a right distinction, to suppose the wonders which the scripture attributes to evil spirits, to be mere præstigiæ, sleights, or delusions. For if the devil has any natural power of doing any thing at all, even but so much as the meanest of men, and be not restrained by God from exercising that natural power, it is evident he will be able, by reason of his invisibility, to work true and real miracles. Neither is it a right distinction to suppose the miracles of evil spirits not to be real effects in the things where they appear, but impositions upon the senses of the spectators; for, to impose in this manner upon the senses of men, (not by sleights and delusions, but by really so affecting the organs of sense as to make things appear what they are not;) is to all intents and purposes a true a miracle, and as great an one, as making real changes in the things themselves.

6. How we are to distinguish miracles worked by God, for the proof of any doctrine, from the frauds of evil spirits. When therefore, upon any particular occasion, for instance, when at the will of a person who teaches some new doctrine as coming from God, and in testimony to the truth of that doctrine, there is plainly and manifestly an interposition of some superior power producing such miraculous effects as have been before mentioned; the only possible ways by which a spectator may certainly and infallibly distinguish whether those miracles be indeed the works, either immediately of God himself, or (which is the very same thing,) of some good angel employed by him, and, consequently, the doctrine witnessed by the miracles be infallibly true and divinely attested; or whether, on the contrary, the miracles be the works of evil spirits, and consequently the doctrine a fraud and imposition upon men: The only possible ways (I say) of distinguishing this matter certainly and infallibly, are these:—If the doctrine attested by miracles be in itself impious, or manifestly tending to promote vice, then, without all question, the miracles, how great soever they may appear to us, are neither worked by God himself, nor by his commission; because our natural knowledge of the attributes of God, and of the necessary difference between good and evil, is greatly of more force to prove any such doctrine to be false than any miracles in the world can be to prove it true: As, for example, suppose a man, pretending to be a prophet, should work any miracle, or give any sign or wonder whatsoever, in order to draw men from the worship of the true God, and tempt them to idolatry, and to the practice of such vices as in all heathen nations have usually attended the worship of false Gods, nothing can be more infallibly certain, than that such miracles ought at first sight to be rejected as diabolical. If the Deut. xiii. 1, &c. doctrine attested by miracles be in itself indifferent, that is, such as cannot by the light of nature and right reason alone, be certainly known whether it be true or false; and, at the same time, in opposition to it, and in proof of the direct contrary doctrine, there be worked other miracles, more and greater than the former, or at least attended with such circumstances as evidently show the power by which these latter are worked to be superior to the power that worked the former; then that doctrine which is attested by the superior power must necessarily be believed to be divine: This was the case of Moses and the Egyptian magicians. The magicians worked several miracles to prove that Moses was an impostor, and not sent of God; Moses, to prove his divine commission, worked miracles more and greater than theirs, or else (which is the very same thing,) the power by which he worked his miracles restrained the power by which they worked theirs, from being able at that time to work all the same miracles that he did; and so appeared evidently the superior power: Wherefore, it was necessarily to be believed that Moses’s commission was truly from God. If, in the last place, the doctrine attested by miracles be such as, in its own nature and consequences, tends to promote the honour and glory of God and the practice of universal righteousness amongst men, and yet, nevertheless, be not in itself demonstrable, nor could, without revelation, have been discovered to be actually true, (or even if it was but only indifferent in itself, and such as could not be proved to be any way contrary to or inconsistent with these great ends,) and there be no pretence of more or greater miracles on the opposite side to contradict it; (which is the case of the doctrine and miracles of Christ;) then the miracles are unquestionably divine, and the doctrine must, without all controversy, be acknowledged as an immediate and infallible revelation from God: Matt. xii. 25. Because, (besides that it cannot be supposed that evil spirits would overthrow their own power and kingdom,) should God, in such cases as these, permit evil spirits to work miracles to impose upon men, the error would be absolutely invincible; and that would, in all respects, be the very same thing as if God worked the miracles to deceive men himself. No man can doubt but evil spirits, if they have any natural powers at all, have power to destroy men’s bodies and lives, and to bring upon men innumerable other calamities; which yet, in fact, it is evident God restrains them from doing, by having set them laws and bounds which they cannot pass. Now, for the very same reason, it is infinitely certain that God restrains them likewise from imposing upon men’s minds and understandings, in all such cases where wise, and honest, and virtuous men would have no possible way left by which they could discover the imposition.

The difference between those who teach that the immediate power of God is, or is not, necessarily requisite to the working of a miracle, is not very great at bottom. And here at last the difference between those who believe that all miracles necessarily require the immediate power of God himself to effect them, and those who believe created spirits able to work miracles, is not very great. They who believe all miracles to be effected only by the immediate power of God, must do it upon this ground, that they suppose God, by a perpetual law, restrains all subordinate intelligent agents from interposing at any time to alter the regular course of things in this lower world; (for, to say that created spirits have not otherwise a natural power, when unrestrained, to do what we call miracles, is saying that those invisible agents have no power naturally to do any thing at all.) And they who believe that subordinate beings have power to work miracles must yet of necessity suppose that God restrains them in all such cases at least where there would not be sufficient marks left, by which the frauds of evil spirits could be clearly distinguished from the testimony and commission of God.

And now, from these few clear and undeniablo propositions, it evidently follows;—

1st. The true definition of a miracle: That the true definition of a miracle, in the theological sense of the word, is this—that it is a work effected in a manner unusual or different from the common and regular method of providence, by the interposition either of God himself, or of some intelligent agent superior to man, for the proof or evidence of some particular doctrine, or in attestation to the authority of some particular person. And if a miracle so worked be not opposed by some plainly superior power; nor be brought to attest a doctrine either contradictory in itself, or vicious in its consequences, (a doctrine of which kind no miracles in the world can be sufficient to prove;) then the doctrine so attested must necessarily be looked upon as divine, and the worker of the miracle entertained as having infallibly a commission from God.

2. The strength of the evidence of our Saviour’s miracles. From hence it appears, that the complete demonstration of our Saviour’s being a teacher sent from God, was, to the disciples who saw his miracles, plainly this: That the doctrine he taught, being in itself possible, and in its consequences tending to promote the honour of God and true righteousness among men; and the miracles he worked being such that there neither was nor could be any pretence of more or greater miracles to be set up in opposition to them,—it was as infallibly certain that he had truly a divine commission as it was certain that God would not himself impose upon men a necessary and invincible error.

3. Concerning the objection, that we prove in a circle the miracles by the doctrine, and the doctrine by the miracles. From hence it appears, how little reason there is to object, as some have done, that we prove in a circle the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine. For the miracles, in this way of reasoning, are not at all proved by the doctrine; but only the possibility and the good tendency, or at least the indifferency of the doctrine, is a necessary condition or circumstance, without which the doctrine is not capable of being proved by any miracles. It is indeed the miracles only that prove the doctrine, and not the doctrine that proves the miracles; but then, in order to this end, that the miracles may prove the doctrine, it is always necessarily to be first supposed that the doctrine be such as is in its nature capable of being proved by miracles. The doctrine must be in itself possible and capable to be proved, and then miracles will prove it to be actually and certainly true. The doctrine is not first known, or supposed to be true, and then the miracles proved by it; but the doctrine must be first known to be such as is possible to be true, and then miracles will prove that it actually is so. Some doctrines are, in their own nature, necessarily and demonstrably true, such as are all those which concern the obligation of plain moral precepts; and these neither need nor can receive any stronger proof from miracles than what they have already (though not perhaps so clearly indeed to all capacities,) from the evidence of right reason. Other doctrines are in their own nature necessarily false and impossible to be true; such as are all absurdities and contradictions, and all doctrines that tend to promote vice; and these can never receive any degree of proof from all the miracles in the world. Lastly, other doctrines are in their own nature indifferent, or possible, or perhaps probable to be true; and these could not have been known to be positively true, but by the evidence of miracles, which prove them to be certain. To apply this to the doctrine and miracles of Christ. The moral part of our Saviour’s doctrine would have appeared infallibly true, whether he had ever worked any miracles or no. The rest of his doctrine was what evidently tended to promote the honour of God, and the practice of righteousness amongst men: Therefore that part also of his doctrine was possible and very probable to be true; but yet it could not from thence be known to be certainly true, nor ought to have been received as a revelation from God, unless it had been proved by undeniable miracles. And the miracles he worked did indeed undeniably prove it to be the doctrine of God. Nevertheless, had his doctrine in any part of it been either absurd and contradictory in itself, or vicious in its tendency and consequences, no miracles could then possibly have proved it to have been true. It is evident therefore that the nature of the doctrine to be proved must be taken into the consideration, as a necessary circumstance; and yet that only the miracles are properly the proof of the doctrine, and not the doctrine of the miracles.